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In 1975 Louisiana became the fiftieth state to enact the Uniform
Commercial Code, but unlike its sister states, Louisiana omitted
several UCC articles. As of 1983, UCC articles 2, 6, and 9 remain
unadopted in Louisiana, and only article 6 remains under serious con-
sideration for adoption by the Louisiana State Law Institute. For the
present, articles 2 and 9 appear to be dead-letters in Louisiana, the
apparent reason for inaction being a perception that the two articles
are incompatible with Louisiana's underlying Civil Code principles.'
By not enacting article 2 of the UCC, Louisiana remains, with Califor-
nia, a jurisdiction without section 2-3022- not the most important sec-
tion in the UCC, perhaps, but by far the most interesting one.
The UCC section 2-302 comment advises that the section is, in
essence, a grant of power to the courts to "police" contracts within
the UCC's ambit and, in the court's discretion, to refuse to enforce
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ion article by Professor Hersbergen, Contracts of Adhesion under the Louisiana Civil
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1. See Charlton, Louisiana's Civil Law Renaissance; A Bar to Adoption of the
U.C.C.?, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 10-12 (1980); Mashaw, A Sketch of the Consequences for
Louisiana Law of the Adoption of "Article 2: Sales" of the Uniform Commercial Code,
42 TUL. L. REV. 740 (1968); Sachse, Report to the Louisiana Law Institute On Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 TUL. L. REV. 505 (1967).
2. S 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
(1978 Official Text).
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any clause or group of clauses found to be unconscionable3 or, indeed,
to refuse to enforce the'contract as a whole. The comment suggests
that section 2-302 now permits courts in UCC states to do directly
what in the past often was done by indirection, that is, the comment
suggests that courts historically have policed unfair contracts and
clauses by adverse construction of the contract language, by manipula-
tion of the rules of offer and acceptance, or by resort to the always-
available ideas of "public" policy. But, it may be wondered, what con-
tracts require such policing in the first place and why did the most
advanced society in the world, by a "vote" of forty-eight to two, decide
very nearly at the time of its bicentennial that such "above-the-board"
judicial policing was necessary? The answer to both inquiries is found
in common law jurisprudence.
Historically, the common law courts have assumed that, as a mat-
ter of inherent equitable power, the enforcement of unfair contracts
or clauses could be refused if the contract or clause was so onerous,
oppressive, or one-sided that a reasonable person, not suffering a delu-
sion, would not have freely given his consent to it.' In earlier and
3. Common law courts have not hesitated to apply the principle of unconsciona-
bility to cases beyond the ambit of S 2-302, recognizing that the adoption of UCC
S 2-302 is an expression of legislative will on a matter having public policy implica-
tions that go beyond the scope of the UCC. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co.,
257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227
N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843
(1967). Courts also have held that bailments come under UCC article 2's ambit of "trans-
actions in goods," Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 9 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979),
as do leases of goods, see, e.g., Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537,
278 A.2d 154 (1971); Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enter.,
Inc., 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977); Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d
198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). Still other decisions have applied the principle of § 2-302
by analogy to checking account agreements, David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Civ. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 59 Misc.
2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. Term. 1969), to an enrollment agreement for a "com-
puter programmer" course, Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 2d 739,
324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct. 1971), to a contract for the hiring of a party room, Lazan
v. Huntington Town House, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 1017, 332 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Dist. Ct. 1969),
and to an apartment lease, Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338
N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566
(App. Term 1973). As an aid to the analysis of the unenforceability of unfair contracts
under the Civil Code of Louisiana, sellers, lenders, lessors, and contractors of work,
labor, and services will be referred to collectively as "suppliers," while buyers, bor-
rowers, lessees, and those who contract for the performance of work, labor, and ser-
vices will be referred to as "consumers," unless the context otherwise requires.
4. The idea that a contract "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other" should not be enforced typically is traced to Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
2 Ves. Sec. 125, 156, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750). The idea germinated in certain deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court; see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
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simpler times, perhaps such one-sided contracts or clauses were not
common, but neither was the mass production and merchandising of
goods and services. With mass merchandising inevitably comes mass
contracting and the standardization of transactions -and the resulting
decline of negotiation and bargaining as the manner of forming con-
tracts. Given the volume of transactions involved- commercial and
noncommercial -standardized contracting is perhaps the only orderly
method by which goods and services can be distributed in the United
States today.' Unavoidably, the terms of standard-form contracts are
dictated by the distributors of goods and services, and terms unfairly
advantageous to the distributor are the predictable result. A legal
system in which goods and services are distributed upon the premise
of caveat emptor perhaps can dispense justice only upon a case-by-
case resort to "adverse construction of language," "manipulation of
the rules of offer and acceptance," or by determinations that certain
clauses or contracts are contrary to public policy.'
For the forty-eight states which enacted section 2-302, unconscio-
nability is now the judicial device of choice by which the fairness
of standard form contracts of adhesion is judged and adjusted. The
policy of section 2-302 was eloquently stated by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson:7
Courts and legislatures have grown increasingly sensitive to
imposition, conscious or otherwise, on members of the public by
persons with whom they deal, who through experience, specializa-
tion, licensure, economic strength or position, or membership in
associations created for their mutual benefit and education, have
acquired such expertise or monopolistic or practical control in the
business transaction involved as to give them an undue advan-
tage. Grossly unfair contractual obligations resulting from the use
of such expertise or control by the one possessing it, which result
in assumption by the other contracting party of a burden which
is at odds with the common understanding of the ordinary and
untrained member of the public, are considered unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable. ... The perimeter of public policy is an
ever increasing one. Although courts continue to recognize that
315 U.S. 289, 305 (1942); Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889); Scott v.
United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870). Of course, pre-UCC decisions exemplify-
ing use of the principle may be found in many states. See, e.g., Morrill v. Amoskeag
Say. Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 365, 9 A.2d 519, 525 (1939); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468,
243 P.2d 446 (1952).
5. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 485, 504 (1967).
6. UCC S 2-302, comment 1 (1978 draft).
7. 50 N.J. 528, 553-54, 236 A.2d 843, 856-57 (1967) (citations omitted).
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persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom
to contract, there is an increasing willingness to invalidate un-
conscionable contractual provisions which clearly tend to injure
the public in some way.
Because the notion of caveat emptor presupposes a parity of bargain-
ing power8 between contractants which does not exist in the modern
marketplace, there can be no realistic presumption in the courts that
ostensibly one-sided contractual terms were consented to. Instead, the
principle of unconscionability permits, but does not compel, the
presumption that a disparity of bargaining power has resulted in con-
tractual terms that were not consented to. Unconscionability is simply
a defect of consent, that is, the absence of a free and deliberate exer-
cise of the will.
In the absence of a common law tradition, it should follow that
the rule of caveat emptor has not stood as an antiquated barrier to
the dispensation of justice in civil obligations matters in Louisiana
courts. Yet, the terms of standardized contracts can be just as one-
sided in Louisiana as in any other state. Neither section 2-302 nor
any notion of inherent common law judicial power can be brought to
bear on the unfair contract in Louisiana. The purpose of this article
is to analyze the approach of the Louisiana Civil Code and the Loui-
siana courts to those contracts or clauses that elsewhere in the United
States could be referred to as "unconscionable." 9 The Louisiana Civil
Code, as interpreted and applied by the courts, will be the focal point,
but to facilitate what inevitably must be an exercise in comparative
law, Civil Code principles will be applied to the facts of selected un-
conscionability cases in an effort to determine whether Louisiana
citizens, particularly consumers, would benefit by the adoption in Loui-
siana of section 2-302.
8. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 140, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390,
393 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 293, 298 N.Y.S.2d
570, 574 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
9. The term "unconscionability" has surfaced many times in Louisiana
jurisprudence, but the principle has never been linked to the Civil Code of Louisiana
or recognized as a legitimate judicial power. See Roberson v. Maris, 266 So. 2d 488
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); J.H. Jenkins Contractor, Inc. v. City of Denham Springs, 216
So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); McKelvy v. Milford, 37 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1948); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Fell, 2 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941);
see also Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511, 50 So. 2d 15 (1950); Succession of Gilmore, 157
La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924); Lazarus v. McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 8 So. 253 (1890); Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Dennis
Miller Pest Controls, Inc. v. Wells, 320 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Johnson
v. Heller, 33 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948); Fleming v. Sierra, 14 Orl. App. 168
(1917). Louisiana does apply the principle of unconscionability in consumer credit trans-
actions coming within the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law. See LA. R.S. 9:3551 (Supp.
1972); Community Acceptance Corp. v. Kinchen, 417 So. 2d 22 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
1318 [Vol. 43
UNCONSCIONABILITY
If one combines with the UCC section 2-302 jurisprudence0 the
cases said by the comments to section 2-302 to have results
"illustrative" of the underlying basis of section 2-302, the cases
similarly cited by the comment to Uniform Consumer Credit Code
section 5.108 as illustrative of prior application of the doctrine of un-
conscionability in a consumer setting, and the cases which adopt the
principle of section 2-302 in cases beyond the scope of that section,"
an aggregate is created of some sixty-five cases refusing to enforce
contracts or clauses. It will be demonstrated that in the clear majority
of these "unconscionability cases," the result yielded by application
of section 2-302 or of its principle would be, and would have been,
the same if decided under the Civil Code of Louisiana.
The unconscionability cases, as a general matter, fall into three
categories: (1) about twenty of the cases in which unconscionability
was found involved an attempt by a supplier to disclaim or modify
an implied warranty or other implied obligation; (2) about fifteen cases
involved terms providing for forfeitures, penalties, and stipulated
damages; and (3) another fifteen or so cases involved the enforceability
of contracts entered into by a relatively sophisticated supplier and
a consumer hampered by a serious disadvantage, such as language
difficulties, ignorance, illiteracy, or a peculiar susceptibility to sup-
plier "overreaching." The remaining cases can be categorized only
under a "miscellaneous" heading.
Not all of the unconscionability cases contain a clear holding
that the contract or a clause therein is unconscionable; in several
cases, unconscionability is offered as an alternative ground for nonen-
forcement. In virtually all the cases, however, a standard form con-
tract, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, is expressly or implicitly
involved. None of the cases give a clear indication that any serious
bargaining as to terms took place."
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF "UNCONSCIONABLE" CLAUSES AND
CONTRACTS UNDER THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
Stipulations Considered Noncontractual in Nature
The Civil Code of Louisiana offers certain general principles and
provisions as to the formation of contracts that are germane to the
issue of enforceability of conventional obligations. A contract in Loui-
10. The "section 2-302 jurisprudence" includes, for purposes herein, some UCC
S 2-719 cases concerning unconscionable limitation of remedies. See UCC S 2-719,
commeht.
11. See note 3, supra.
12. See Appendix Table 1.
13. See Appendix Table 2.
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siana is an agreement by which one person obligates himself to another
to give, to do, or to permit something or not to do something,
expressed or implied by such agreement. 4 No contract is valid or com-
plete, however, without the consent of both parties." In a bilateral
or reciprocal contract,'" consent, being the concurrence of intention
in the parties with regard to a matter understood by them and
resulting from a free and deliberate exercise of the will" of both par-
ties, is not to be presumed, but must be expressed 8 in some manner
that causes it to be understood as such by both parties. 9 Something
must be proposed by one party and agreed to by the other." But,
"[n]ot always are contracts formed through a process of negotiation
and bargaining, [for] necessities of modern life have gradually
developed a kind of contract one of the parties to which is not free
to bargain."2' Standard-form contracts containing unbargained-for terms
govern virtually all contractual relationships today. Because the sup-
plier dictates the terms of such standard-form contracts, they likely
are advantageous to him and often are unfairly so.
A Washington decision, Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., recently
applied the concept of unconscionability to the unbargained-for terms
of a receipt-like document. A consumer, having contracted for the per-
formance of services for the purpose of splicing some twenty-two reels
of developed home movies, was given a receipt on which appeared
the following language: "We assume no responsibility beyond retail
cost of film unless otherwise agreed in writing." There was, of course,
no such written agreement "otherwise," and no discussion of the
exclusionary language on the receipt had occurred. The consumer
denied having read the words. The exclusionary language was found
to be unenforceable because it was unconscionable; hence the drug
company was subjected to liability for loss of the films.
A virtually identical issue arose in Louisiana less than a year after
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1761. Article 1762 cautions:
The contract must not be confounded with the instrument in writing by which
it is witnessed. The contract may subsist, although the written act may, for some
defect, be declared void; and the written act may be good and authentic, although
the contract it witnesses be illegal. The contract itself is only void for some cause
or defect determined by law.
15. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1766, 1779.
16. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 1765.
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1819.
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1766.
19. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1797. Assent to a contract can be implied. See LA. CiV.
CODE arts. 1811, 1818.
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1798.
21. 1 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS S 194 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 346
(1969) [hereinafter cited as LITVINOFF].
22. 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979).
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the Mieske decision. In Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Products, Inc.,23
the consumer contracted with a photograph processor for the develop-
ing of films taken on vacation. The receipt given to the consumer
included an exclusionary clause similar to' that in Mieske, limiting to
replacement the processor's liability for lost film. But, Louisiana
jurisprudence has long held that unless such language in a receipt
or receipt-like document is explained or brought to the consumer's
attention, the consumer is entitled to treat the slip of paper as nothing
more than what it appears to be-a receipt-so that the consumer
is not bound by the purported limitation of liability.24
In Louisiana, the small, receipt-like but term-laden piece of paper
generated in everyday transactions does not necessarily constitute a
contract document at all. Louisiana courts have so held for many years.
The rationale of this approach is clear: Not one in a thousand con-
sumers receiving such a piece of paper is aware of the contents of
the language printed thereon; to permit such to constitute a part of
the bargain struck would allow the supplier to limit most, if not all,
of the duties and obligations it owed to the consumer, without either
the knowledge or consent of the latter-a result inconsistent with
the nature of consent in the Civil Code.2" While the same legal princi-
ple is involved, the outcome is likely to be different if the customer
is a knowledgeable or commercially sophisticated party.26 Likewise,
the Mieske language probably would not have been found to be un-
conscionable had the customer been a commercially sophisticated party
23. 379 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
24. Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945) (admission
ticket to movie theatre, containing language reserving "right" of theatre management
to refuse admission); Roppolo v. Pick, 4 So. 2d 839 (La. App. Orl. 1941) (rent receipt
releasing lessor from liability); Marine Ins. Co. v. Rehm, 177 So. 79 (La. App. Orl.
1937); see also S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand & Gravel v. Checkmate Ready Mix Con-
crete, Inc., 390 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (language on an invoice regarding
interest and attorney's fees); Clofort v. Matmoor, Inc., 370 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979) (rent receipt stipulating that tenant was responsible for defects in the
premises); Wilda, Inc. v. Devall Diesel, Inc., 343 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977)
("not responsible for downtime" clause on an invoice not binding on a corporation con-
tracting for repair services on a marine engine); Lawes v. New Orleans Transfer Co.,
11 La. App. 170, 123 So. 144 (1929) (clause on receipt issued by a common carrier
did not bind customer); cf. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Neidhardt, 381 So. 2d 979
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (discussing the liability of an automobile interior cleaning ser-
vices contractor).
25. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1766, 1819; LITVINOFF, supra, note 21, S 195 at 351;
see generally Note, Automobiles-Parking Lots-Letting of Services for Hire-Effectiveness
of Limitation of Liability Printed on Claim Check, 12 TUL. L. REV. 458 (1938).
26. See Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979);
Southern States Equip. Co. v. Jack Legett, Co. 379 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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accustomed to the trade usage of exclusionary clauses," perhaps even
using such clauses in dealings with its own customers. Bowes
represents what is meant by the Civil Code requirement that con-
sent must be freely and deliberately given as to a matter understood
by both parties."
Consent Produced by Error
To become a party to a valid and, therefore, enforceable contract
in Louisiana, the contract must be "legally entered into,"' which under
the Civil Code means that the parties' consent must be "legally
given.""0 As consent is the concurrence of intention in both parties
concerning a matter understood by both and resulting in each party
from a free and deliberate exercise of the will, it is not "legally given"
where it has been produced by error3 -ignorance of that which really
exists or a mistaken belief in the existence of that which has no
existence.2 Not every error invalidates the consent of a contracting
27. The existence of a trade usage with respect to exclusionary clauses was proved
in Mieske, but only as among film processors, not as between commercial film pro-
cessors and their retail customers. 92 Wash. 2d at 49, 593 P.2d at 1313. See
UCC 5 1-205(2) (1978); LA. R.S. 10:1-205(a) (Supp. 1974). Still, it seems that a
sophisticated commercial customer would be held more likely to know of such trade
usage than a relatively unsophisticated and unsuspecting consumer. See Deutschmann
v. Standard Fur Co., 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Leithman v. Dolphin
Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 259 La. 1055, 254
So. 2d 464 (1971); Lawes v. New Orleans Transfer Co., 11 La. App. 170, 123 So. 144 (1929).
28. In David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1080, 287 N.Y.S.2d
503 (Civ. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App.
Term. 1969), an unconscionability decision similar to Mieske, the court refused to en-
force a waiver of jury trial clause in a bank's checking account "signature card." The
court's own remarks demonstrate the applicability of Louisiana Civil Code principles
as applied in Bowes:
[T]here is nothing to show that [the consumer] was at all aware of the terms
of the "contract" which he signed or that he intended to sign a "contract" at
all. Neither [of the two signature cards signed] called attention to the fact that
its purpose was to create duties and obligations between the parties, enforceable
in a court of law. . . .[The card] failed to give the slightest indication that the
bank considered his signature an element in the formation of a contract of any
kind. For all that ... [the] depositor knew he was executing a form generally required
by banks to be signed by a depositor ...so that the bank would have on file
a specimen of his signature for use in handling his account.
55 Misc. 2d at 1083, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 506. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Term, reversed the decision, however, finding no unconscionability. David v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co., 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S.2d 847 (App. Term. 1969).
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1779. The parties, of course, must have legal capacity to
contract, and the purpose of the contract must be certain and lawful. Id.
31. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1819-1822.
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1821 (error of fact).
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party in Louisiana. First, the error must be as to the principal cause
or motive for the contract, that consideration without which the con-
tract would not have been made;3  second, the principal motive must
have been known to be such by the other party or, from the nature
of the transaction, he must be presumed to have known it to be such.'
Such principal motives need not be expressed or stipulated, but may
be apparent. 5 The Civil Code also provides that consent is invalidated
where there is error as to the nature of the contract, ' error as to
the substance or some substantial quality of the thing that is the sub-
ject of the contract, 7 or error as to any quality of the thing that was
the principal motive for the contract. 8
The common law likewise regards error or mistake as a defect
of consent, and given a mutual mistake as to a material fact or a
unilateral mistake known by the other party or such knowledge
chargeable to him, the equitable powers of the common law courts
cQuld be invoked for a rescission or reformation of the contract.39 In
deference to the statement of section 2-302's comment that, in the
past, the policing of unconscionable contracts or clauses was
accomplished by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or
by determination that the offensive clause was contrary to the domi-
nant purpose of the contract, one may conclude that common law prin-
ciples of mistake were inadequate tools with which to achieve just
results in contract disputes. In any event, there exists an impressive
body of case law in Louisiana demonstrative of Civil Code flexibility
in the area of consent produced by error.
Error will invalidate a contract in Louisiana only when the error
is as to a principal cause for making the contract, which may be either
as to the motive for the contract, the person with whom it is made,
or the subject matter of the contract itself." Error in the motive and
error as to the subject matter of the contract are treated differently
in the Civil Code: "No error in the motive can invalidate a contract,
unless the other party was apprised that it was the principal cause
of the agreement, or unless from the nature of the transaction it must
be presumed that he knew it";" but "if the object ...be supposed
33. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1823-1825.
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1826. See Delta School of Business, Baton Rouge, Inc. v.
Shropshire, 399 So: 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
35. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1827-1829.
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1841.
37. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1842-1844.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1845.
39. A recent expression of the mistake rule is found in Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower
& Co. v. Keene, 28 Wash. App. 499, 624 P.2d 742 (1981).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1823.
41. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1826 (emphasis added).
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by one or both the parties to be an ingot of silver, and it really is
a mass of some other metal that resembles silver, there is an error
bearing on the substance of the object. 4 2 A number of cases illustrate
the flexibility of the Civil Code in regard to error. 3
A business person in Louisiana, as an expert in his trade (relative
to the layman-consumer, at any rate), must be diligent to spot any
potential misunderstandings and make such disclosures as will avoid
the same. In Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Co.," for example, the
consumer's known motive in the contract was for the fabrication of
a fur coat made with "continuous," not "pieced together," furs. The
furrier did not reveal to the consumer that in his trade, a "V-type"
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1843 (emphasis added).
43. In Jones v. DeLoach, 317 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), a homeowner
offered her home for sale under terms which included payments of $295 per month.
Plaintiff's offer, accepted by the homeowner, included payments of $225 per month.
Neither party realized that such an amount was insufficient to cover interest and prin-
cipal. One might presume that there was no error as to the substance of the contract
and assume that in any such case the respective principal motives of seller and buyer
are the price and acquisition of the thing. The court, however, found an error in consent:
In this day and time when most sales of residences are made with maximum
financing, either by the seller or by a lending institution, the terms of the financ-
ing are often the primary consideration of the transaction. The buyer often is
more concerned with the amount of the monthly payment than with the total
amount of the price of the property or the total amount of the loan.
Id. at 243. The consumer in Pollard v. Ingram, 308 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975),
contracted for a three-week European tour, believing that the travel would be primarily
by air-an important consideration for him because he suffered from a chronic heart
disorder. In fact, the tour included some 2,400 miles of travel by bus. The consumer,
as a result, could tolerate no more than seven days of the tour before being forced
to return home due to ill health, The tour contractor had not misrepresented the travel
arrangements, had not known of the consumer's motivation (the source of the error
apparently was another party booked on the tour), and understandably sued for the
full contract price of the tour. The contractor was not successful, the court ruling
that the mode of travel is as important to a traveler as where he is going. Pollard
v. Ingram is perhaps a better example of an error as to the substance of the contract,
LA. CIv. CODE art. 1843, than of an error in principal motive, because it is difficult
to understand how the tour contractor could have known that predominant air travel
was the principal motive; less difficult to understand is how the substance of the tour
contract turned out to be of a "totally different nature" from that which the consumer
intended within the meaning of LA. CIv. CODE art. 1843.
It can be presumed in some cases "from the nature of the transaction," LA. CIv.
CODE art. 1826, that a particular motive is the principal cause of the agreement. An
example is seen in Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
Both General Motors and its dealer concealed all indications that would have sug-
gested to prospective buyers that certain Oldsmobiles were equipped with engines
manufactured by the Chevrolet division of General Motors. Concealment before the
fact gave rise to the presumption that the dealer and General Motors knew "from
the nature of the transaction" that the consumer's principal motive was to obtain an
Oldsmobile equipped with an Oldsmobile engine.
44. 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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seam was an acceptable method of joining fur pieces and was not con-
sidered as "piecing together." But, the furrier had not made the con-
sumer aware of that trade usage; his failure to do so was held to
have caused an error of fact as to the consumer's principal motive,
invalidating her consent. "It was his responsibility to communicate
to [the consumer] information which . . . would have avoided the
confusion."45
Three of the unconscionability cases arguably would have been
decided favorably to the consumer in Louisiana on the basis of con-
sent produced by error. One such case, Andrews Brothers v. Singer
& Co.,4" is a UCC section 2-302, comment 1 "illustrative results" case.
The contract in Andrews called for the seller to deliver to the buyer
a new "Singer" automobile; what the seller delivered was an
automobile which, while not previously sold, had been driven some
550 miles by another prospective purchaser. Seller took the position
that the thing delivered was not "defective" and that, even if it was,
the company had excluded all implied warranties. In Louisiana, the
issue of the obligation of the seller respecting defects and waiver of
responsibility therefor would not have been reached in Andrews,
because the consent of the buyer would have been considered as
having been produced by error."' The seller in Andrews knew from
the nature of the transaction, within the meaning of Civil Code article
1826, that the buyer's principal motive was a new automobile;" most
45. Id. at 221.
46. [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (C.A. 1933).
47. See Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So.,2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (Oldsmobile
equipped with a Chevrolet engine); Ouachita Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Pierce, 270 So.
2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972) (homeowner ordered a "York" air conditioning unit;
seller installed an "Amana" unit); Atlantic-Gulf Supply Corp. v. McDonald, 175 So. 2d
6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) (purchase of a 7 1/2-ton air conditioning unit represented
to be a 10-ton unit); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208 (La. App. Orl. 1955) (thing
not "new" and "unused" as represented); Violette v. Capital City Auto Co., 4 La. App.
465 (1st Cir. 1926) (auto represented to have a 1923 engine had a 1921 engine); cf.
Carpenter v. Skinner, 224 La. 848, 71 So. 2d 133 (1954) (purchase of a house represented
to be in a "white" neighborhood); Beyer v. Estopinal, 224 La. 516, 70 So. 2d 109 (1954)
(1942 model automobile represented as a 1946 model); Gates v. Dykes, 338 So. 2d 1190
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (truck equipped with a 283 cubic inch engine instead of a 350
cubic inch engine as represented); Dieball v. Bill Hanna Ford Co., 287 So. 2d 595 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1973) (purchase of pickup truck to be suitable for carrying a camper of
specified dimensions); Campo Appliance Co. v. Hurst, 256 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971) (1967 model TV represented to be a 1969 model).
48. The agreement between Andrews Brothers and the Singer Company appointed
Andrews Brothers as Singer's sole dealer in a named area "for the sale of new Singer
cars." Additionally, the express warranty addressed "new vehicles manufactured by
us." Nothing in the case suggests that Singer dealt in second-hand vehicles.
Another UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" case, Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor
Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922), appears to have involved an error in prin-
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probably, the seller knew in fact of such motive. It even can be
assumed that the seller believed in good faith that a previously un-
sold car could be considered a "new car.""9
A factual background similar to Andrews is presented in a more
recent unconscionability case, Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.,50 in
which a warranty disclaimer clause was held invalid. By use of a
brochure and by tests on a prototype, the buyer was led to believe
that he was to receive the "first production model" of a portable
sawmill, capable of full-time commercial operation. What the buyer
received, without his knowledge or consent, was a second prototype
not capable of full-time commercial usage, in short, an entirely dif-
ferent machine. The validity of the disclaimer clause would not be
an issue reached by a court in Louisiana, in that the consent of the
buyer in Butcher was produced through an error of fact known to
the seller.
A contract to purchase, for $67,000, jade carvings worth less than
half that amount was found to be unconscionable in Vom Lehn v. Astor
Art Galleries, Ltd. 1 While there is scant jurisprudential evidence in
Louisiana that great price-value disparity, without more, would per-
mit a court to deny enforcement of the contract, 2 enforceability of
the contract in Vom Lehn could be denied on the basis of error-
produced consent. Unlike in Andrews, however, the buyer's principal
motive and the seller's knowledge of it are not so clear in Vom Lehn.
While the facts are slightly convoluted, it seems fairly inferable that
the Vom Lehns were wealthy and educated persons, interested
generally in the acquisition of fine works of art. The seller displayed
to them and they purchased twenty hand-carved items of varying jade
or near-jade classifications.5
cipal motive similar to that of the Andrews case. The buyer's principal motive in Meyer
arguably was to acquire a rebuilt Packard truck advertised to be "practically as ser-
viceable and efficient" as a new one and "carrying the same warranty." What buyer
received was a truck requiring $900 in repairs. The litigation arose over payment for
those repairs.
49. If it could be shown that the seller knew that the car could not be considered
a "new" car, buyer's consent would be invalidated in Louisiana on the basis of fraud.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1832, 1847. See text at notes 73-74, infra.
50. 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978).
51. 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
52. See text at notes 448-503, infra.
53. The Vom Lehns initially purchased $20,000 of the jade carvings from Astor,
but they subsequently were pursuaded by one of Astor's salesmen to renege on that
purchase and deal with the Hartley Gift Shop and its owner, Levy (referred to herein
as the seller). Levy came to the Vom Lehns' home and, disparaging the Astor goods,
displayed the twenty items around which the case revolves. The Vom Lehns testified
that the seller misrepresented the items as "Ming Dynasty" jade, obtainable by him
only from Europe. The seller testified that he told the Vom Lehns that nine of the
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The outcome would not be considered an assured one, but cer-
tainly it would be possible to apply the principle of error if the Vom
Lehn case were in Louisiana. The seller knew, for instance, that all
of the carvings were of contemporary, twentieth-century creation, and
he knew that the Vom Lehns were wholly unfamiliar with the quality
and value of the items purchased.' The lack of familiarity with the
items tends to dilute the credibility of an assertion by the Vom Lehns
that their principal motive was the acquisition of "priceless Ming
Dynasty" jade, but it could be credibly argued that in view of the
price, their motive was to acquire pre-twentieth century or antique
works of art. Viewed objectively, the seller certainly must have known
that the Vom Lehns supposed the items to be works of antiquity (when
they were really items that only resembled works of antiquity) or
"from the nature of the transaction it must be presumed" that the
seller was apprised that such was the principal cause of the
agreement.5 Relevant to Vom Lehn in this regard is the admonition
of the Deutschmann case: "[Ilt was his responsibility to communicate
to [the consumer] information which. . would have avoided the
confusion."5 The furrier in Deutschmann made no false representa-
tions; rather, knowing in fact the customer's principal motive, he was
required to come forward with information as to the fabrication and
substantial qualities of the contemplated work. Vom Lehn is not
significantly dissimilar.57
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.5" contains only dicta
regarding unconscionability, yet it is as well-known and often-cited
items were hand-carved "Serpentine" (a semi-precious stone), making no mention of
any age or period, and that subsequently he displayed the nine jade carvings, describ-
ing them as "hand-carved Chinese jade of fine quality," again making no mention of
age or period. The New York court dismissed the Vom Lehns' fraud count, holding
that they had failed to proved fraud by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence.
The Vom Lehns had not asserted mistake of fact in their petition. The court no doubt
felt that certain "oddities" in the facts detracted from the plaintiffs' fraud allegations.
For instance, there was no allegation of duress, coercion, or high-pressure selling; neither
the bill of sale nor a subsequent written appraisal by the seller (obtained for the pur-
pose of future civil and criminal actions) described the items as "Ming Dynasty" or
as antiques; and the Vom Lehns' paid $49,000 after getting the "feeling that something
was wrong" and that some of the items were only "Serpentine."
54. 86 Misc. 2d at 5 & 11, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 536 & 541.
55. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1826, 1843-1845. It can be presumed in some cases "from
the nature of the transaction" (article 1826) that a particular motive is the principal
cause of the agreement. An example is seen in Gour v. Daray Motor Co., discussed
at note 43, supra.
56. 331 So. 2d at 221, discussed in text at notes 44-45, supra.
57. Vom Lehn also is amenable to the Louisiana notion of fraudulently produced
consent, the New York court's dismissal of the fraud count notwithstanding. See discus-
sion in text accompanying notes 67-138, infra.
58. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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as any unconscionability case. The buyer, a person whose education,
commercial sophistication, and financial capabilities were limited, pur-
chased during the period of 1957 to 1964 about $1,800 in merchandise
from Walker-Thomas. With each purchase, a contract form was signed
in which it was stipulated in fine print that title would remain in
Walker-Thomas until the item purchased was paid in full, and that
each payment would be credited pro rata on all purchases. Apparently
no verbal explanation was given as to the payment allocation clause.
In 1964, at a time when the buyer's outstanding balance was about
$160-with none of the items previously purchased deemed "paid"
under the payment allocation clause-the buyer was permitted to incur
an additional $500 debt. Shortly thereafter, she defaulted in her
payments, and as a result of this default, Walker-Thomas sought to
repossess everything she had purchased since 1957, seven years of
payments notwithstanding. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for evidentiary
hearings, expressing in unmistakable terms its doubt that such a con-
tract or series of contracts could be free of unconscionability.
It is quite possible that the buyer's consent in Williams was pro-
duced by error. A principal cause of each of the contracts was, at
the very least, the acquisition of ownership of the various items Mrs.
Williams acquired from Walker-Thomas over the years; what she
obtained in fact was temporary use of those items, indistinguishable
from the use enjoyed by a mere lessee. But, as two Louisiana cases,
Jones v. DeLoach"9 and Pollard v. Ingram" instruct, classifying the
acquisition of the thing sold or of rights to a contractor's performance
as the consumer's determining motive can be simplistic, for often the
consumer's principal concern is not where the contract leads him, but
the manner in which the contract will get him there. 1 Such a motive
of ownership is arguably one which from the nature of the transaction
it must be presumed that the supplier knew.2
Williams also may fall within Civil Code article 1841's example
of an error as to the nature of the contract: "Thus, if the party receives
property, and from error or ambiguity in the words accompanying
the delivery, believes that he has purchased, while he who delivers
intends only to pledge, there is not [sic] contract." Relevant to
Williams also is Civil Code article 2163, by which a debtor may declare
59. 317 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), discussed at note 43, supra.
60. 308 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), discussed at note 43, supra.
61. See also Hartsell v. Pipes Auto Shop, Inc., 318 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1975); Dieball v. Bill Hanna Ford Co., 287 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Gibert
v. Cook, 144 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
62. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1826.
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which of several debts he means to discharge by his payment.13 When
the debtor accepts a receipt by which the creditor has made the im-
putation, however, Civil Code article 2165 declares that the debtor
no longer has the right to declare a different imputation himself,
"unless there have been fraud or surprise on the part of the creditor.""
Can it be doubted that Mrs. Williams would have been surprised to
learn in 1964 that the bed in which she had nightly reposed since
1957 had been, for all those years, hers merely on temporary loan
from Walker-Thomas pending the outcome of her payment history,
the final chapter of which story might well have to await her death?
Because the Civil Code does not recognize the common law conditional
sale, 5 Williams could not arise in Louisiana in precisely its original
posture, but the result very likely would be the same as that alluded
to by the Court of Appeals-a series of contracts the enforceability
of which is highly doubtful."6
It seems clear that, as indicated by Appendix Table 1, many of
the unconscionability cases could have been decided in the same man-
ner under a Civil Code error-in-consent analysis.
Consent Produced by Fraud
The emergence of standard-form contracts, offered on a "take-it-
or-leave-it" basis and too often characterized by fine print, esoteric
legal jargon, and inordinate length, unquestionably played a role in
the development of unconscionability as a legitimized obligation-
avoidance principle. But the failure of fraud to have evolved as a com-
mon law protective principle also may have played a role in the
development of unconscionability. Misrepresentation of material facts
readily produces a vitiation of consent, but in a caveat emptor tradi-
tion, representations as to facts may only follow the buyer's specific
inquiry, without which inquiry there may be no affirmative duty to
disclose. For example, the common law would not require the seller
63. See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hogg, 351 So. 2d 1324 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1977).
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2166 is also relevant:
When the receipt [if there be one] bears no imputation [of the payment], the
payment must be imputed to the debt, which the debtor had at the time most
interest in discharging, of those that are equally due; otherwise to the debt which
has fallen due, though less burdensome than those which are not yet payable.
If the debts be of a like nature, the imputation is made to the debt which
.has been longest due; if all things are equal, it is made proportionally.
65. See, e.g., Thomas v. Philip Werlein, Ltd., 181 La. 104, 158 So. 635 (1935); Barber
Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908); Claude
Neon Federal Co. v. Angell, 153 So. 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934); Comment, The Condi-
tional Sale in Louisiana, 2 LA. L. REV. 338 (1940).
66. See text at notes 329-334, infra.
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to disclose to the prospective buyer a known latent defect such as
termite damage or infestation."7 By contrast, the buyer's consent in
such a case in Louisiana would be considered as produced by fraud. 8
The same conclusion arguably applies to nineteen of the unconsciona-
bility cases.
Under the Louisiana Civil Code, fraud is "the cause of an error
bearing on a material part of the contract, created or continued by
artifice, with design to obtain some unjust advantages to the one party,
or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other.""9 Unlike the case
with simple error, fraud-produced error need not be as to the prin-
cipal cause of the contract, that is, that consideration without which
the contract would not have been made,"0 but need be merely as to
a material part thereof, that is, a part of the contract that reasonably
may be presumed to have influenced the party in making it.7 By
"artifice" is meant an assertion of that which is false or a suppres-
sion or concealment of that which is true as to a material part of
the contract or any other means calculated to produce a belief of what
is false or an ignorance or disbelief of what is true."
Andrews73 provides a factual background which demonstrates the
relationship between simple error and fraud under the Louisiana Civil
Code. Andrews Brothers believed it would receive only new
automobiles under its contract with Singer & Company and that "new"
meant more than just "not previously sold." If the "new" quality was
the principal cause or motive of Andrews Brothers and this was known
to Singer & Company, the error would have invalidated the contract
in Louisiana. If, however, Singer & Company had caused the error
or continued it by artifice with a design to obtain some unjust advan-
tage, the "new" quality would need be only a material part of the
contract for fraud to be found.7 ' The principles of simple error would
seem applicable to most cases of fraud.
67. See Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942);
Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960).
68. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1819, 1832 & 1847.
69. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1847 (emphasis added).
70. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1825.
71. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1847(2).
72. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1832, 1847(5), (6). By numbered paragraphs 7 and 8, arti-
cle 1847 further explains that the artifice must be designed to obtain either an unjust
advantage for the one carrying it out or a loss or inconvenience to the one against
whom it is practiced, although attended with advantage to no one; in fact, it is not
necessary that an advantage or an inconvenience or loss results, so long as such would
be the effect of the contract if the artifice were actually performed.
73. Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (C.A. 1933).
74. The knowing sale of a "used" thing, upon the declaration or representation
that it is "new" or that it is newer than in fact it is, has been held in numerous cases
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Although unnecessary for affirmance, an Illinois appellate court
approved the trial court's finding of unconscionability in American
Buyer's Club v. Grayling,5 a case, similar to Andrews, that could be
decided in Louisiana on the basis of error, most probably error created
by artifice under Civil Code article 1847. The club proclaimed that
through bulk buying, its members could save substantial amounts with
respect to many items of merchandise. In fact, prices for merchan-
dise obtained through the club did not yield the promised savings-a
clear error in the principal motive of each buyer, known to be such
by the club. Members of the club were required to execute promis-
to constitute fraud within the meaning of Civil Code article 1847. See, e.g., Chauvin
v. La Hitte, 229 La. 94, 85 So. 2d 43 (1956) (used automobile sold as "new"); Sunseri
v. Westbank Motors, 228 La. 370, 82 So. 2d 43 (1955) (used automobile sold as "new");
Beyer v. Estopinal, 224 La. 516, 70 So. 2d 109 (1954) (1942 model truck represented
to be a 1946 model). The cases of Barnidge v. Cappel Motor Co., 125 So. 778 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1930) and Albert Switzer & Assoc. v. Dixie Buick, Inc., 265 So. 2d 313 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972), most closely resemble the facts of Andrews Brothers. In Barnidge,
an automobile sold as "new" had been owned previously by another party who had
returned it to the seller as unsatisfactory. The automobile sold as "new" in Dixie Buick
was in fact a "demonstrator" vehicle. The courts found fraud in both cases. See also
Killeen v. Ducote, 405 So. 2d 1281 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (previously unsold automobile
on which extensive repairs had been made was fraudulently sold as "new"); Wheat
v. Boutte Auto Sales, 355 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (automobile misrepresented
as "not previously wrecked"); Tauzin v. Sam Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d
266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (previously unsold automobile that had been extensively
damaged and repaired was sold as "new"; buyer's consent was held to have been pro-
duced by fraud); Kiefer v. Bernie Dumas Buick Co., 210 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1968) (automobile rendered completely defective by exposure to salt water was
fraudulently represented as "new and undamaged"); Johnson v. Heller, 33 So. 2d 776
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) (1936 model motorcycle represented to be a 1939 model); Cockrell
v. Capital City Auto Co., 3 La. App. 385 (Orl. 1925) (1918 automobile represented to
be a 1919 model); cf. Gour v. Daray Motor Co., 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979)
(buyer of an Oldsmobile did not consent to purchase an Oldsmobile equipped with a
Chevrolet engine; the type of engine provided was intentionally concealed by the seller);
Violette v. Capital City Auto Co., 4 La. App. 465 (1st Cir. 1926) (the consent of the
buyer of an automobile equipped with a 1921 engine, but represented as a 1923 model
engine, was produced by simple error).
Not always are the year, model, and equipment of automobiles and other things
considered material under Civil Code article 1847. See Ganucheau v. Greff, 181 So.
2d 854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (a 1953 model automobile sold as a "1956" model, but
no showing that buyer necessarily would have declined to purchase had he known
the truth); Port Fin. Co. v. Campbell, 94 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) (Mercury
automobile with a Ford engine); King v. Moore, 61 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952)
(1949 Packard sold as a "1950," but no difference in price); Dupuy v. Blotner Bros.
Auto Parts, 6 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942) (sale of a Chrysler automobile with
a Plymouth engine; court held the engines of the two makes of cars were inter-
changeable); cf. Castille v. Champ Auto Sales, 92 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
(a 1951 model automobile represented to be a 1952 model, but good faith representa-
tion of model year held not a per se Civil Code article 2529 redhibition case).
75. 53 Ill. App. 3d 611, 368 N.E.2d 1057 (1977).
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sory note payable in installments that totaled almost $500. Moreover,
the agreement signed by each club member was found to be obscure
and to have been purposely written so as to evade federal truth-in-
lending requirements and to conceal the fact that the "members"
actually received no benefits at all from the club,"6 but were members
of a club in name only. Such intentional concealment and use of
obscurity and obfuscation comes under the heading of fraud in
Louisiana.7
Two similar cases, Kugler v. Romain8 and State v. ITM, Inc.,"5 are
considered to be unconscionability cases herein, but in fact, either case
could have been decided on traditional common law fraud principles.
Both certainly would be fraud cases in Louisiana. The ITM facts
revolved around what is commonly referred to as the "endless chain"
variety of the referral sales scheme," in which products were sold
76. The court noted that the wording of the contract was "obviously intended
to conceal from the ordinary consumer that once he [had] signed the contract and
promissory note he [was] obligated to continue to make payments without regard to
whether he in fact [made] use of club facilities." 53 Ill. App. 3d at 616, 368 N.E.2d at 1061.
77. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1832, 1847, 2547. See Succession of Molaison, 213 La. 378,
34 So. 2d 897 (1949); Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Carter v. Foreman,
219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co.,
146 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Griffing v. Atkins, 1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1941). Closest to the facts of American Buyers is Broussard. In that case,
misrepresentations by an insurance agent that large dividends would be paid under
the proposed life insurance policy produced an error in consent permitting the buyer
to rescind the agreement under article 1847.
78. 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
79. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
80. See generally State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d
624 (Iowa 1971). A "referral sales scheme" under LA. R.S. 9:3536 (Supp. 1972) involves
a giving or the offer to give a rebate or discount or to otherwise give value to the
buyer as an inducement for a sale or lease in consideration of the buyer's giving to
the seller the names of prospective purchasers or lessees; additionally, the earning
of the discount or value is contingent upon the occurrence of an event subsequent
to the time of the agreement, e.g., the seller actually following up on the list of pro-
spective buyers or actually using buyer's newly sided or roofed home as a "demonstra-
tion" or "showplace" home. Section 3536 is keyed to a "consumer loan, a consumer
credit sale, or a consumer lease," each of which transactions is also defined. A "con-
sumer credit sale" is defined by LA. R.S. 9:3516(11) (Supp. 1972) to be the "sale of
a thing ... in which a credit service charge is charged and the purchaser is permitted
to defer . . . the purchase price . . . in two or more installments . . . and the thing
is purchased primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes." The
purchaser must be a natural person. The concept of "thing" is found in section 3516(29):
as used in the credit law, "thing" is "as defined by law and includes . . . goods, or
services." Thus, an exterminator, utilizing a referral sales scheme, could be covered
by LA. R.S. 9:3536, even though he is not a "seller" for purposes of Civil Code arti-
cle 2520.
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door-to-door following a deceptive introductory sales pitch" by which
the seller's agents gained admission to the buyer's home. Buyers were
told that in view of the commissions to be earned by them, the pro-
ducts (the quality of which was substantially misrepresented) would
cost them nothing. Moreover, it was represented to some of the buyers
that the commissions would pay off their home mortgages. Not only
was there no disclosure or explanation given to the buyers regarding
the respective standing of each in the geometric progression of the
"pyramid" of buyers,82 the misrepresentation and concealment were
compounded by high pressure sales techniques,83 with subsequent
attempts by the buyers to cancel being met by threats of lawsuits
and enforcement of a substantial penalty clause and wage garnish-
ment and loss of job.84 Kugler v. Romain involved the enforceability
of door-to-door sales of books and related materials purportedly design-
ed to aid a child's educational development,, but, in fact, worthless
for that purpose. The sales were consciously aimed at low-income
minority groups in urban areas. Amidst misrepresentations which
abounded,85 the seller made no explanation of the obligations incur-
red or of the contract form signed by the buyer. In each case, the
state's attorney general sought an injunction against the seller.
While a ruling of unconscionability certainly would be a conve-
nient approach for courts confronted with cases such as Kugler and
ITM, the application of traditional notions of fraud doubtless would
have yielded the same outcome in a suit by one of the individual
buyers involved in either of the two cases. 6 Nonenforceability unques-
81. Seller's agents obtained appointments in the homes of buyers via telephone
contacts in which a "money-making plan" was the central item of conversation.
82. See State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa
1971).
83. When the seller's representatives were asked to leave or to return later, pro-
spective buyers were told, for example, "It's now or never."
84. The evidence disclosed that the seller in fact had utilized invalid "sewer ser-
vice" and had perjured affidavits to obtain judgments in numerous cases.
85. The seller's agents misrepresented that they were acting pursuant to a federal
grant, sometimes mentioning the "Head Start" program, the "Board of Education,"
the "School System," or a named school. The true price of the books and materials
also was misrepresented, as was the privilege of cancellation of the contract and the
resultant achievability of a high school equivalency diploma.
86. Both Kugler and ITM were representative actions by the state's attorney
general acting pursuant to consumer fraud statutes. In ITM, the "endless chain" sales
scheme was held violative of the New York consumer fraud law as a fraudulent act.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1982). Under that law, the concept of fraud in-
cludes "unconscionable contractual provisions." The attorney general successfully
demonstrated that the price charged, which ranged in individual cases from two to
six times the cost to the seller, was an "unconscionable contractual provision" within
the meaning of UCC § 2-302 and the New York fraud statute. The importance of ITM
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tionably would be the outcome under Civil Code articles 1832 and
1847.87
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynosoll is an unconscionability case similar
lies less in the issue of unenforceability than in the jurisdiction and power of the state's
attorney general-to act on behalf of consumers.
Similarly, Kugler v. Romain concerned the power of the state's attorney general
acting under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-1 to 56:8-25
(West 1964 & Supp. 1982). The trial court had held that the unconscionability of a
contract or clause thereof and the remedy therefor was a private issue which could
not be asserted representatively by the attorney general, rejecting the contention that
the contracts, being unconscionable, were also violative of, and unenforceable under,
the Consumer Fraud Act. The Supreme Court of New Jersey permitted the attorhey
general to act on behalf of all consumers who had signed similar contracts for the
educational materials, agreeing with the attorney general that the one illegal aspect
of the sales contract that was common to each transaction was the (fixed) price and
that the price (about $275, or two and one-half times a reasonable market price for
books having no functional value) for the worthless package was so exorbitant as to
be unconscionable and, therefore, a fraud under the statute.
87. Civil Code articles 1832, 1847, 1895, and 2547 all seem obviously applicable
to the referral sales scheme. See, e.g., Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin, 286 So. 2d 511 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1973) (referral sale); Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (referral
sale); Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962); cf. Alexander Hamilton Inst. v. Hollis, 133 So. 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) (con-
tract for course of study involved no misrepresentations and plaintiff was not lacking
in education or otherwise disadvantaged; held, enforceable); Twentieth Century Co.
v. Quilling, 130 Wis. 318, 110 N.W. 174 (1907) (an endless chain scheme characterized
as "contra bonos mores"). Both Kugler and ITM could be decided favorably to the
buyers in Louisiana on the basis of consent produced by simple error, in that the
obvious principal motive of the buyer (educational development of children, obtaining
goods at reduced prices, paying off mortgages) was, to the seller's knowledge, unat-
tainable. See, e.g., Dieball v. Bill Hanna Ford Co., 287 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1973); Gibert v. Cook, 144 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Rapides Grocery Co.
v. Clopton, 15 La. App. 27, 125 So. 325 (1st Cir. 1929).
It perhaps is analytically more difficult to apply the concept of error to the matter
of the referral sales scheme, since the principal cause may not as readily be viewed
as the obtaining of a thing which, in essence, will pay for itself. Consider, for example,
the case of Claiborne Butane Co. v. Hackler, 138 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962),
in which a merchant's allegation that an ice making machine had been represented
as a thing which would pay for itself (even if the allegation be accepted as true) did
not constitute a defense of error as to a principal cause. The court did concede that
had the representation been incorporated into the agreement as a stipulated condi-
tion, a different result could obtain. It would seem that if such an unstipulated profit
motive does not avail a merchant, it will not avail the consumer whose agreement
is even less likely to so stipulate. Implicit in the Hackler opinion also is the element
of "puffing," i.e., a salesman is perhaps expected to say his mercantile product will
"pay for itself." This, however, is readily distinguishable from the representation that
actual "commissions" will be paid to the buyer, and it is probably true that most of
the consumer sales induced by a referral sales scheme would not have taken place
in the face of a more honest sales pitch.
88. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
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to ITM in that, when the buyer -who was not fluent in the English
language - advised the seller that he had but one week of employ-
ment left in his job and could not afford the purchase of a $1,145
freezer, the seller employed a "referral sale" artifice to convince the
buyer that the appliance actually would cost him "nothing," because
of the $25 commission the buyer would earn on each sale resulting
from his referrals of friends and neighbors to the seller. In Louisiana,
consent in such circumstances is deemed to be produced by fraud,
and therefore it is defective. 9
Toker v. Perl9° is a relatively simple case of fraudulent procure-
ment of a consumer's signature on a contract, in which the court
offered unconscionability as an alternative ground for nonenforcement.
The facts of Perl present a vintage artifice. The seller and the buyer
discussed the purchase of food on an eighteen-week delivery plan, and
the seller falsely represented that a freezer was included in the food
plan. When the agreement was reached (which the buyer supposed
was as represented), the seller arranged three forms for the buyer's
signature so that the top form (the food plan contract) left visible
only the signature line of the second form, the second form in turn
leaving visible only the signature line of the third form. In this manner
the buyer unknowingly signed a financing application and an install-
ment contract for a freezer at a total credit price of $1,092.96." Because
the maximum value of the freezer was only $300, the retail purchase
price of $800 was held to be unconscionable, an unnecessary ruling
in light of the holding that the signature was procured by fraud. It
also would be unnecessary to reach the "price unconscionability" issue
in Louisiana in view of Civil Code articles 1832 and 1847.92
Articles 1832 and 1847 also clearly apply to the unconscionability
cases of Industralease Automated & Scientific Equipment Corp. v.
R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc.,9 3 Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.,94 and
Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co. 5 In Industralease, the lessee
89. See cases cited in note 87, supra.
90. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968), aff'd per curiam on other grounds,
108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (1970).
91. The presence of fraud renders inapplicable the general rule that a person sign-
ing a contract has a duty to read it or have it read to him. Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin,
286 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
92. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Harang, 190 La. 1060, 183 So. 349 (1938) (misrepresen-
tation as to the character of the instrument signed); Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin, 286
So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973) (same); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d
635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (unknowing execution of a mortgage on buyer's home).
See also Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Longino, 168 La. 824, 123 So. 587 (1929). The price
unconscionability issue is discussed in text at notes 448-503, infra.
93. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977).
94. 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
95. 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922). The case is cited in UCC S 2-302, com-
ment 1 as an example of a "prior application" of unconscionability.
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had signed a lease form (pertaining to rubbish disposal equipment)
under which the lessee enjoyed the benefits of the manufacturer's
standard express warranty. After the lessee had installed a concrete
slab, a fuel tank, and underground wiring in preparation for, but prior
to, the delivery of the equipment, the lessee was visited by represen-
tatives of the manufacturer-lessor and Industralease. The lessee was
convinced by them to execute a new lease upon the artifice that the
original lease was "no good" and a new contract was necessary if
delivery of the equipment was to be insured. The new lease contained
an unqualified disclaimer of all express and implied warranties. Upon
installation the equipment did not perform satisfactorily. The
disclaimer of warranties in the substituted lease was held unen-
forceable as unconscionable. Because the existence of warranties
normally would be considered a material part of a contract for the
lease or sale of equipment costing almost $20,000,96 articles 1832 and
1847 would deny enforcement of such a disclaimer in Louisiana. 7
The manufacturer in Majors knew that the effectiveness of its
soybean innoculant product for the intended purposes was ques-
tionable, yet not only was that fact concealed from the buyer, the
manufacturer expressly warranted the product as "100%" guar-
anteed-while limiting consequential damages to a return of the price.
Ruling the remedy limitation unconscionable gave the buyer the
opportunity to recover consequential damages. Had the validity of
buyer's consent been put in issue, neither the contract nor the limita-
tion of remedy arguably would have been enforceable in Louisiana. 8
96. The "lease," which the court held to be a disguised sale, called for sixty monthly
payments of $319.70, plus sales tax.
97. In Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin, 286 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973), the artifice
consisted of a representation that the papers to be signed-in reality a mortgage and
a promissory note-were only a contract to permit the seller to "advertise" their newly-
sided home. Cf. Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965)
(fraudulently obtained mortgage).
98. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1832, 1847, 1934, 2547 & 2548. See Aetna Ins. Co. v.
General Elec. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 247
(La. 1978); Aiken v. Moran Motor Co., 165 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Southern
Iron & Equip. Co. v. Brown & Bevill Gravel Co., 141 So. 413 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932);
Plauche, Locke Sec. v. B. Bazerque & Sons, 139 So. 786 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932). By
Civil Code article 2547, "a declaration made by the seller, that the thing sold possesses
some quality which it does not possess, comes within the definition of fraud" under
article 1847. The manufacturer in Majors knew that there were serious doubts, based
on its own tests, as to whether the product would be effective, yet no disclosure of
the experimental nature of the product was made. Such knowledge is immaterial to
the manufacturer, who is presumed to know of any defects in the products he makes,
but if the seller also knew of the doubts as to the product's effectiveness, such
knowledge certainly would trigger the nondisclaimer principle of Civil Code article
2548. Because the seller adopted the "satisfaction guaranteed" language appearing on
the package, he made a declaration as to quality when he did not know whether the
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Similarly, the waiver in Meyer of "all promises, verbal understandings
or agreements of any kind" in a contract for the purchase of a used
truck advertised as "guaranteed," "practically a new truck," and as
carrying the same warranty as a new truck would produce consent
vitiated by fraud in Louisiana should the thing not possess, to the
seller's knowledge, those advertised or declared attributes.99
Even if common law fraud ceased at some point to be an effec-
tive means of contract avoidance,1 °° the same is not true of fraud-
produced error in consent under the Louisiana Civil Code, for article
1847 has demonstrated remarkable flexibility over the years. That
flexibility can be seen in the "materiality" aspect of Civil Code article
1847,0' and it is partly responsible for the importance of article 1847
as a modern contract avoidance device.1 °2 The common law was not
necessarily less flexibile or liberal in regard to materiality. Both legal
systems also subscribe to the maxim that "fraud is not to be
presumed,""1 3 but it has long been recognized in Louisiana that an
inference of fraud may be drawn from the presence of "highly
suspicious" circumstances." 4 Since the effect of such an inference is
declaration was true. This also is arguably a fraud, triggering article 2548. Cf. Aetna
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365
So. 2d 247 (La. 1978) (suggesting that it is fraud within Civil Code article 2548 to
make a representation as to a certain quality when it is not known whether the
representation is true or false).
99. In addition to the cases collected at note 98, supra, see cases collected at
note 74, supra. Meyer also could be categorized as a case of simple error in principal
cause under Louisiana Civil Code articles 1819-1826.
100. The stated proposition draws support from the UCC S 2-302, comment 1.
101. See text at notes 69-72, supra.
102. Louisiana courts have found fraud, for example, in false representations that
a real estate purchaser would have access to property via a "common" driveway,
Franklin v. Evans, 315 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), in false representations
that a cottage situated 150 feet from the beach was a "beach cottage," Hauser v. Ladd,
8 La. App. 220 (Orl. 1928), in false representations that property would be near a
golf course or near boating, swimming, and picnicking facilities, Turner v. Southland
Resorts, Inc., 151 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) and Van Vracken v. Harry G.
Spiro, Inc., 139 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), in false representations that an
automobile was "new," Tauzin v. Sam Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973) and Albert Switzer & Assoc. v. Dixie Buick, Inc., 265 So. 2d 313
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972) (see text at note 74, supra), in false representations that a
vehicle was a newer model than it was, Johnson v. Heller, 33 So. 2d 776 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1948); Cockrell v. Capital City Auto Co., 3 La. App. 385 (Orl. 1925), in false
representations that an automobile was in "good running" or mechanical condition,
Roby Motors Co. v. Price, 173 So. 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937), and in false representa-
tions that an insurance policy would yield a certain amount of dividends, Broussard
v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
103. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1848.
104. In 1961, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal said of Civil Code arti-
cle 1848:
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to shift to the defending party the burden of showing the absence
of fraud," 5 the willingness of Louisiana courts to find such "highly
suspicious" circumstances may explain the continuing viability of fraud
as a contract avoidance device when common law fraud arguably
ceased at some point to sustain such viability.
There can be no doubt that the lack of education, sophistication,
or mental capacity of a "layman" or a consumer will be weighed
heavily by a Louisiana court. Very significant examples of the in-
ference of fraud are seen in those cases in which there is a great
disparity between the parties as to education or mental ability or
where the one party suffers from an impairment or infirmity or where
the contract calls for a result that cannot be reasonably assumed was
mutually intended by the parties. A sound starting point is Succes-
sion of Molaison,"°6 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to
enforce a legatee's renunciation of a succession interest. The legatee,
an adopted daughter, had not seen the will and did not understand
that she was entitled to an interest in the succession. Not knowing
the legal consequences of adoption and no explanation of her rights
being given by the other interested (and knowledgeable) parties, she
had signed the renunciation under the belief that such was the only
way she could obtain anything from the succession. The Louisiana
Supreme Court's refusal to enforce the Molaison renunciation set a
very important standard:
All the parties involved in this suit except the plaintiff, have
The jurisprudence interpretive of this article has consistently reasoned from
the major premise that fraud, unlike other allegations in civil cases, must be pro-
ved by more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. Since the accusation
is a grave one, the courts have required strict proof thereof. However, the in-
herent difficulty of establishing fraud by direct evidence has also been recogniz-
ed juristically; therefore, the courts have reasoned that an inference of fraud may
be drawn from the existence of highly suspicious conditions or events, in confor-
mity with the rationale of Article 1848.
George A. Broas Co. v. Hibernia Homestead & Say. Ass'n, 134 So. 2d 356, 360 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1961). This approach is consistent with Civil Code articles 1848 and 1849:
Art. 1848. Fraud . . . must be proved by him who alleges it, but it may be
proved by simple presumptions or by legal presumptions, as well as by other
evidence. The maxim that fraud is not to be presumed, means no more than that
it is not to be imputed without legal evidence.
Art. 1849. Some circumstances and acts attending particular contracts, are
by law declared to be conclusive; and others, presumptive evidence of fraud.
105. See George A. Broas Co. v. Hibernia Homestead & Say. Ass'n, 134 So. 2d
356, 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
106. 213 La. 378, 34 So. 2d 897 (1948). The terms "consumer" and "layman" are
not synonymous; while most consumers would fit the description "layman," many cases
reveal a "layman" in a commercial transaction. Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974), is an example.
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had extensive business experience and the plaintiff has had prac-
tically none. It may be that much was taken for granted when
it was executed, but this does not relieve the situation because
the plaintiff had a decided inferior mental capacity to the other
parties. We are not prepared to say than an intentional fraud was
perpetrated on the plaintiff, but the evidence does show that the
opposing parties were cognizant of all the facts and the plaintiff
was ignorant of them and laboring under an entirely different
impression.
Where parties of somewhat equal experience and mental capa-
city enter into an engagement, the courts are reluctant to disturb
it unless there is fraud. However, it is the duty of the courts to
carefully and painstakingly investigate the circumstances surround-
ing transactions between a person of limited mental capacity and
one experienced in business affairs, in order that substantial justice
might be meted out."0 7
Lack of education and business sophistication has been pointed to time
and time again in Louisiana courts as a basis on which to infer fraud
so as to relieve the disadvantaged party from the consequences of
unfair terms or entire contracts.' s Exemplary of the line of cases
spawned by Molaison are Carter v. Foreman.9 and Smith v. Everett."'
Mr. Carter, an "unintelligent" man of 67 years of age, who could
neither read, write, nor multiply, signed a contract for home im-
107. 213 La. at 397, 34 So. 2d at 903. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1851.
108. See Succession of Aymond, 202 La. 469, 12 So. 2d 233 (1943); Guillory v. Morein
Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973); Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin, 286 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Coburn
Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 241 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 292 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962); Port Fin. Co. v. Campbell, 94 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957);
Griffing v. Atkins, 1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941); Davis v. Whatley, 175 So.
422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937); Segretto v. Menefee Motor Co., 159 So. 345 (La. App.
Orl. 1935). In several cases, the "disadvantage" lay not in illiteracy, but in being unaware
of the existence of usages of trade or custom among merchants and the effects such
usages may have on particular words or phrases. See, e.g., Blum v.'Marrero, 346 So.
2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Maxwell v. Bernard, 343 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977); Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Deutschmann
v. Standard Fur Co., 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Leithman v. Dolphin
Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied., 259 La. 1055,
254 So. 2d 464(1971). Cf. Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales, 364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1978) (unsophisticated buyer could not be expected to understand legal language).
These cases are decided less on the ground of error than as a matter of Civil Code
articles 1957, 1958, and 2474.
109. 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
110. 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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provements under the terms of which he agreed to pay a total price
of $3,250, but total payments of $7,875. The total payments figure
was not disclosed to him by the home improvement contractor. The
contract was not properly performed by the contractor"' -itself
grounds enough for avoidance of the agreement"'-but more impor-
tantly, the contractor was aware of Carter's educational deficiencies
and knew that Carter's income was only $200 per month, primarily
derived from Social Security. This produced an inference of fraud and
a vitiation of consent."3
The inference of fraud in Smith v. Everett arose upon the follow-
ing facts: The buyer learned from the public records that the seller's
deceased parents had owned a parcel of land fronting on what was
to become an interstate highway service road, with a value of $65,000
to $70,000. The seller, a grade school drop-out, had not opened the
appropriate proceedings by which to have title transferred to his name,
but after discussion with the buyer, the seller granted the buyer an
option to buy the land for $9,200. The buyer agreed to open succes-
sion proceedings for the seller's parents in order to place the seller
in possession of the property. The seller then retained a lawyer and
sued for a declaration of nullity. Since there presumably had occur-
red no false assertion as to value by the buyer, the decision turned
on a theory of concealment or suppression of the truth:
The disparity between the education and business experience
of plaintiff and defendant makes it apparent they could not
111. The repairs were labelled "worthless." 219 So. 2d at 24. Cf. Rapides Grocery
Co. v. Clopton, 125 So. 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929) (no real consent where the thing
sold is without value).
112. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2046.
113. The court states:
[Tihere is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to reach the conclusion
that Foreman realized [Carter's] deficiencies and intentionally withheld from him
the fact that the payments would amount to $7,875.00.
And there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Foreman never
intended to do a "good job" in the first place in that he quoted [Carter] a con-
tract price without making an examination of the premises to determine the amount
of work and materials necessary to do the job; in that he did not obtain a building
permit which would have subjected the work to inspection by the City; in that
he subcontracted the work to a self-styled shoring contractor who had no equip-
ment; and in that only $113.00 of materials were used on the entire job.
219 So. 2d at 25.
The Carter opinion does not emphasize Foreman's knowledge of Carter's meager
financial resources, but one fairly can draw the inference from Carter that knowledge
of deficiency in financial resources in an appropriate case can form the basis for an
inference of fraud; for example, where the knowledgeable party does not in good faith
believe, based on what he knows, that there is a reasonable probability of payment
of the contract in full by the debtor. Such a contract is unconscionable under UNIFORM
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 & 6.111(3) (1968).
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negotiate the sale on an equal footing .... Smith's testimony con-
firms he is an uneducated man who could easily be victimized or
intimidated by an unscrupulous businessman.
Even were we to disregard the circumstances under which plain-
tiff was spirited from his home to the act of sale, the facts con-
cerning location and value as compared to the sale price scream
fraud. . . . Had plaintiff known defendant was buying his prop-
erty for a pittance of its real value, he would not have consented
to the contract. And it is clear from the evidence defendant knew
full well (or being a realtor should have known) he was buying
from Smith for approximately one-seventh of the value of the prop-
erty. In concealing the information as to true value, defendant
obtained plaintiffs assent through fraud.11 '
With deference to Louisiana Civil Code articles 1832, 1847, and
2547 and with particular emphasis directed at the "inference of fraud"
jurisprudence under article 1848, exemplified by Molaison, Carter, and
Smith, it is arguable that ten of the unconscionability cases, in addi-
tion to those previously discussed in this section, could have resulted
in nonenforcement in Louisiana on the basis of fraud, without the need
for resort to the principle of unconscionability. The facts of four cases,
Greene v. Gibraltar Mortgage Investment Corp.,"'5 American Home Im-
provement, Inc. v. MacIver,"' Murphy v. McNamara,'17 and Albert Mer-
rill School v. Godoy,"' fall obviously into the Molaison-Carter-Smith
model. As do Toker v. Perl"9 and other unconscionability cases, the
Greene decision offers unconscionability as a ground of nonenforce-
ment alternative to fraud. The consumer in Greene sought a loan in
the amount of $3,000 for the purpose of bringing her home mortgage
payments up-to-date and to pay for certain repairs to the home. The
lender represented to her that the only way the loan could be made
was to designate it as a "business loan." That designation not only
ostensibly avoided federal truth-in-lending protection for Mrs. Greene
but also removed usury limitations. The significance of the designa-
tion, however, was not explained to Mrs. Greene. The lender also con-
114. 291 So. 2d at 839-40. Despite the fact that the parties were in litigation over
the option, the buyer was able to persuade the seller to pass an act of sale at the
office of the buyer's lawyer, as well as to sign papers dismissing the lawsuit and dismiss-
ing his own attorney.
115. 488 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1980).
116. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
117. 36 Conn. Supp. 217, 416 A.2d 170 (Super. Ct. 1979).
118. 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974).
119. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968), affd per curiam on other grounds,
108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (1970). See text at notes 90-92, supra.
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cealed the fact that a $2,800 fee would be charged for brokering the
loan.
American Home Improvements, Inc. v. MacIver presented uncons-
cionability as an alternative basis of nonenforcement of a home im-
provement contract on facts similar to Carter v. Foreman. As in
Carter, the contractor concealed the true cost of credit in an apparent
attempt to generate a promissory note which could be subsequently
enforced by a finance company as a holder in due course. The artifice
violated New Hampshire's truth-in-lending laws, which was policy
reason enough to deny enforcement of a contract calling for a total
payment of $2,569 for goods and services valued at $960, with an in-
terest charge of $809 and a sales "commission" of $800. The inference
of fraud takes shape in the case by virtue of the signing by the
homeowner of a promissory note and power of attorney that were
blank, undated, and stated no rate of interest and by the fact that
within a week of the signing, the contractor had paid the sales com-
mission, but had performed only a negligible amount of contracted
services.
Murphy v. McNamara concerned a television rental agreement
calling for weekly payments of $16 which if continued for seventy-
eight successive weeks would constitute a purchase by the lessee. No
disclosure was made to the lessee that $16 multiplied by seventy-eight
would yield a credit purchase price of $1,248 for the television. As
in Maclver, but unlike in Carter, the consumer could have made that
multiplication based on the figures in the contract. Despite that dif-
ference, Carter would permit an inference of fraud to arise, in that
the lessor's "rent-to-own" plan was violative of the public policy
evidenced by the federal truth-in-lending laws and in that the agree-
ment, which was in fact a disguised conditional sale, was imposed upon
an obviously unsophisticated consumer.
Albert Merrill School v. Godoy unquestionably involved a more
sophisticated artifice than that employed in Greene, Murphy, or
MacIver, but the holding of unenforceability due to unconscionability
would just as simply be error and probably fraud in Louisiana under
the Molaison-Carter-Smith jurisprudence. The school routinely gave
passing scores to all applicants taking an aptitude test for its course
in data processing. This misled applicants, who erroneously believed
that the school was selective in admissions and that the test was a
valid and reliable indicator of their ability in the data processing course
or of success in the data processing field, when in fact no such validity
or reliability was demonstrable.2 '
120. See Delta School of Business, Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Shropshire, 399 So. 2d 1212
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (school's recruiting practices and advertising raised a presump-
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Davis v. Kolb.' makes an interesting comparison to Albert Mer-
rill School v. Godoy. In Godoy, the school held itself out as
knowledgeable and experienced in the evaluation of aptitude and,
therefore, as a knowledgeable and reliable party concerning the value
of the student's investment of tuition money. In truth, the school
misrepresented the benefit which the student would receive from his
investment. In Davis, a landowner gave a timber deed to a timber
buyer who had misrepresented his experience and knowledge as a
timber buyer and who had told the landowner that the timber was
worth $10,000 to $20,000, when in fact the value was in excess of
$50,000. The deed was set aside on the ground of unconscionability.
Viewed as a case of simple error,2 ' the deed could be set aside in
Louisiana if the price was the seller's principal motive. Viewed in the
same light as Godoy, the case becomes one of misrepresentation by
tion that the school knew that plaintiffs principal motive was the school's promise
of job placement assistance); cf. Sciortino v. Leach, 242 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1970) (owner of a beauty school did not maintain certain records he knew were re-
quired to qualify students to take state licensing examination-a "failure of considera-
tion"). The Godoy plaintiff was not fully conversant in the English language and suf-
fered from a lack of general education-factors which would call for unenforceability
in Louisiana under Molaison, Carter, and Smith. See also Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin,
286 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973) (illiterate buyers unknowingly signed a mor-
tgage and promissory note); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969) (elderly buyer with impaired vision and only a fourth-grade education
did not consent to contract); Community Constr. Co. v. Governale, 211 So. 2d 677 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968) (illiterate and language-impaired homeowner); Fidelity Credit Co.
v. Bradford, 177 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (fraud found where sellers employed
a "referral sales" scheme and obtained an unknowing execution of a mortgage on buyer's
home; there were numerous other purchaser-complaints about unknowing mortgage
execution); Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962) (purchaser of insurance who had "little formal education" did not consent
to purchase); Segretto v. Menefee Motor Co., 159 So. 345 (La. App. Orl. 1935) (illiterate
buyer).
Students seeking a refund or avoidance of payment of tuition have been unsuccessful
in Louisiana courts on several occasions. See Guillot v. Spencer Business College, Inc.,
267 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff, suffering no apparent disabilities,
failed to prove fraud in connection with the enrollment of his son); Alexander Hamilton
Inst. v. Hollis, 133 So. 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) (student, suffering no apparent
disabilities, was bound by his enrollment agreement). Compare Penny v. Spencer
Business College, Inc., 85 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) (student's inability to
attend school term, because of illness, gave her no right to a return of prepaid tuition,
so long as the school permitted her to take the course of study later or transfer her
enrollment to a third person) with Richardson v. Cole, 173 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1965) (a physical disability made it impossible for plaintiff to take the remaining
hours of contracted dancing instruction; rescission and recovery of the unearned por-
tion of the amount paid was proper).
121. 263 Ark. 158, 563 S.W.2d 438 (1978).
122. See Jones v. DeLoach, 317 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
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the purchaser for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage. ' In
such a case, the fraud has tainted the seller's consent (assuming price
to have been a material part of the contract).'24
It previously was suggested that the unconscionability cases of
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.'25 and Vom Lehn v. Astor
Art Galleries Ltd.' would be cases of consent produced by simple
error in Louisiana."7 Fraud was not found in either Williams or Vom
Lehn. Still, the facts of each are analogous to those of the Molaison-
Carter-Smith jurisprudence in that, in both Williams and Vom Lehn,
the seller seemingly took advantage of an obvious lack of buyer
sophistication. As such, fraud might be a viable theory of non-
123. In Aetna Ins. Co. v. General Elect. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1978), GE declared that its electric transformer would withstand a certain level of
electrical "surge." In truth, GE did not know whether the transformer had the declared
quality and only hoped that it did. The court equated such an assertion to fraud:
We deem it an unjust advantage to obtain a sale by misrepresentation. A [party]
who in fact does not know of a defect in his product cannot reveal it to the buyer.
But [such a party] could have refrained from making an assertion, the truth or
falsity of which it did not know.
362 So. 2d at 1187. Because the knowledge that the declared quality was not present
can be imputed to the manufacturer in Louisiana, see text at notes 196-227, infra,
the court was not pressed to find actual knowledge of falsity. Cf. Smith v. Everett,
291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (buyer knew real value of land).
Davis also comes under the Louisiana Civil Code articles on lesion. LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 1860-1880. According to Civil Code article 1860, lesion is the injury suffered by
one who does not receive "a full equivalent for what he gives" in a commutative con-
tract, i.e., a contract in which what one party does, gives, or promises is considered
as equivalent for that done, given, or promised by the other. The Civil Code affords
a remedy on the premise that the contract in which equivalents are not present is
tainted by error or imposition. However, Civil Code article 1861 restricts the remedy
in the case of persons of full age and sound mind to certain cases of partition and
to cases in which the vendor of immovable property receives less than one-half of
the value of the property. Lesion has been held applicable to the sale of timber in
Louisiana. Hyde v. Barron, 125 La. 227, 51 So. 126 (1909); Smith v. Huie-Hodge Lumber
Co., 123 La. 959, 49 So. 655 (1909). Standing timber is legislatively deemed subject
to the laws relative to immovables. LA. Civ. CODE art. 464.
124. Cf. Chemical Cleaning, Inc. v. Brindell-Bruno, Inc., 214 So. 2d 215 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968) (pipe cleaning company represented itself as having had experience in
making estimates on cleaning jobs of the kind undertaken; the defendant had a right
to assume that plaintiff's expert estimate would bear some reasonable proportion to
the total time required for completion of the job); Smith v. Ponder, 169 So. 2d 683,
684-85 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) ("The courts have repeatedly held that a person who
holds himself out as skilled in any art, trade or profession is primarily liable for any
damage to persons who place themselves or their belongings in his charge, since they
are justified in relying on the skill which he holds himself out as possessing. The ex-
pert has an obligation to warn of any incidental danger of which he is cognizant due
to the particular knowledge of his speciality.").
125. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'g on other grounds 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.).
126. 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See note 53, supra.
127. See discussion in text accompanying notes 51-66, supra.
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enforceability in Louisiana. Vom Lehn is factually quite similar to
Molaison, Carter, and Smith, but it is also amenable to the holding
in Griffing v. Atkins,"8 in which a jeweler purchased from an uneducated
man a ring at a price he knew to be almost one-tenth of the actual
market value, a value he did not disclose. Such concealment was held
to be fraud, vitiating the seller's consent.9 Likewise, Williams is
reminiscent of Carter, in that in neither case was the consumer made
aware of the key credit terms. Moreover, there is a certain absurdity
to the idea in Williams that one would knowingly enter into an agree-
ment that, seven years later, could permit the seller to repossess all
items purchased during that period despite monthly payments
throughout the period. Such a state of facts might yield a judicial
response similar to that of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Henry,1"' in which an elderly woman,
physically unable to read (or' drive) and possessing limited financial
resources, had signed a promissory note for the purchase of an
automobile: "It taxes our credulity to believe that a seventy-year old
woman in her physical and economic condition would, without some
misrepresentation or fraud, proceed on her own to buy a -new
automobile."''
Perhaps the courts of Louisiana have developed a paternalistic
attitude toward those citizens hampered in their contractual dealings
by lack of education, literacy, and fluency in the English language
and by obvious physical and financial infirmities. The Molaison-Carter-
Smith-Henry jurisprudence certainly so suggests, and the history of
education in the state and the diversity of culture and language
arguably justifies such an attitude. In any event, the unconscionability
cases of Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz,'32 Jefferson Credit Corp.
v. Marcano," and Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso" each involved Spanish-
speaking purchasers, while the unconscionability cases of Jones v. Star
Credit Corp."' and Toker v. Westerman... involved the sale of freezers
for a total credit price of $1,400 and $1,200, respectively, to purchasers
whose financial resources, like those of the buyers in Murphy v.
McNamara and Williams v. Walker-Thomas, were known by the sellers
128. 1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
129. See also Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924).
130. 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
131. 221 So. 2d at 533.
132. 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
133. 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
134. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
135. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
136. 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
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to be so limited as to make them eligible for welfare payments. 13 7 Is
it not absurd to believe that buyers in such obviously weak educa-
tional, linguistic, and economic circumstances would have made such
purchases without some misrepresentation or fraud? 8'
The Supplier's Obligation to Properly Advise the Consumer
As between the supplier and the consumer, the former is typically
more knowledgeable about the nature of the product sold, the space
to be leased, or the project to be undertaken. Louisiana Civil Code
article 2474 recognizes the' normal disparity in knowledge and
sophistication between buyer and seller in its requirement that "the
seller is bound to explain himself clearly respecting the extent of his
own obligations" and that "any obscure or ambiguous clause is con-
strued against him." Louisiana courts have applied the principle of
article 2474, by analogy, to contractors, lessors, and other suppliers."9
Louisiana Civil Code article 1958 likewise recognizes the disparity in
the positions of suppliers and consumers by providing that in a
supplier-prepared contract, any doubt or obscurity arising for want
of a necessary explanation calls for the adoption of the construction
most favorable to the consumer. Avoidance of error is the underlying
rationale of each article, but the duties of the supplier in Louisiana
to avoid error extend beyond merely an explanation of the extent
of his own obligations and the use of contract forms that are free
of ambiguity.
137. The buyers in Jones and Murphy were welfare recepients at the time of sale;
in Westerman the buyers subsequently sought such assistance.
138. Fraud was said not to be present in Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d
at 191, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266, yet the opinion also remarks: "The very limited financial
resources of the purchaser, known to the sellers at the time of sale, is entitled to
weight in the balance. Indeed, the [price] value disparity itself leads inevitably to the
felt conclusion that knowing advantage was taken of the plaintiffs." 59 Misc. 2d at
192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The New Jersey court in Westerman no doubt felt the same.
Similarly, in Frostifresh, the seller of a freezer for a credit price of $1,145 knew at
the time of sale that the buyer was unemployed and that the buyer himself did not
believe he could afford the purchase. However, taking "knowing advantage" of finan-
cially, linguistically, and educationally handicapped persons is precisely the conduct
labelled "fraud" in the Molaison-Carter-Smith-Henry jurisprudence in Louisiana.
139. See Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979);
Governor Claiborne Apts. v. Attaldo, 231 La. 85, 90 So. 2d 787 (1956); Gautreau v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (insurance);
United Cos. Mortgage & Inv. v. Estate of McGee, 372 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1979) (loan company); Blum v. Marrero, 346 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Equilease
Corp. v. Hill, 290 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (leases); Algiers Medical & Surgical
Group, Inc. v. Adams, 275 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 686
(1973); Community Constr. Co. v. Governale, 211 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
See generally Comment, Unconscionable Contract Provisions: A History of Unenforceability
From Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUL. L. REV. 193, 206-07 (1967).
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The more knowledgeable supplier often must, in the exercise of
good faith, affirmatively act as an advisor to the consumer 40 pointing
out to him for example, any construction methods that he knows may
yield advantages such as lower insurance rates,"' warning him of any
problem or condition that the supplier knows or should know might
cause an unsatisfactory result,' 2 even advising him in an appropriate
140. In Mixon v. Brechtel, 174 So. 283 (La. App. Orl. 1937), the court approved
the following statement by the trial judge:
A [sic] person who undertakes to hold themselves out to the world as skilled in
any art, trade or profession and have people put themselves or their cases or
belongings in their charge, are perfectly and absolutely justified in relying on
the skill and art and science that such a person holds himself out to have in
the exercise of such a trade, profession or art and a person so doing is primarily
liable for any damage that occurs.
174 So. at 284. See also Smith v. Ponder, 169 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); American
Mfgrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Gas Corp., 159 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
141. See Fire Protection Equip. Co. v. Rabinowitz, 194 So. 733 (La. App. Orl. 1940);
see also Algiers Medical & Surgical Group, Inc. v. Adams, 275 So. 2d 907 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 686 (1973).
142. Wurst v. Pruyn, 250 La. 1109, 202 So. 2d 268 (1967) (building contractor should
have known of a soil defect and should have advised the owner of the need to take
corrective action); Spring v. Stevens Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc., 343 So. 2d 256 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977) (paving contractor had duty to warn customer that concrete should
not be poured when there is a high probability of rain); Kunnes v. Bryant, 49 So.
2d 872 (La. App. Orl. 1951) (painting contractor must advise homeowner that painting
over a surface previously painted with creosote may not yield a satisfactory result);
A.B.C. Oil Burner & Htg. Co. v. Palmer, 28 So. 2d 462 (La. App. Orl. 1946) (air condi-
tioning contractor was under a duty to advise owner that existing water line was
insufficient for satisfactory operation of contemplated air conditioning system); Mat-
thews v. Rudy, 4 La. App. 226 (2d Cir. 1926) (building contractor must disclose to
homeowner any insufficiency in the foundation soil of which he is aware). Compare
Dyess v. Weems, 178 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) with Rinaudo v. Treadwell,
212 La. 510, 32 So. 2d 907 (1947) (implied warranty as to potability of well water).
The UCC imposes a similar requirement upon the seller with "superior knowledge."
See Addis v. Bernardin, 226 Kan. 302, 597 P.2d 250 (1979).
In general, if the contracted work is performed in accordance with plans and specifica-
tions furnished by the owner, the contractor has no liability for defects that later
appear if the plans were proper and, if followed, could produce the desired result,
assuming no defect in materials or workmanship. On the other hand, if the contractor
has expert knowledge on the subject and has reason to believe that there is a defect
in the specifications or plans, it is his duty to examine them carefully and to voice
his concern to the owner. See Brasher v. City of Alexandria, 215 La. 887, 41 So. 2d
819 (1949); Draube v. Rieth, 114 So. 2d 879 (La. App. Orl. 1959). Thus, the contractor
who neither prepared the plans nor possesses or holds himself out as possessing ex-
pertise or special knowledge in the field has no duty to inspect the plans for possible
insufficiencies. See, e.g., Co-Operative Cold Storage Bldrs., Inc. v. Arcadia Foods, Inc.,
291 So. 2d 403 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Lebreton v. Brown, 260 So. 2d 767 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1972); Draube v. Rieth, 114 So. 2d 879 (La. App. Orl. 1959). But plans deficient
in some important respect should give rise to a duty on the part of the experienced
contractor (as a part of his overall duty under Civil Code article 1958 to avoid am-
biguity in the contracting process) to warn the inexperienced layman-consumer thereof.
1983] 1347
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
case that the contemplated project is not economically worthwhile."'
The supplier also must explain the meaning and implication of any
trade usages of which the consumer likely will be ignorant.'44
The idea that the more knowledgeable supplier should act as an
advisor to the consumer would be appealing to a Louisiana court in
a case involving language deficiencies, such as Albert Merrill School
v. Godoy,' 5 Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz,'" Jefferson Credit Corp.
v. Marcano,'7 and Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso.' 8 Thus, while the seller
could have explained in each case the extent of his own obligations
(to deliver and warrant) and utilized a nonambiguous contract form,
an inference of fraud still could be drawn from the failure of the sup-
plier to act as an advisor to the consumer. The goal of the consumer
in Godoy to successfully complete the Albert Merrill data processing
course, for example, was likely unattainable because of his own lack
of language skills and preparatory education. He should have been
so advised, just as the homeowner in Louisiana must be advised by
the painting contractor that his idea of painting over a previously
creosoted surface will not be successful."9 Likewise, the buyers in
Frostifresh v. Reynoso, Jones v. Star Credit Corp.," Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co.,"' and Toker v. Westerman'52 should have been
advised that the contemplated purchase might exceed their limited
See Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). Compare
Katz v. Judice, 252 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971) with Mut v. Newark Ins. Co.,
289 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (obligation of contractor to construct a building
that was safe and in compliance with requirements of local building code). In addition,
the contractor may not always rely on appearances. He must determine, in appropriate
cases, whether the contemplated project is structually feasible. See Peak v. Cantey,
302 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
143. The roofing repair contractor, for example, must so advise the owner whenever
the roof is unrepairable. U-Test-M of La., Inc. v. Martin, 305 So. 2d 557 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1974).
144. See, e.g., Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Co., 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1976); Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 259 La. 1055, 254 So. 2d 464 (1971); cf. Wilda, Inc. v. Devall Diesel, Inc.,
343 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (contention that boat owner did not adhere
to custom of the marine repair industry); Davis v. Turnbull, 7 Mart. (o.s.) 228 (La.
1819) (plaintiff could not claim interest on an account, according to the custom of mer-
chants, where the defendant was not a merchant).
145. 78 Misc. 2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civ. Ct. 1974).
146. 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
147. 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
148. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
149. Kunnes v. Bryant, 49 So. 2d 872 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
150. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
151. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
152. 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
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financial abilities," with the result that their goal or motive of full
ownership and use of the thing would be thwarted. At the very least,
such buyers require a clear disclosure, as in Carter v. Foreman,1 5 4 of
the total credit price and the contemplated allocation of payments.
The Supplier's Demand for Performance Despite His
Own Nonperformance
The Louisiana Civil Code describes a resolutory condition of an
obligation as one that does not prevent the obligation from taking
effect, 55 but which may defeat or revoke the obligation if the event
in question happens.5 5 A resolutory condition is implied by Civil Code
article 2046 in all commutative contracts..7 in Louisiana in case either
of the parties fails to comply with his engagements. 5 ' Several of the
unconscionability cases appear to fall within Civil Code article 2046,
in that a supplier sought to compel performance despite the fact that
his own performance was defective or not in conformity with the con-
tract requirements. In Andrews, the seller insisted upon payment,
taking the position that the dispute as to the "new" quality of the
automobile was a matter of implied warranty and that, even if its
disclaimer of warranty was ineffective,'59 the automobile delivered was
not "defective." The Andrews decision emphasized that if a seller is
bound to deliver a new car, that is an express, rather than an im-
plied, obligation and it is not fulfilled by the delivery of something
entirely different. The analysis is the same in Louisiana. The failure
to comply with the contract description renders immaterial the issue
of exclusion or renunciation of implied warranties. 60 For example,
where the seller has delivered a different type of diesel fuel than that
ordered by the buyer, the buyer's proper action in Louisiana is for
153. Cf. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969)
(buyer told seller that she "lived on a pension"); Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (homeowner told contractor he could not afford any repairs
to his home).
154. 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
155. Such a condition would be a "suspensive" condition. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2021.
156. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2021, 2045.
157. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1767, 1768.
158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046.
159. See text at notes 46-49, 73-74, supra. The seller in Andrews was also the
manufacturer of the vehicle, and as such he arguably could not avoid implied warran-
ties in Louisiana. See text at notes 184-227, infra.
160. See, e.g., Henderson v. Leona Rice Milling Co., 160 La. 597, 107 So. 459 (1926);
Shreveport Mill & Elevator Co. v. Stoehr, 139 La. 719, 71 So. 961 (1916); United Suriname
Trading Co. v. C.B. Fox Co., 242 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Dales Jewelers
& Home Furnishers, Inc. v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 126 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); Wrenn v.
Lafayette Furniture Co., 151 So. 148 (La. App. Orl. 1933); Continental Jewelry Co.
v. Augusta, 129 So. 177 (La. App. Orl. 1930).
13491983]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
breach of contract, rather than for breach of implied warranty."' The
disclaimer of implied warranty would become germane upon a perfor-
mance that met the contract description or other expressed terms. '62
Robert A. Munro & Co. v. Meyer,'6 ' New Prague Flouring Mill Co.
v. Spears,' Green v. Arcos, Ltd.,'65 and F.C. Austin Co. v. J. H. Tillman
Co., '6 like Andrews, are UCC section 2-302 "illustrative results" cases
which present essentially the same legal issues against different factual
backgrounds. The buyer in Munro contracted for a specified quantity
of meat and bone meal, with a "guaranteed" analysis as to composi-
tion, under a "with all faults"'' 7 clause. Subsequent analysis revealed
that the bone meal had been adulterated by an admixture of cocoa
husks average 3.66 per cent of the total. Although the analysis
arguably met the contract specification, the court held that the seller's
tendered performance nevertheless had not met the description of
"meat and bone meal" and that the seller's "with all faults" clause
could apply only to goods which in fact answered the trade descrip-
tion. In the absence of a conforming tender, the exclusion clause could
not foreclose the overriding implied warranty -accompanying a sale
by description- that the goods will conform to the description.
The buyer in New Prague contracted for the delivery in separate
shipments of "Old Wheat Flour." What he received was flour of in-
ferior quality that was not suitable for his purposes. The seller's posi-
tion was that, notwithstanding the nonconforming tender, the buyer
was required by the terms of the contract to continue to give instruc-
tions for the remaining shipments and the seller was entitled, under
the contract, to treat the buyer's repudiation of the contract as merely
a request to extend the time of performance. The Iowa court did not
agree. The court in Green v. Arcos, Ltd. similarly refused to enforce
a contract under which the buyer's right to reject the goods shipped
was waived, purportedly even with respect to a failure of the seller
to ship the goods at all or where the seller shipped entirely different
goods.
161. See Victory Oil Co. v. Perret, 183 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
162. In Dales Jewelers & Home Furnishers, Inc. v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 126 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1967), the refusal of a jeweler to honor a guarantee entitled the buyer to dissolve
the contract and obtain a restoration of the price and damages for the breach. The
result would be the same in the case of a nonconforming tender. See Rapides Grocery
Co. v. Clopton, 125 So. 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
163. [19301 2 K.B. 312.
164. 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922).
165. 47 T.L.R. 336 (C.A. 1931).
166. 104 Or. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922).
167. The indicated language would constitute a valid disclaimer of all implied UCC
warranties. See UCC S 2-316(3)(a) (1978). The bone meal was guaranteed as follows:




As had seemingly been true in Andrews, Munro, and Green v.
Arcos, the sellers in Butcherl"8 and Austin, in essence, were attempt-
ing to use an implied warranty exclusion clause as a shield from the
consequences of nonperformance by nonconforming tender."6 9 In UCC
section 2-302 parlance, the Andrews-Austin line of decisions represents
the "unfair surprise" notion. In Louisiana, such cases simply would
reflect a self-serving attempt by a seller to stretch beyond the limits
of tolerance the meaning of key contract language in circumstances
in which the seller had not in fact performed. 7 '
The Munro, Green, and New Prague nonenforcement results would
be the same in Louisiana under Civil Code article 2046. In Henderson
v. Leona Rice Milling Co., 7' for example, the seller tendered as against
a contract description of "pure Honduras rice" a mixture of Honduras,
Carolina, and Red rice. The Louisiana Supreme Court treated the suit
as one for breach of an express warranty, but the court indicated
that it made little difference whether the case was labelled as a breach
of contract case or as one for breach of the implied warranty of general
fitness; the seller's nonperformance made any implied warranty waiver
issue irrelevant.1
7 2
168. See text at note 50, supra.
169. In Arcos, a buyer of timber had agreed that he would "not reject the goods
. but shall accept or pay for them in terms of the contract." In Austin, the buyer
of an asphalt-mixing plant had agreed to a return and cancellation as the sole remedy
for breach of the contract.
170. The Arcos rationale is that the nonrejection clause was inoperative in light
of the seller's nonperformance. In addition to the decisions cited at note 160, supra,
numerous other Louisiana decisions compare quite nicely to Austin and Arcos. See,
e.g., Edington Drilling Co. v. Yearwood, 239 La. 303, 118 So. 2d 419 (1960); Schreiner
v. Weil Furniture Co., 68 So. 2d 149 (La. App. Orl. 1953); Meyer v. Southwestern Gas
& Elec. Co., 133 So. 504 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931); cf. Tremont Lumber Co. v. Robinson
Lumber Co., 160 La. 254, 107 So. 101 (1926) (lumber buyer would have been justified
in canceling the contract because of seller's untimely delivery); Owens v. Robinson,
329 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (seller failed to deliver as required by the con-
tract); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208 (La. App. Orl. 1955) (air conditioning units-
misrepresented as new could not be delivered in performance of the seller's obliga-
tion); Graves v. Flynn, 63 So. 2d 619 (La. App. Orl. 1953) (stipulation as to delivery
not performed, so that late delivery could be refused by the buyer); Perry Mill &
Elev. Co. v. D.A. Varnado & Son, 147 So. 510 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933) (seller non-
compliance with shipment stipulation); Turk v. Crnkovic, 144 So. 203 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1932) (seller, obligated to deliver red and white staves, had not performed by late
delivery of white staves); John J. Meier & Co. v. Schmidt & Ziegler, 12 La. App. 431,
125 So. 191 (La. App. Orl. 1929) (buyer, under a stipulation for "shipment this week,"
not obligated to accept a later shipment); T.A.D. Co. v. Saurage, 6 La. App. 570 (1927)
(certain free merchandise to buyer of goods was part of the buyer's consideration);
Robert Gair & Co. v. Joseph Levy & Bros., 3 Orl. App. 359 (La. App. 1906) (seller
noncompliance with shipment stipulation).
171. 160 La. 597, 107 So. 459 (1926).
172. See also Shreveport Mill & Elevator Co. v. Stoehr, 139 La. 719, 71 So. 961
(1916) (contract called for "split silk" flour; seller tendered "ambrosia," which he
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Another UCC section 2-302 "illustrative results" decision, Kansas
City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp.,13 likewise presents
but a factual variation of Andrews and Munro and would be amenable
to the implied resolutory condition principle of Civil Code article 2046.
A seller of catsup provided in its contract form that "all claims other
than swells [had to] be made within ten days from receipt," yet it
delivered to the buyer catsup that contained a latent defect (mold)
discoverable only by microscopic examination. Because a product for
human consumption was involved, there would be implicit in such a
contract an obligation that the product was fit for consumption. 74
Indeed, such is perhaps inherent in the express description "catsup."
In either case, the seller arguably had not met the contract descrip-
tion and had not performed. 75
The landmark New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Unico v.
Owen,17 one of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code section 5.108 "prior
application" cases, would probably be decided in Louisiana as a simple
matter of Civil Code article 2046. The plaintiff in Unico attempted
to enforce, as a third party holder in due course or, alternatively,
as an assignee protected by a "waiver of claims and defenses" clause,
a contract that the assignor-seller itself had not and could not
perform.177 The New Jersey court would not permit enforcement, find-
ing between the seller and the plaintiff a "close connexity" destruc-
tive of holder in due course status and ruling that the waiver of
defenses clause was unconscionable. A Louisiana court likely would
not follow suit on the close connexity issue,"' but this issue has been
erroneously supposed would be of the same grade and suitable for buyer's purposes);
United Suriname Trading Co. v. C.B. Fox Co., 242 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970)
(delivery of the wrong grade of wheat); cf. Gauthier v. Bogard Seed Co., 377 So. 2d
1290 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (express warranty as to germination rate of seed); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (declaration
as to quality made without knowing whether the declaration was true).
173. 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
174. Civil Code article 1903 states that the obligation of contracts "extends not
only to what is expressly stipulated, but also to everything that, by law, equity or
custom, is considered as incidental to the particular contract, or necessary to carry
it into effect." Louisiana courts have long held that a food or beverage processor im-
pliedly warrants the wholesomeness of its products. See Demars v. Natchitoches Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 353 So. 2d 433 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), and cases cited therein.
175. Cf. Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926); Shreveport
Mill & Elev. Co. v. Stoehr, 139 La. 719, 71 So. 961 (1916); United Suriname Trading
Co. v. C.B. Fox Co., 242 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
176. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
177. The contract called for the delivery of 140 record albums (with a record player
to be received free) for a time-payment price of $820 to be paid in monthly installments.
The buyers received only the record player and 12 albums before the seller's insolvency.
178. Hebert, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1959-1960 Term-A
Symposium, 21 LA. L. REV. 277, 330-334 (1961) (by Dean and Professor Paul M. Hebert);
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negated by the Federal Trade Commission's Preservation of Consumer
Claims and Defenses Rule,179 by which third party assignees remain
subject to all claims and defenses of the consumer-buyer, including
that of Civil Code article 2046.
The previously discussed Industralease case' and Nosse v. Vulcan
Basement Waterproofing, Inc."'1 also can be categorized as supplier
nonperformance cases. In Industralease, the garbage incinerators
delivered to the lessee did not work from the moment of installation,
yet the supplier sought to force the lessee to make the contractual
payments, while asserting its disclaimer of implied warranties. It is
difficult to see how a supplier could assert in good faith" its disclaimer
of warranty under such circumstances. It is doubtful, however, that
the delivery of an incinerator that will not incinerate would be con-
sidered a satisfactory compliance by the supplier with his express
engagements within the meaning of Civil Code article 2046. That prin-
ciple also would seem to provide relief for the lessee in United States
Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc.,83 which signed a
lease for the rental of certain equipment, agreed to waive all implied
warranties as against the lessor, but never received one vital compo-
nent of the equipment, without which the components delivered were
useless. Likewise, the basement waterproofing contractor in Nosse
failed completely to perform his engagements when, as a result of
his initial efforts, the consumer's basement leaked more seriously than
it previously had. The issue of the contractor's disclaimer of implied
and express warranties in such a case in Louisiana need not be
reached.
Failure to perform as a result of the nondelivery of the thing pro-
mised must be distinguished from the delivery of a thing which simply
does not have a certain quality which the seller in good faith declared
it would have and which he knew was the buyer's principal motive
for the sale. The two ideas can be difficult to separate in actual prac-
tice. Did the seller in Andrews deliver the thing sold or something
entirely different? Or, did he simply deliver something that did not
have the quality of being "new" as he had declared it would have?
Andrews, Munro, Kansas City Wholesale, Arcos, Austin, and Meyer
all can be similarly analyzed.
Comment, Negotiable Instruments Law-"Close Connexity" and the Finance Company
as a Holder in Due Course, 18 LA. L. REv. 322 (1958).
179. See 16 C.F.R. S 433 (1982).
180. See text at notes 93-97, supra.
181. 35 Ohio Misc. 1, 299 N.E.2d 708 (1973).
182. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901.
183. 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
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The Manufacturer's Inability to Avoid Implied Warranties
Civil Code articles 2474 and 2475 provide that the seller in Loui-
siana is bound to two principal obligations: to deliver the thing sold
and to warrant it as free of "redhibitory vices."'84 The warranty as
to redhibitory vices, implied from the nature of the agreement of sale
according to Civil Code article 1764,185 obligates the seller to deliver
a thing that is, according to article 2520, reasonably fit for intended
uses; that is, free of any nonapparent'8 defects that render the thing
either "absolutely useless" or its use "so inconvenient and imperfect,
that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased
it, had he known of the vice. 187 Upon proof of a redhibitory defect
and its existence at the time of the sale, the seller is obligated to
restore (or, in certain cases, reduce) the purchase price."' Civil Code
articles 11 and 1764(2) clearly indicate that the seller's implied war-
ranty may be modified or renounced.189 With equal clarity, however,
the Civil Code distinguishes between a seller who knew not of the
defects and a seller who knew of the defects or who was otherwise
in bad faith. The former is afforded an opportunity to repair any such
defect and only is bound to restore or reduce the purchase price if
he is unable to repair.' He theoretically can effectuate a valid renun-
ciation of the implied warranty by the purchaser. 9' The latter is not
privileged to renounce the implied warranty, has no right to cure the
defect by repair, and is answerable to the purchaser in damages and
attorney's fees in addition to restoration of the price. 92
184. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520.
185. Civil Code article 1764(A) reads:
All things that are not forbidden by law, may legally become the subject of,
or the motive for contracts; but different agreements are governed by different
rules, adapted to the nature of each contract, to distinguish which it is necessary
in every contract to consider:
2. Things which, although not essential to the contract, yet are implied from
the nature of such agreement . h.. but which the parties may expressly modify
or renounce, without destroying the contract or changing its description; of this
nature is warranty, which is implied in every sale, but which may be modified
or renounced, without changing the character of the contract or destroying its
effect.
186. By Civil Code article 2521, apparent defects such as those which the buyer
might have discovered by simple inspection are not considered to be redhibitory defects.
187. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520.
188. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2531. See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2541-2544.
189. Civil Code article 1764(A)(2) is set out at note 185, supra. See also LA. CIv.
CODE art. 2503.
190. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531.
191. The term "theoretically" is used because instances of successful renunciation
by the consumer are rare. See text at notes 251-273, infra.
192. LA, CIv. CODE arts. 2531, 2545, & 2548.
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Civil Code article 2547 provides that a declaration made by the
seller that the thing sold possesses some quality which he knows it
does not possess constitutes fraud-as would the concealment of a
known defect of the redhibitory nature.'93 Civil Code article 2548
declares that the renunciation of warranty by the buyer is not
obligatory where there has been fraud on the part of the seller. In
Louisiana, manufacturers are considered to be "sellers," and they are,
by definition, knowledgeable of any redhibitory defects in their pro-
ducts and, therefore, unable to renounce the implied redhibition
warranty.
Fifty-five years prior to the landmark New Jersey Supreme Court
decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors'94 - probably the most
notorious of all the unconscionability cases-in which a manufacturer's
disclaimer of implied warranty was struck down, the Louisiana
Supreme Court was laying the foundation of a broad rule of nonen-
forceability of any and all attempts by manufacturers to disclaim the
implied warranty. The Louisiana court determined in George v.
Shreveport Cotton Oil Co.' that when the seller is the manufacturer
of the thing sold, the fair presumption is that he is familiar with the
raw materials from which the thing is made and understands the pro-
cess of manufacture, and therefore he should be presumed to know
of any defects in the thing sold. 96 Six years after the George decision,
the court added, in Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer,"' definitional guidance:
"Every one ought to know the qualities, good or bad, of the things
which he fabricates in the exercise of the art, craft, or business of
which he makes public profession."'9 8
One might have argued convincingly that George and Doyle were
applicable only to the seller who, being in privity of contract with
the buyer, happened also to be the manufacturer of the thing.'99 In-
deed, the Civil Code's articles "Of Sale" arguably contemplate that
no redhibition action can be brought against one not in contractual
privity with the buyer."' However, despite the theoretical arguments
193. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1832 & 1847.
194. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
195. 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905).
196. The court cited to Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884).
197. 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911).
198. 129 La. at 840, 56 So. at 907. See also Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57
So. 2d 666 (1952); Sales Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Emco Inc., 385 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1980).
199. Doyle itself seemingly so holds. 129 La. at 943, 56 So. at 908 (citing POTHIER,
VENTE S 214).
200. Civil Code article 2439, for example, states: "The contract of sale is an agree-
ment by which one gives a thing for a price .. , and the other gives the price." (em-
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available to the manufacturer, the recent decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz
of North America, Inc.,"°1 Moreno's, Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High
Schools Inc.,2 2 and Alexander v. Burroughs Corp."3 have made the
privity issue moot. In Media, Mercedes-Benz had no contract with the
purchaser; rather, it was a distributor "standing in the shoes" of the
manufacturer. Implied warranties had arisen, of course, when a sale
occurred between the purchaser and a subsequently defunct dealer,
but had Mercedes-Benz of North America any warranty liability
without privity of contract? The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
it did.11
4
Moreno's applied the presumption of knowledge of defects by a
manufacturer so as to permit a consumer's suit against the manufac-
turer to be brought under the more liberal prescription rule of Civil
Code article 2546 rather than under article 2534.11 The Alexander deci-
sion reaffirms the George proposition that the manufacturer's presumed
phasis added). See Newman v. Dixie Sales & Serv., 387 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980).
201. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
202. 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975).
203. 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978). See also Newman v. Dixie Sales & Serv., 387 So.
2d 1333 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
204. The significance of the decision was noted by the court:
The equation of no privity, no liability is the traditional rule that held sway
for many years. Beginning with the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co .... in 1916, however, the privity requirement has been eliminated in
product liability cases.
Louisiana has aligned itself with the consumer-protection rule, by allowing a
consumer without privity to recover, whether the suit be strictly in tort or upon
implied warranty.
We see no reason why the rule should not apply to the pecuniary loss resulting
from the purchase of a new automobile that proves unfit for use because of la-
tent defects.
... By placing automobiles on the market, the supplier represents to the public
that the vehicles are suitable for use. The intervention of a franchised dealer
should not mitigate that responsibility. The dealer serves only as a conduit for
marketing the automobiles.
The pecuniary loss resulting from an unusable vehicle is recoverable when there
is an express warranty without privity. [W]e find no adequate reason for not ap-
plying the same rule and allowing recovery when there is an implied warranty
without privity.
262 La. at 90, 262 So. 2d at 381.
205. Civil Code article 2534 requires that the redhibition action "must be instituted
within a year, at the farthest, commencing from the date of the sale," but it excepts
that limitation where the seller "had knowledge of the vice and neglected to declare
it to the purchaser." In the latter case, articles 2545 and 2546 require that the action
be commenced within one year of the discovery of the vice. See also Radalec, Inc. v.
Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955); Tuminello v. Mawby, 220
La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952).
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knowledge of defects in the thing manufactured takes the manufac-
turer out of the "good faith" seller category so as to be responsible
for damages. In short, it appears that the manufacturer in Louisiana,
in its relation to the ultimate purchaser, is considered to be a seller
presumed to know of any defects in the thing sold. The Media and
Moreno's opinions suggest this theoretical basis for holding a manufac-
turer liable with the dealer-seller: The manufacturer is the original
vendor, and under French law, the dealer-seller would be considered
to have transmitted to the consumer his rights to sue the original
vendor-a subrogation-like approach.2 0
As a seller presumptively knowledgeable of any redhibitory
defects in the thing sold, the manufacturer in Louisiana is liable for
damages under Civil Code article 2545, and his concealment of the
(imputed) knowledge of defects in the thing sold is arguably bad faith
and the equivalent to fraud."0 7 That imputed knowledge, if viewed as
the equivalent to fraud, brings to bear Civil Code article 2548, under
which any purported waiver or renunciation of the implied warranty
as to redhibitory vices and defects, no matter how clear and unam-
biguous, would be ineffective and unenforceable. But while it is
presently well established that the manufacturer's presumed or im-
puted knowledge of redhibitory defects prevents it from asserting a
right to attempt to repair the defects under Civil Code article 2531,08
exposes it to liability for damages and attorney's fees, and so exposes
it for a longer period of time,0 9 it is less than certain that presumed
or imputed knowledge should be the equivalent of fraud for purposes
206. Media, 262 La. at 89 n.3, 262 So. 2d at 381 n.3; Moreno's, 315 So. 2d at 663.
See also Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Borne v. Mike Persia Chevrolet Co.,
396 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2503. Compare Anderson
v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973) (distinguishing between
manufacturer-dealer and dealer-consumer waivers) with LA. CiV. CODE art. 2531 (no
effect is given to manufacturer-to-retailer waiver clauses).
207. See Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d 607 (La. 1978); Gordon v. Bates-
Crumley Chevrolet Co., 158 So. 223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935); LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1832
& 2547.
208. See, e.g., Newman v. Dixie Sales & Serv., 387 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980); Riche v. Krestview Mobile Homes, Inc., 375 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979);
Laughlin v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 368 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); see also Benard
v. Bradley Automotive, 365 So. 2d 1382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978). In Burns v. Lamar-
Lane Chevrolet, Inc., 354 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), it is said that a manufac-
turer could never be a "seller who knew not of the vice of the thing" within article
2531. Id. at 623. See also Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So.
2d 830 (1955).
209. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Alexander that a manufacturer "is
presumed to know of the defects of the thing which it manufactures and therefore
is deemed to be in bad faith. Hence, article 2545 is applicable." 359 So. 2d at 609 (em-
phasis added; citations omitted). See also Moreno's, Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High
Schools, Inc., 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975); Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228
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of article 2548. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Moreno's did equate
presumed knowledge with fraud for purposes of applying Civil Code
articles 2534 and 2546,21 but application of the imputed or presumed
knowledge proposition to a manufacturer who in fact was in subjec-
tive good faith, so as to apply article 2548, has been questioned by
one commentator. 21 Of course, whenever Civil Code articles 1832, 1847,
and 2547 can be applied directly, as in cases of actual knowledge of
defects, the issue of the relationship between imputed knowledge of
defects and the requisite "fraud" for article 2548 will not arise. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana has not squarely addressed the issue,
but Moreno's and prior high court pronouncements presage absolute
nonrenunciation for manufacturers.2 2
La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955); Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952).
See note 205, supra.
210. 315 So. 2d at 663-64.
211. Campbell, The Remedy of Redhibition: A Cause Gone Wrong, 22 LA. B.J. 27
(1974).
212. In Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955),
the court said, in the context of the manufacturer's liability for damages under Civil
Code article 2545: "[Tlhe question of defendant's actual knowledge of the defects is
unimportant. It was the manufacturer of the [thing sold], and is therefore presumed
to have known of the vices therein." 228 La. at 125, 81 So. 2d at 833. In Rey v. Cuccia,
298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974), the court seemingly held a manufacturer to the more liberal
prescription period of article 2546 because it "failed to declare" a defect of which it
had knowledge only by virtue of the presumption attributable to manufacturers. This
holding was echoed a year later in Moreno's. By 1978, the court moved a step closer
to decreeing nonrenunciation when it held a manufacturer liable for damages under
article 2545, remarking in the process that, by virtue of the presumed knowledge,
a manufacturer "is deemed to be in bad faith." Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359
So. 2d 607, 609 (La. 1978); see also Marsh v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 394 So. 2d 670
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
In 1973, a Louisiana court of appeal decision took the view that manufacturers are
conclusively presumed to know of the defects of things they manufacture. Breaux v.
Winnebago Indus., Inc., 282 So. 2d 763 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973). The 1976 decision in
Edwards v. Port AMC/Jeep, Inc., 337 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), did not in-
volve a manufacturer, but the court did apply the nonrenunciation idea of Civil Code
article 2548 to a seller who "knew or should have known of the defects." Id. at 280.
The seller's "reason to know" of the defect in the thing sold arose in Palmer v. Anchor
Marine, Inc., 331 So. 2d 114 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) because of a similar defect in
a similar thing previously sold, the idea obviously being that once a latent defect in
one of like things is discovered, it is, as to the seller, no longer latent with respect
to the other similar things-whether or not the seller in fact knows of any such defects
in the other things.
In the recent decision in Aetna Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 247 (La. 1978), no defect, as such, in the product
in question was found, but the product would not do what the manufacturer had declared
that it would do. Had the seller's declaration (see Civil Code article 2529) been made
with knowledge of falsity, fraud would be the conclusion under Civil Code article 2547,
as to which the court in Aetna said:
If the confessed fact this manufacturer did not know whether its representa-
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The following unconscionability cases involving nonenforcement
of a manufacturer's disclaimer of implied warranties could have been
decided in Louisiana against the manufacturer under the "presumed
knowledge" principle of Civil Code article 2548: Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc.,21 Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.,14 Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co.,2"5 Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc.,216 Andrews Brothers v. Singer
& Co.,2  Eckstein v. Cummins,"8 Industralease Equipment Corp. v.
tion was true does not suffice as knowledge of its falsity for purposes of Civil
Code article 2547, we apply [the reaffirmation by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Moreno's of] imputation to charge the manufacturer with knowledge that the
declared characteristic was not present. Thus the manufacturer is liable [under
article 2545] for the damages.
362 So. 2d at 1187. The Aetna court expressly recognized that it might be less than
fair to impute such knowledge to a manufacturer as "suppressed" knowledge in a case
in which the manufacturer had made no declaration as to the qualities of the thing,
but in deference to the second paragraph of Civil Code article 2531, giving the good
faith seller who is held liable for redhibitory defects "a corresponding and similar
right of action against the manufacturer" (any manufacturer-seller agreements to the
contrary notwithstanding), the court admitted that "perhaps a manufacturer can never
stipulate against warranty." 362 So. 2d at 1187. The second paragraph of article 2531
establishes that in the event a good faith seller is held liable for redhibitory defects,
"the seller shall have a corresponding and similar right of action against the manufac-
turer of the thing for any losses sustained by the seller, and . . . any provision of
any ... agreement attempting to limit, diminish or prevent such recoupment by the
seller shall not be given any force or effect." Added to the Civil Code in 1974, this
paragraph apparently overrules Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973). The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to review the Aetna decision.
365 So. 2d 247 (La. 1978). See Banks, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: An Untapped
Adjunct to the Law of Redhibition, 26 Loy. L. REV. 263, 284 (1980); Barham, Redhibi-
tion: A Comparative Comment, 49 TUL. L. REV. 376, 387-88 (1975); Comment, Modifica-
tion or Renunciation of Warranty in Louisiana Sales Transactions, 46 TUL. L. REV.
894, 901-02 (1976).
The presumed knowledge rule also denies the manufacturer an opportunity to at-
tempt to repair the alleged rehibitory defect under Civil Code article 2531. See text
at note 190, supra. This denial is arguably as unfair to the manufacturer as the nonrenun-
ciation rule and, perhaps, less defensible as well, an idea voiced in Newman v. Dixie
Sales & Serv.:
It might well be argued that since there is no contractual relationship between
the manufacturer and the [ultimate] buyer, any cause of action by the buyer against
the manufacturer must come from the retailer's right against the manufacturer
by either subrogation or transmission. If this is so, then the manufacturer's duty
should be no greater than that of the retailer, which is repair under article 2531.
387 So. 2d 1333, 1336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). "However," noted the first circuit, "the
supreme court has not adopted this view .... " Id.
213. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (a Uniform Consumer Credit Code S 5.108 "prior
application" case).
214. 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
215. 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
216. 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974).
217. [1934] 1 K.B. 17 (C.A. 1933) (a UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" case).
218. 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
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R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc.,"9 Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons,22 McCarty
v. E.J. Korvette, Inc.,21 Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co.,222 Kan-
sas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing Corp.,223 Robert A.
Munro & Co. v. Meyer,224 Butcher v. Garrett-Enumclaw Co.225 and F.C.
Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman Co." Of course, the fact that most manufac-
turers today do make written warranties brings to bear the implied
warranty nondisclaimer provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act, a fact
which in a consumer case renders moot both the need in Louisiana
to impute knowledge of defects to the manufacturer and the need of
a UCC court to invalidate manufacturer disclaimers of implied war-
ranties on the basis of unconscionability.227 Still, it is significant to
note that while the manufacturer-disclaimer issue simply does not arise
in Louisiana so as to provide a meaningful comparison to the uncons-
cionability cases involving that issue, had Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors arisen in Louisiana rather than in New Jersey, it would not
have represented a landmark decision or even a significant departure
from prior law. It would have been only a logical extension of George
v. Shreveport Cotton Oil Co. Despite comparative differences, the result,
an invalid waiver or renunciation of implied warranty, is the same
in Louisiana, even without a principle of unconscionability.
219. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977).
220. 35 A.D.2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), affd, 30 N.Y.2d 613, 331 N.Y.S.2d
40, 282 N.E.2d 126 (1972).
221. 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975).
222. 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974).
223. 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937) (a UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" case).
It is not entirely clear from the report whether Weber Packing was a manufacturer
(or processor) of the catsup or merely an intermediary distributor. In any event, Weber
Packing most likely could be called a "vendor," and as such, it would be presumed
to know of the qualities of the things it sold. See McAvin v. Morrison Cafeteria Co.,
85 So. 2d 63 (La. App. Orl. 1956); MacLehan v. Loft Candy Stores, 172 So. 367 (La.
App. Orl. 1937). In general, a distinction can be drawn between a clause disclaiming
implied warranties and a clause requiring that any required warranty claims regard-
ing implied warranties be asserted within ten days. In Louisiana, an attempt to reduce
the time within which a redhibition claim may be asserted could be viewed as an
attempt to force the buyer to renounce his protection. Because of the manufacturer's
presumed or imputed knowledge of these very defects, such a clause falls under Civil
Code article 2548 and would not be obligatory on the buyer. Viewed in this light,
the assertion of claims clause in Kansas City Wholesale Grocery is unenforceable. A
similar analysis would seem to fit Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301
N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980) and Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 121
N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (1981). In both Trinkle and Pittsfield, manufacturers supplied
defective goods (fabric and yarn) to be fabricated into finished products and asserted
a limitation on claims despite the fact that the defects in question could not be
discovered until the fabrication process was completed.
224. [1930] 2 K.B. 312 (a UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" case).
225. 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978), discussed in text at note 50, supra.
226. 104 Or. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922) (a UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" case).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1976).
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The Supplier's Duty to Clearly Explain the Extent of His Own Obliga-
tions and Utilize a Contract Form Free of Ambiguity or Obscure
Language
With respect to the refusal to enforce contracts consented to in
error or tainted by fraud, the consumer in Louisiana probably fares
better than consumers elsewhere, and this has probably been true
historically. Fraud and error, however, are more or less what the
judiciary chooses from time to time to make them. Accordingly, one
could simply conclude that a more liberal tradition surrounds the issue
in Louisiana than elsewhere. Even the rule of imputed manufacturer
knowledge of defects can be categorized as primarily judge-made law.
But the absence of a caveat emptor philosophy as a systematic dif-
ference between the Louisiana Civil Code and the common law is
evident in two key error-avoidance articles of the Civil Code. By arti-
cle 2474, a seller "is bound to explain himself clearly respecting the
extent of his obligations: any obscure or ambiguous clause is construed
against him. '2 8 Article 1958 requires, in reference to cases in which
the intent of the parties is unclear or not clearly expressed (as to
which article 1957 lays down the general rule that the agreement is
interpreted against him who has contracted the obligation) that if the
"doubt or obscurity arise for the want of necessary explanation which
one of the parties ought to have given, or from any other negligence
or fault of his, the construction most favorable to the other party
shall be adopted, whether he be obligor or obligee."
The reference point of Civil Code article 2474's requirement of
a clear explanation of the extent of the seller's own obligations is
found in articles 2475, 2476, 2520, and 2531. The seller, in fact, is bound
to three principal obligations: (1) that of delivery of the thing he sells,
(2) that of the implied warranty that the thing he sells is free of
redhibitory vices, and (3) that of restoring the price to the buyer if
he is unable to correct any such vices. 29 Any other obligations of the
228. An early example of the application of Civil Code article 2474 is seen in the
case of Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Slack, 42 La. Ann. 107, 7 So. 230 (1890), in which
the seller and buyer disagreed as to whether the sale of a boat and barge were both
to be completed on August 20 or whether the boat sale was to be completed on August
18 (a matter of some importance, since the boat sank on August 19). The ambiguity
was resolved against the seller:
The boat and barges were included in the same contract; and, if the [seller]
intended to make different terms, as to the time when the sale was to take effect,
from those as to the sale of the barges, it was his duty to have stated the dif-
ference very clearly, so that there should have been no room for misunderstanding.
42 La. Ann. at 109, 7 So. at 230.
229. Restoration of the price is the remedy for a breach of the seller's obligation
to deliver a thing free of redhibitory vices, and as such, it is not mentioned in Civil
Code articles 2474-2476, which form a part of Chapter 6 of Title VII, Book III of the
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seller imposed on him by law 230 or the express terms of the contract
likewise must be clearly explained to the buyer. Although lenders,
lessors, and contractors of work, labor, and services are not "sellers,"
the article 2474 requirement of a clear explanation has been extended
to those suppliers by analogy in Louisiana jurisprudence. 2 ' The univer-
sal use of supplier-prepared standard-form contracts brings the general
principle of Civil Code article 1958 to bear on them in any event.
The effect of article 1958 is similar to that of article 2474, but
while article 2474 commands a clear explanation only of the extent
of the seller's own obligations, article 1958 applies to any "doubt or
obscurity" which the supplier should have explained, because the
doubtful or obscure contract language is his language.232 Thus, obscure
clauses or language in the supplier's contract form respecting some
aspect of the consumer's obligation to pay or some other matter
beyond the scope of the supplier's own obligations nevertheless would
be construed against the supplier pursuant to Civil Code article 1958.23
Code, referenced "Of The Obligations of The Seller." By the language of Civil Code
article 2531, however, the good faith seller is required to restore the price only if
he is unable to "repair, remedy or correct" the vices of the thing, and he is "bound"
to repair under that article.
Under Civil Code articles 2541-2543, the buyer may choose to demand only a reduc-
tion in the price and the court may decide to award only a reduction in price. By
article 2544, the reduction in price ("quanti minoris") actions are subject to the same
rules and limitations as the actions for restoration of the price.
230. Imputation of payments, LA. CiV. CODE art. 2166, and rebates of unearned,
precomputed interest in consumer credit transactions, LA. R.S. 9:3527-9:3529 (Supp.
1972), are examples.
231. See cases collected at note 139, supra.
232. Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926).
233. See, e.g., Meraux & Nunez v. Houck, 202 La. 820, 13 So. 2d 233 (1942); Rayford
v. Louisiaha Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Ellis v. Dozier, 339
So. 2d 873 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). The doubt or obscurity must have arisen for want
of a "necessary explanation" which the party preparing the contract ought to have
given. Because the one who prepares the form is almost always the more knowledgeable
and experienced supplier, an explanation is typically necessary. There is a distinction,
however, between an unexplained clause which is ambiguous because it admits of con-
flicting interpretations and a clause which is clear and unambiguous but to which the
buyer's attention is not directed, particularly if the buyer is disadvantaged by lack
of education or literacy. See Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974). Article 2474 applies to both cases,
but articles 1957 and 1958 apply only to the former case.
Furthermore, a distinction can be seen between "ambiguity" and "obscurity" in cases
in which a seemingly unambiguous word or term has an esoteric trade or legal mean-
ing unknown to the layman and unexplained by the more knowledgeable merchant.
See, e.g., Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958) (meaning
of "accidental death"); Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1370 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1978) (esoteric legal meaning); Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co.,




A remarkable number of the unconscionable contracts cases would
have yielded the same nonenforcement result in Louisiana under the
principle of Civil Code articles 2474 and 1958 that the unexplained,
obscure, or ambiguous term is not freely consented to.2" Some two
dozen of the unconscionability decisions represent common law or UCC
section 2-302 judicial relief for consumers faced with contract language
purportedly modifying or disclaiming the supplier's or manufacturer's
implied warranty or other obligation or limiting the remedy for breach
thereof. In other cases, suppliers attempted to enforce other provi-
sions of the contract despite a failure to have properly explained the
provision to the buyer.
Similar to the UCC implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for particular purposes,23 the warranty that the thing sold is
free of hidden ("redhibitory") vices or defects arises in every sale in
Louisiana by virtue of Civil Code articles 2475 and 2476, as among
those things said by article 1764(2) to be implied from the nature of
the agreement. Likewise, it is implied in a lease of habitable space
that the premises are in a habitable condition suitable for the intended
purposes and will be maintained as such. 21 So, too, does the contrac-
tor impliedly warrant that his work, labor, or services will be per-
formed in a workmanlike manner."' Civil Code article 1764(2) also in-
dicates, as does article 11, that such implied warranties may be
modified or renounced. But if the law of Louisiana can be said to
roughly equate that of the UCC and the common law to this point,
the two legal systems part company on the issue of the enforceable
modification or renunciation of implied warranties and remedies
therein, for an enforceable renunciation of implied warranty is infre-
quent in a commercial transaction in Louisiana and, in fact, rare in
a noncommercial (or "consumer") transaction. In light of the supplier's
obligation to give a clear explanation, that such is the case is not
purely accidental, for as a general matter, the unexplained obscure
or ambiguous term or phrase is treated in the Civil Code as not freely
and deliberately consented to and, therefore, not enforceable by a
supplier.238
The good faith seller in Louisiana theoretically can present to the
buyer a contract form containing a valid waiver or renunciation of
234. Consent must be as to "a matter understood" under LA. Civ. CODE art. 1819.
235. UCC S 2-314 (1977).
236. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2692-2695; see Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv.,
Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979).
237. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1930, 1963-1965 & 2769. See Tiger Well Serv. v. Kimball
Prod. Co., 343 So. 2d 1153 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Hunter v. Mayfield, 106 So. 2d
330 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
238. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1819.
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implied warranty, but the good faith seller of a defective thing is in
no event liable beyond restoration of the price and reimbursement
of certain of the buyer's expenses.239 Unconscionability cases such as
Trinkle v. Schumacher Co.,'" Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.,24 Walsh
v. Ford Motor Co.,2"' McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc.,'" Collins v.
Uniroyal, Inc.,'" and Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc.,"5
involving the enforceability of clauses limiting a seller's liability for
consequential damages, are meaningless in Louisiana. The good faith
seller has no such potential liability under the Civil Code, and the
manufacturer or the seller not in good faith cannot, by virtue of Civil
Code article 2548, disclaim or modify the implied warranty or its
remedy in any event.246 Three of the unconscionability cases involved
attempts to disclaim implied warranties by suppliers who were not
manufacturers, but who also were not in good faith: Industralease
Equipment Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc.,"' Meyer v. Packard
Cleveland Motor Co.,4 and Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano.49 The
other unconscionability cases involved suppliers who were not in good
faith, so that had the implied warranty or other disclaimer issue arisen,
Civil Code article 2548 would have applied. 5
239. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531. Among the "expenses" recoverable against the good
faith seller are transportation costs, sales taxes, finance charges. See Abdelbaki v.
University Presb. Church, 380 So. 2d 35 (La. 1980); Greenburg v. Fourroux, 300 So.
2d 641 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Ticheli v. Silmon, 304 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1974); Bernard v. Tiner, 181 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Rapides Grocery Co.
v. Clopton, 15 La. App. 27, 125 So. 325 (1st Cir. 1929).
240. 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980).
241. 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
242. 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
243. 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975).
244. 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974).
245. 121 N.H. 344. 430 A.2d 638 (1981).
246. See text at notes 194-212, supra.
247. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977). Industralease became the "lessor" when
it and the manufacturer fraudulently substituted agreements with the lessor. The tran-
saction was held to be a sale. The case is discussed in text at notes 93-97, supra.
Waiver of a lessor's implied warranty objections is subject to Civil Code article
2474 by analogy. See cases at note 139, supra.
248. 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922) (a UCC 5 2-302 "illustrative results" case).
Seller used a deceptive and unfair advertisement of the "bait and switch" variety
to lure buyers to his place of business. The promises and representations contained
in the advertisement intentionally were excluded in the contract signed by the buyer.
The case is discussed in text at note 99, supra.
249. 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969). The seller imposed upon
the buyer a waiver of implied warranties despite the buyer's obvious inability to unders-
tand the significance of his act. See text at notes 133 & 147, supra.
250. See Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26,, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967); State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39,
275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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With respect to the waiver or modification of the good faith seller's
implied warranty obligation, there has emerged over the years from
Civil Code articles 2474 and 1958 a most meaningful set of jurispruden-
tial rules, extendable by analogy to all nonsale implied warranties:
To be effective, the language of modification or renunciation must
appear in the key sale document, 5 ' be "clear, unambiguous, explicit,
and unequivocal," ' be brought to the attention of the purchaser or
explained to him,253 and, because it is in derogation of general law,
be strictly construed.254 A most striking example of the application
of these standards is presented by Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales,
Inc.,' in which the bill of sale contained the following waiver language:
Purchaser . . . does hereby waive the warranty of fitness or
guarantee against the redhibitory vices applied in Louisiana by
operation of law, more specifically, that warranty imposed by Civil
Code Article 2476 or other applicable law. . . .Additionally, I
forfeit any right I may have in redhibition Pursuant to Civil Code
Article 2520 and following Articles ...
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that this language
was not written in "clear and unambiguous terms":
The language of this purported waiver is couched in legal
terms, and not in terms which may be read and understood by
a layman. The requirement "clear and unambiguous" means that
the language used must be comprehendible by the average buyer.
The plaintiff, a woman with a sixth grade education, stated that
she did not know the meaning of the words "redhibitory vices,"
"redhibition," nor was she acquainted with the provisions of the
Civil Code cited in the instrument. The plaintiff cannot be expected
251. Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Media Prod. Consults.,
Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972). See generally
Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-
Consumer Protection, 40 LA. L. REV. 619, 619-23 (1980).
252. The quoted phraselogy results from a composite of Louisiana judicial statements
concerning the relationship between Civil Code articles 1764(2), 2474, and 2503. See
Hob's Refrig. & Air Cond., Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974); Rey v. Cuccia,
298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973);
Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Guillory
v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 299 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th Cir 1974); Harris v. Automatic Enter., Inc., 145
So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
253. See, e.g., Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Thibodeaux
v. Meaux's Auto Sales, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Guillory v. Morein
Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La App. 3d Cir. 1975).
254. See, e.g., Dufief v. Boykin, 9 La. Ann. 295 (1854); Wolfe v. Henderson Ford,
Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co.,
123 So. 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
255. 364 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
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to be acquainted with these legal terms or their implications. This
instrument did not contain "clear and unambiguous" language.256
Moreover, the court held that the seller failed to meet the require-
ment that the waiver language be explained to the buyer or brought
to his attention.5 7
With respect to the waiver or modification of the good faith seller's
implied warranty obligations, the Thibodeaux case and the jurispru-
dence it reflects258 casts doubt on the viability of any renunciation
of implied warranty by a consumer. In transactions between merchants
or other relatively sophisticated parties, the Louisiana Supreme Court
recently has indicated that the Thibodeaux standard is not to be
applied so vigorously: "Safeguards protecting consumers must be more
stringent than those protecting businessmen competing in the
marketplace. It must be presumed that persons engaged in business
.. .were aware of the contents of the . ..agreement which they
signed."" 9 The commercially sophisticated consumer, therefore, can-
256. Id. at 1371-72. The court distinguished the waiver language held valid by Foy
v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 220 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), as being more explicit
and understandable by an ordinary buyer. The Foy language was:
[I]t is specifically understood between the buyer and seller that this sale is
made without any warranty whatsoever, express or implied, except as to title,
and the buyer herein specifically waives the implied warranty provided for by
Louisiana law, including all warranties against vices or defects or fitness for any
particular purpose. This express waiver shall be considered a material and in-
tegral part of any sale which may hereafter be entered into between the parties
covering the automobile herein described.
Id. at 238. In Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1976), the bill of sale stipulated that the buyer buys "this car with no warranty," and
although the transaction was consummated beneath a sign stating, in eight inch let-
ters, "All Cars Sold As Is! Please Test Before Buying," the renunciation language
was held not to be "clear and unambiguous." The language, however, was held to
have been brought to the buyer's attention. On the other hand, in Wolfe v. Henderson
Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), language closely approximating that
found in Foy was held ineffective because the seller had not "explained" it, no doubt
because the salesman testified that he, like his counterpart in Thibodeaux, 364 So.
2d at 1372, did not know what was meant by a "vice" in a car.
257. 364 So. 2d at 1372. The testimony of the salesman reflected that he had not
pointed out the waiver language to the buyer and he had not explained it to her because
he did not know what the waiver language meant. Given that the language of waiver
was ambiguous, it would have been irrelevant to have merely pointed it out to the
buyer without any explanation. See Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d
892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
258. See Hersbergen, supra note 253, at 619-23.
259. Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92, 96 (La. 1979)
(citations omitted). The Louisiana Supreme Court has historically has made a distinc-
tion between consumer transactions and purely mercantile transactions. See Davis v.
Turnbull, 7 Mart. (o.s.) 228 (La. 1819); see also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom,
357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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not as easily claim that the waiver of redhibition language in the con-
tract had not been sufficiently explained to him or brought to his at-
tention. The relatively unsophisticated "average layman," conversely,
will not be bound by language that is ambiguous or which the seller
should have pointed out to him or explained to him, the consumer's
signature on the contract notwithstanding."'
It has been said that the application of the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor presupposes parity of bargaining power between the parties.26
Because the doctrine of caveat emptor is foreign to the Louisiana Civil
Code,262 the Code does not presume an equality between the bargain-
ing parties; rather, it requires disclosures by the seller that are in-
tended to assure that the buyer's consent is freely given as to a matter
understood by him." 3
From the standard for valid consent to renunciation which
Thibodeaux epitomizes, it should follow that (1) language in an order
form, a manufacturer's warranty pamphlet, an invoice, or in any docu-
ment other than the key transaction document simply cannot constitute
a valid renunciation of the implied warranties, no matter how clear,
unambiguous, or explained it was or that attention is drawn to it;2 4
(2) language in the key transaction document that is specific,
unequivocal, clear, and unambiguous still must be brought to the at-
260. The time-honored rule in Louisiana and elsewhere is that competent parties
who are not mislead and who do not read the contract or have it read to them are
negligent and are estopped to deny that they are bound by the contract. See, e.g.,
Snell v. Union Sawmill Co., 159 La. 604, 105 So. 728 (1925); Jackson v. Lemle, 35 La.
Ann. 855 (1883); Watson v. Planters' Bank, 22 La. Ann. 14 (1870). Civil Code articles
1958 and 2474 cut across the rule, of course
261. See Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ.
Ct. 1969).
262. See Rushton v. LaCaze, 106 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958); Dependable
Refrig. v. Giambelluca, 94 So. 2d 148 (La. App. Orl. 1957); Landry v. Poirier, 11 Orl.
App. 194 (La. App. 1914).
263. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1819.
264. Prince v. Paretti Pontiac, Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Media Prod. Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972); Ben-
dana v. Mossy Motors, Inc., 347 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. Bohn
Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974);
Stevens v. Daigle & Hinson Rambler, Inc., 153 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963);
cf. Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 131 So. 462 (1931) (limitation on time
for asserting claims found on invoice in fine print). Harris v. Automatic Enter., Inc.,
145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), leaves open the possibility that language in
a collateral document could be incorporated by reference into the contract so as to
be effective. Such incorporating recitals would themselves have to be clear, unam-
biguous, and conspicuous. However, the pronouncement of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Prince seems to draw a line: "[Warranty limitation provisions in 'Buyer's Order'
documents and automobile service manuals have no effect on the implied warranty
against hidden defects." 281 So. 2d at 116; see also Media, 262 La. at 87, 262 So. 2d at 380.
13671983]
1368 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
tention of the consumer 6 or explained to him in an unambiguous
manner;' (3) there can be no meaningful attention drawn to ambiguous
renunciation language;267 (4) language in fine print will be neither clear
and nonobscure nor, by itself, brought to the consumer's attention, 8
nor will obscure or inconspicuous language satisfy the requirement;..9
(5) the language "as is" or "no warranties of any kind" is not suffi-
ciently clear and unambiguous and will not of itself renounce the im-
plied warranty,27 ° although it may modify the warranty;271 (6) the
265. Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Anderson v. Bohn
Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974);
Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon
Chevrolet Co., 260 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
266. Edwards v. Port AMC/Jeep, Inc., 337 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Guillory
v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lee v. Blanchard, 264
So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215
(La..App. 3d Cir. 1973).
267. Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
R.O. Roy & Co. v. A & W Trailer Sales, 277 So. 2d 204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Wolfe
v. Henderson Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Harris v. Automatic
Enter., Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
268. Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lee v.
Blanchard, 264 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); cf. Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler,
171 La. 469, 131 So. 462 (1931) (limit on time for filing claims). See also Note Contract
Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REV. 494 (1950).
269. See cases cited in note 268, supra; see also Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc.,
277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Harris v. Automatic Enter., Inc., 145 So. 2d
335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (both cases involve waiver language on the backside of
the document).
270. See Hellman v. Commeaux, 353 So. 2d 407 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Hendricks
v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Sallinger v. Mayer,
304 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chrevrolet Co., 260
So. 2d 919 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); McClain v. Cuccia, 259 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1972); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971);
Breeden v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 140 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
In Roby Motors Co. v. Cade, 158 So. 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), a sale on "as is"
terms was held to have excluded the implied warranties; also present in the contract
was the stipulation that "any adjustments or repairs made from this day will be charged
for." The Breeden decision characterized the latter stipulation as the true reason for
exclusion of implied warranties in Cade. 140 So. 2d at 682. In Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 299 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) and Stumpf v. Metairie Motor Sales,
Inc., 212 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), language that the buyer "understood
that no warranties of any kind or character, either express or implied, are made by"
seller was held not sufficiently clear, explicit, and unambiguous. Similarly, language
that "I ... understand no warranty is given because car reduced from $1,995 to $1,795"
was held not clear and unambiguous in Edwards v. Port AMC Jeep, Inc., 337 So. 2d
276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). See also Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co., 123 So.
911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929) ("no warranties have been made by the vendor" held not
a clear and explicit waiver of implied warranties).
271. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Breeden
v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 140 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Kuhlmann
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existence of an express warranty does not constitute a renunciation
of the implied warranty,"' even if it is "in lieu of" other warranties
or limits the supplier's obligation to repairs or replacement of defec-
tive parts.
3
Under the jurisprudence of Civil Code articles 2474 and 1958, vir-
tually all of the unconscionability cases involving supplier disclaimer
of implied warranties or other supplier obligations would be resolved
favorably to the consumer in Louisiana, by virtue of the supplier's
use of obscure or ambiguous language or by his failure to clearly
explain the extent of his own obligations or draw the consumer's
attention to language clearly making that explanation.
Ambiguous Contract Language
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."' is cited by the comments
to Uniform Consumer Credit Code section 5.108 as a decision ex-
emplary of prior de facto application of the doctrine of unconscion-
ability. An analysis of the decision reveals that it would have caused
very little stirring among Louisiana civilians and points out the fun-
damental reason why the doctrine of unconscionability, in large
measure, is cumulative in Louisiana. Henningsen is the classic example
of a court grappling with the entrenched but harsh effects of a caveat
emptor tradition in a case raising a simple issue: Did Chrysler's written
"warranty" validly foreclose Mrs. Henningsen's suit for personal injuries"
v. Purpera, 33 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947); Maddox v. Katz, 8 So. 2d 749 (La.
App. Orl. 1942); United Motor Car Co. v. Drumm, 3 La. App. 741 (Orl. 1926).
272. Hob's Refrig. & Air Cond. Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974); Media Prod.
Consults., Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972);
Bendana v. Mossy Motors, Inc., 347 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Hoffman v.
All Star Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Bernard v. Tiner, 181
So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
273. The Louisiana Supreme Court suggested in Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing
Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955), that had the written warranty stated that
it "was given in lieu of all other warranties implied by law," the written warranty
might have excluded the implied warranty. 228 La. at 124, 81 So. 2d at 833. Twenty
years later, in Hob's Refrig. & Air Cond., Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974),
the court seemingly expressed doubt that the "in lieu of" language is sufficiently clear
and explicit to be regarded as a waiver of implied warranties. However, if the "sold
as is" and "no warranties of any kind or character" language, see note 270 supra,
will not clearly and unequivocably renounce the warranty, it is difficult to see how
the "in lieu of" language would suffice, particularly in view of Thibodeaux.
274. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
275. Mr. Henningsen purchased a new car under a standard form contract of adhe-
sion. Small print on the front of the purchase order referred the reader to the reverse
side thereof, where it was stipulated that neither the seller (dealer) nor Chrysler "made"
any warranties, express or implied, and that Chrysler's sole obligation was to "make
good any defective parts." This "warranty" was said to be "in lieu of all other warran-
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caused by a breach of implied warranty? ' The Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that it had not foreclosed the suit.
If it is assumed that the seller, Bloomfield Motors, was in good
faith (knew not of the defect), the Henningsen decision has no relevance
in Louisiana, for under Civil Code article 2531, the good faith seller
is only bound to restore the price (assuming, as would have been the
case in Henningsen, that the defect cannot be repaired by the seller).
He is not subject to damages that flow from the defect. As to the
manufacturer, the disclaimer would be ineffective, as discussed
previously. " As to the buyer's redhibition action against the good
faith seller for restoration of the price, however, Henningsen can be
examined against the standard embodied in Civil Code articles 2474
and 1958, and that examination reveals that the buyer would have
prevailed against the seller had the case arisen in Louisiana. Although
the contract stipulated that the dealer "made no warranties, express
or implied," except the manufacturer's express warranty to replace
defective parts "in lieu of" all other warranties, such was not a clear
and unambiguous explanation of the dealer's position with respect to
implied warranties." 8 The language "seller makes no implied warran-
ties" is not considered clear and unambiguous in Louisiana, because
warranties of fitness for general purposes are not "made" by the seller;
they are implied or "legislated." Therefore, a disclaimer of warran-
ties "made" by the seller is not an effective modification or renuncia-
ties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities." Mrs. Henningsen
subsequently was injured in a crash apparently caused by a defect in the automobile.
The circumstances surrounding the crash (which occured twelve days after the sale)
are discussed at 32 N.J. at 368-69, 161 A.2d at 75. Chrysler apparently could not suc-
cessfully point out a plausible theory of the accident other than a steering defect or
breakdown.
276. A case for negligence would have hinged on the Henningsens' ability to prove
some negligence in design, manufacture, or inspection on Chrysler's part or would
have been based on res ipsa loquitur.
277. See text at notes 184-227, supra. If the defendant is a bad faith seller or a
manufacturer, a personal injury plaintiff can recover traditional personal injury damages
such as loss of future earnings; because the standard of care is partially governed
by Civil Code article 2545, attorney's fees can be awarded as well. This is so because
the act of delivering a known defective thing gives rise to delictual, as well as con-
tractual, liability. Phillipe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981). In addi-
tion, the plaintiff would face a lessened burden of proof as to the exact nature of
the actual defect. See, e.g., Moreno's, Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc.,
315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975); Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); J.B. Beaird Co.
v. Burns Bros., 216 La. 655, 44 So. 2d 693 (1950); Grayson v. General Motors Corp.,
309 So. 2d 373 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). See generally Crawford, Products Liability-The
Cause of Action, 22 LA. B.J. 239 (1975); Robertson, Manufacturer's Liability For Defec-
tive Products in Louisiana Law, 50 TUL. L. REV. 50 (1975).
278. 32 N.J. at 399-401, 161 A.2d at 92-93. See note 282, infra.
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tion by the consumer of the legislatively implied warranty as to
redhibitory defects.279
It seems obvious that the express warranty "in lieu" of all other
warranties is not significantly more clear or less ambiguous than the
"seller makes no warranty" language.28 To the New Jersey court, such
language was ambiguous:
[Can] it be said that an ordinary layman would realize what
he was relinquishing in return for what he was being granted?
. . . Any ordinary layman of reasonable intelligence, looking at
the phraseology, might well conclude that Chrysler was agreeing
to replace defective parts .... but that he would not be entitled
279. Edwards v. Port AMC/Jeep, Inc., 337 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Dunlap
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 299 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Stumpf v. Metairie
Motor Sales, Inc., 212 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); Stracener v. Nunally Bros.
Motor Co., 123 So. 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929). See also Tuttle v. Lowrey Chevrolet,
Inc., 424 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982). That such decisions are premised upon
Civil Code articles 1958 and 2474 is not always expressly stated, but as the following
excerpt from Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co. reveals, the premise cannot be
doubted:
That clause ... shows [that vendor] was laboring under the mistaken idea that
unless he agreed to the warranties and properly indorsed them on the contract,
he was not bound by any warranties. It is . . . probable that no warranties had
"been made by the vendor"; but even so .... they were nevertheless made or
implied by law as they are in all contracts of sale . . . These warranties are ex-
pressly given by law, and should not be denied the purchaser "unless they have
been waived expressly or by the clearest implication," [because] by such waivers
the parties make a law unto themselves, in derogation of the general law, and
they should therefore be construed strictly.
123 So. at 911.
It can be argued that the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana National
Leasing Corp. v. ADF Service, Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979) (see notes 259 & 260,
supra), has implicitly overruled the Stracener idea that "the seller makes no warran-
ties" language is not a clear waiver, at least in a commercial context. The court in
ADF upheld a waiver of a lessor's implied warranties between two commercially
sophisticated parties. The key language of the waiver was: "Lessor itself makes no
express or implied warranties as to any matter whatsoever, including, without limita-
tion, the condition of equipment, its merchantability or its fitness for any particular
purpose." 377 So. 2d at 94. This language was held to be clear and unambiguous. Id.
at 96. The court also pointed out, however, that ADF "at all times expected [the sup-
plier] to warrant and service the machine," making it clear that the lessor's waiver
language came as no surprise to ADF. Id. The majority opinion does not offer a rebut-
tal to any of the consumer transaction cases cited hereinabove, and in fact, the ma-
jority opinion carefully segregates the consumer and nonconsumer transaction. Justice
Dixon, however, dissented, taking the view that the key language was not "clear and
unambiguous." Id. at 96.
280. Moreover, the language in Henningsen (which appeared in fine print on the
reverse side of the document) was rendered even more ambiguous and confusing by
a reference to the dealer's obligations under the "owner service policy." 32 N.J. at
407-08, 161 A. 2d at 96-97.
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to a new car .... [OInly the abandonment of all sense of justice
would permit us to hold that, as a matter of law, the phrase "its
obligation under this warranty being limited to making good at
its factory any part or parts thereof" signifies to an ordinary
reasonable person that he is relinquishing any personal injury
claim that might flow from the use of a defective automobile.281
Only those who wish not to do so conceivably could fail to see the
similarity between the quoted language and the principle it represents
and the language of Thibodeaux and article 2474: "The seller is bound
to explain himself clearly respecting the extent of his obligations." '282
The Henningsen waiver unquestionably would be ineffective
against a consumer in Louisiana today. In fact, seller waiver attempts,
in general, are less likely to succeed in Louisiana than in the UCC
jurisdictions, for while the UCC and Louisiana law as to valid waiver
of implied warranty are quite similar in terms of requirements as to
conspicuity and clarity and as to the nonviability of waivers in col-
lateral documents, there exist perhaps two grounds beyond that of
Civil Code articles 1958 and 2474 upon which to defeat the Louisiana
supplier's waiver attempt. The first is rooted in legal philosophy.
Unlike the UCC seller, a Louisiana seller cannot "waive" the implied
warranties by his unilateral act-the waiver must be the expressed
281. 32 N.J. at 399-400, 161 A.2d at 92-93. Of this language, the New Jersey court
also observed:
The draftsmanship is reflective of the care and skill of the Automobile Manufac-
turers Association in undertaking to avoid warranty obligations without drawing
too much attention to its effort in that regard. No one can doubt that if the will
to do so were present, the ability to inform the buying public of the intention
to disclaim liability for injury claims arising from breach of warranty would pre-
sent no problem.
32 N.J. at 400, 161 A.2d at 93.
282. In the quoted excerpt from Henningsen, the reference to the expectations of
"an ordinary layman" is quite meaningful in light of Thibodeaux, supra notes 254-273
and accompanying text. In Citizens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So. 2d 503 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1949), the Louisiana court made a similar statement where a used automobile
was rendered unsteerable by a defective coupling rod:
We assume that [purchaser] recognized, by reason of the age of the vehicle,
that he would likely be subjected to annoyance, inconvenience and difficulty in
maintaining the car in operation, but none of this ... would justify the conclusion
that he expected [it], suddenly and without warning, to leave the road ...and
destroy itself ..., subjecting him, incidentally, to serious bodily injury. Such an
assumption would be entirely contrary to any standard of human behavior.
40 So. 2d at 505. The ordinary layman's expectations are not the only underlying ra-
tionale of the Civil Code article 2474 standard; Louisiana jurisprudence has long
distinguished between the knowledgeable contractant and the layman contractant. See,
e.g., Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Co., 331 So. 2d 219 (La, App. 4th Cir. 1976); Leithman
v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 59 La.
1055, 254 So. 2d 464 (1971).
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agreement of both seller and buyer, and it must be knowingly and
understandingly consented to. In short, while it is perhaps correct
to speak of an exclusion of implied warranty by a UCC seller, it is
incorrect to speak of an exclusion of implied warranty by a Louisiana
seller. In Louisiana, both parties must agree that the warranty is
waived.' The second additional Louisiana ground has more to do with
logistics or, perhaps, simply privity of contract: It seems clear that
the seller cannot point to the manufacturer's waiver language to avoid
his own implied warranty responsibility.2
Language identical to that in Henningsen-"no warranties are
made"-was denied effectiveness as a disclaimer of implied warran-
ties in the unconscionability cases of Eckstein v. Cummins85 and
Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co.2 In neither case would the
language suffice as a clear explanation of the seller's obligations
respecting implied warranty in Louisiana.28 As an additional matter,
the buyer in Wilson Plumbing signed a purchase order stating "this
car is sold as is," and he received at the time of delivery of the
automobile (and after he was obligated to buy) Chrysler's "warranty"
that "neither Chrysler. . .nor the dealer assumes any other obliga-
tion or responsibility with respect to the condition of the vehicle."
Neither the phrase "as is"2 nor any language in a collateral docu-
ment can be an effective waiver of implied warranty in Louisiana. 8
The UCC section 2-302 "illustrative results" cases of Robert A.
283. See Stevens v. Daigle & Hinson Rambler, Inc., 153 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st.
Cir. 1963); Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co., 123 So. 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
284. Hebert v. Claude Y. Woolfolk Corp., 176 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965);
Fisher v. City Sales & Serv., 128 So. 2d 790 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
285. 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974).
286. 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974).
287. See text at note 279, supra. The waiver clause, found on the backside of the
"retail buyer's order" in both cases, stated in relevant part: "No warranties are made
..I by either the dealer or the manufacturer . . ., excepting only Chrysler Corpora-
tion's current printed warranty . . ., which ... is incorporated herein .... Such
warranty shall be expressly in lieu of any other warranty, express or implied, including
... any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness. ... The Wilson Plumbing
decision held the waiver language ineffective under UCC S 2-316 because it was writ-
ten in the same size and color of type as all other paragraphs on the same side of
the form-a failure of conspicuity. The same outcome and rationale is predictable under
Civil Code articles 2474 and 1958. Inconspicuous language will not meet the requirements
that the langauge of the renunciation be "clear, explicit, and unequivocal." Such language
is, in fact, arguably "obscure" within the meaning of articles 1958 and 2474. See Guillory
v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lee v. Blanchard, 264
So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); see also Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469,
131 So. 462 (1930); Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926).
288. See note 270, supra.
289. See note 264, supra.
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Munro & Co. v. Meyer,"0 Bekkevold v. Potts,"' and Hardy v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp.,2 along with Industralease Automated & Scien-
tific Equipment Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc.,' Butcher v. Garrett-
Enumclaw Co.,29 4 and Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co.,295 present variations
of the "no warranties have been made"'2 disclaimer language of Hen-
ningsen, Wilson Plumbing, and Eckstein. But as previously mention-
ed, the warranties of fitness for general purposes in a sale or lease
in Louisiana (as in the common law states) are not "made" by the
seller or lessor; they are "implied" or "legislated." This fact of life
presented an ambiguity in both Bekkevold and Hardy which was resolv-
ed by the court in each case against the seller. The same result clear-
ly would be mandated under Civil Code articles 1958 and 2474.297
290. [1930] 2 K.B. 312.
291. 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
292. 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928).
293. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977).
294. 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978) (discussed in text at note 50, supra).
295. 92 Wash. 2d 40, 573 P.2d 1308 (1979). The case concerns the liability of a con-
tractor for consequential damages where the receipt stipulates that he "assumes" no
responsibility beyond retail cost. The stipulation likely would be given no viability,
as discussed in text at notes 14-28, supra, but in any event, the "we assume no respon-
sibility" language seems indistinguishable from language such as "we make no war-
ranties," "I understand no warranty is given," or "there are no warranties of any
kind." See Edwards v. Port AMC/Jeep, Inc., 337 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Stracener
v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co., 123 So. 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
296. Munro involved the "with all faults" variation of the "as is" language of
disclosure.
297. In a sense, the Louisiana jurisprudence and the Bekkevold and Hardy deci-
sions themselves actually hold that there is no true ambiguity at all concerning the
effect on the implied warranties of the language "no warranties are made by the seller";
rather, the seller's construction is simply an erroneous and unreasonable one which
would produce an unfair result if adopted. The Bekkevold court's assessment of the
issue was as follows:
We are of the opinion that the parties intended to say that no contractual war-
ranties had been made; that the seller had not spoken or written any warranty
in reference to the outfit. There was no other way by which such warranties
could have been "made." No action of the parties was necessary to "make" that
implied warranty [of fitness] which the law writes into it. We must conclude that
the parties did not intend to exclude the implied warranty which could easily
have been done in unmistakable terms had they so chosen.
173 Minn. at 90, 216 N.W. at 791.
The Hardy decision presented a construction of the ambiguous waiver language that
is quite similar to that of Bekkevold:
The language of the [purported waiver] ...should be construed as referring
to express stipulations, and not as excluding the warranties implied by law. It
should not be taken to nullify the implied convenant that the ...property...
was merchantable and reasonably suited to the uses intended, and that the seller
knew of no latent defects undisclosed. The rational interpretation of the [waiver]
provision must be taken to be that the company making the sale sought in this
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Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co."8 also involved only a varia-
tion of the "seller makes no warranty" language. The seller advertis-
ed "rebuilt" Packard trucks, advising the reading public that the
rebuilt trucks would give the buyer "the very best of service," would
be a better buy and of more substantial value than a cheap new truck,
and would be "practically as good as a new one" as far as wearing
qualities and operating efficiency was concerned. But in the actual
contract form signed by the buyer, it was stipulated that "all pro-
mises, verbal understandings or agreements of any kind pertaining
to this purchase, not specified herein are hereby expressly waived."
The Ohio court refused to permit the clause to negate the represen-
tations made in the advertisements.' A Louisiana court undoubtedly
would do the same, in that the seller's waiver clause in Meyer created
an ambiguity as to the extent of the seller's obligations. 00
way to make it plain that it was not be be bound by any expressed verbal warran-
ties which might have been made by its agents, but was limited to only such express
obligations as were set forth in the sale agreement. The expression cannot reasonably
be taken to refer to implied warranties, which do not have to be "made," and are
not supposed to be expressed, but which if not excluded by the contract, are deem-
ed to be a part thereof as a matter of law.
38 Ga. App. at 465, 144 S.E. at 328. The similarity between Bekkevold, Hardy, and
Stracener v. Nunally Bros. Motor Co., 123 So. 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929), quoted
at note 279, supra, is apparent.
The Bekkevold court distinguished Bagley v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 150 F.
284 (2d Cir. 1906), which upheld, as a valid waiver of implied warranties, the language
"no obligations . . . shall be binding upon either party." In view of Thibodeaux and
the Civil Code article 2474 jurisprudence discussed at notes 228-273, supra, even the
Bagley waiver language may not meet the "clear and unequivocal" standard in Loui-
siana. See Gullet Gin Co. v. Varnado Gin Co., 120 So. 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929) ("this
order [as] accepted by you . . . shall be . . . the entire contract between us and no
agreement, verbal or otherwise, other than is set forth herein, forms any part of this
contract" held ineffective as a waiver); cf. Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d
215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) ("no guarantee of any kind applies . . . and buyer expressly
waives any right to rescind or reduce the sale for hidden defects or redhibitory vices"
phraseology was not brought to buyer's attention or explained to the court; held it
was not a valid waiver). But see Foy v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 220 So. 2d 229 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969).
298. 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922) (a UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" case).
299. The court said of the clause: "[This language] relates solely to any special
contracts or arrangements expressly made by the parties outside of the general custom
or usage in such sale of goods. It in no wise negatives or nullifies the things or mat-
ters set forth by the [seller] in its general newspaper ads." 106 Ohio St. at 337-38,
140 N.E. at 121.
300. Cf. Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 131 So. 462 (1930) (seller's limita-
tion of liability as to claims made after twenty days from receipt of the goods-a
limitation found on the backside of the shipping invoice-was ineffective to alter the
expressed guaranty found in the seller's catolog); R.O. Roy & Co. v. A & W Trailer
Sales, 277 So. 2d 204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972) (supplier's express warranty was am-
biguous in that it both guaranteed against defects in material and workmanship for
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Another theory of nonenforcement applicable to Kansas City
Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber,"0 ' in which the seller of catsup at-
tempted to exclude "all claims other than swells" not made within
ten days of receipt by the buyer, is to view it as an attempted
modification of the normal one-year period under Civil Code article
2534 for instituting the redhibition action; thus the exclusion must
be clearly explained to the buyer. 2 While the language seems clear
enough, the decision itself points out the ambiguity: Did the seller
really mean to impose a time limit on claims that were premised on
latent defects discoverable only by a microscopic examination? °
The cases of Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.," ' Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co.,305 Trinkle v. Schumacher Co.,"' McCarty v. E.J. Korvette,
Inc., 7 Fischer v. General Electric Hotpoint,"8 Pittsfield Weaving Co.
v. Grove Textiles, Inc.,"9 Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v.
C. A. Roberts Co.,3"' and Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc. " each found an ex-
clusion of consequential damages an unconscionable limitation of
remedies for breach of warranty."' The eight cases have little
significance for Louisiana because a similar limitation on consequen-
tial damages is found in Civil Code article 2531 with respect to good
faith sellers; accordingly, there is no need for a good faith seller in
the "life-time" of the thing and limited its warranty to ninety days from delivery);
Harris v. Automatic Enter., Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (express war-
ranty that the product was suitable for intended purposes, but restricting remedy
for breach thereof to replacement of defective parts, was ambiguous).
To the extent that the seller's advertisements in Meyer would come under Civil
Code article 2529 as declarations as to qualities of the thing, see, e.g., Coco v. Mack
Motor Truck Corp., 235 La. 1095, 106 So. 2d 691 (1958); Gates v. Dykes, 338 So. 2d
1190 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Reiners v. Stran-Steel Corp., 317 So. 2d 657 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 914 (La. 1975), it seems clear that the waiver language
used by the seller would not be a valid waiver under the article 2474 jurisprudence.
To the extent that the seller was not in good faith, Civil Code article 2548 would
disallow a waiver of the implied (or article 2529) warranty anyway.
301. 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937). See text at notes 173-175 & 223, supra. Weber
is one of the UCC S 2-302 "illustrative results" cases. It is not entirely clear whether
the seller in Weber was also the manufacturer (i.e., processor) and, thus, arguably unable
to place any limits on the redhibition action in Louisiana.
302. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2474.
303. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1958.
304. 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
305. 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup Ct. 1969).
306. 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980).
307. 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975).
308. 108 Misc. 2d 683, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Dist. Ct. 1981).
309. 430 A.2d 638 (1981).
310. 86 Il. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980). Frank's involved both a seller-
defendant and a manufacturer-defendant.
311. 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974).
312. See UCC S 2-719(3) (1978 Official Text).
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Louisiana to so stipulate. Manufacturers and sellers not in good faith
also have no need to stipulate against consequential damages, because
such a stipulation is without effect under Civil Code articles 2545 and
2548. 3' 3
In six of the eight cases, the buyer was assured by express war-
ranties that the product would not fail to perform, but the contract
also added that if it did so fail, the buyer's sole remedy would be
replacement of defective parts or a refund of the price. This was the
same limitation denied enforcement in Henningsen.3"4 In Louisiana, the
buyer would have little to gain by attacking the validity of such a
limitation of remedies as against a good faith seller,"5 and, no doubt,
he would prefer to sue the manufacturer whenever possible. Still, it
is noteworthy that six of the eight cases arguably present an am-
biguity as to the extent of the seller's obligations, because as in Hen-
ningsen, these cases present situations in which a buyer is not clear-
ly made to understand that the seller (or manufacturer) is taking the
position that personal injuries and other consequential damages caus-
ed by a failure of the product to meet the express guarantee are not
its responsibility." 6 In Louisiana, it has been held that to both
313. See text at notes 184-227, supra. Collins involved only a manufacturer. Walsh,
McCarty, and Majors involved both the manufacturer and the seller. Trinkle involved
a nonmanufacturer-seller. Like Henningsen, Majors, McCarty, Walsh, and Collins in-
volved a limit on remedies to repair, replacement, or refund. Such a remedy is essen-
tially the sole remedy available against the good faith seller in Louisiana and manufac-
turers cannot so limit the remedy for breach of the implied warranty.
314. See text at note 280, supra.
315. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531. It is unclear in Pittsfield Weaving whether the
manufacturer expressly warranted the yarn or whether the contract stipulated that
the buyer's sole remedy would be refund or replacement. Because the contract did
stipulate that all disputes would be submitted to arbitration, perhaps no such limita-
tion was stipulated. It is only inferable in Fischer that there was an express warranty
of suitability, but the inference is a strong one because the product was a refrigerator
for use in the buyer's home. In general, an express warranty comes within Civil Code
article 2529's "a declaration made in good faith by the seller, that the thing sold has
some quality . . ." language. If, under that article, the thing sold does not have the
declared quality, the declaration gives rise to a claim in redhibition or avoidance of
the sale if the declared quality was the principal motive for making the purchase.
In Collins and McCarty, for example, the manufacturer (seller) declared, by express
* warranty, that its tires would not "blowout." The manufacturer, saddled with imputed
knowledge of any defects, see text at notes 182-227 supra, cannot make that declara-
tion in "good faith"; rather, the manufacturer comes within articles 2545, 2547, and
2548 and as such, is liable for damages that he cannot contractually avoid. See Aetna
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 362 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). In any event,
the good faith seller is not liable for damages under article 2531.
316. In Fischer, the opinion itself states that the seller "should have been aware
that the plaintiff did not understand the significance of the provision [excluding conse-
quential damages for breach of warranty]." 108 Misc. 2d at 684, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691.
Collins, McCarty, and Walsh involved personal injury plaintiffs asserting rights to
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guarantee the suitability of the thing for its intended purposes and
to restrict the buyer's remedy for breach to replacement or refund
damages in the face of Henningsen-like stipulations that refund or replacement of defec-
tive parts was the exclusive remedy for breach of warranty. In all three cases, the
relationship between the seller's expressed warranties and the actual stipulated remedy
created an ambiguity and would not constitute a "clear" explanation to the average
layman-buyer of the extent of seller's obligation In that sense, these cases clearly
resemble Henningsen. In McCarty and Collins, the seller in effect expressly warranted
that its tires would not "blow-out," only to later say in the contract, "If they do blow-
out, we'll replace them (or refund price) and do nothing more." For the courts in Col-
lins and McCarty, this was simply too much to swallow; it was "unconscionable" to
so limit damages, in light of a buyer's natural reliance on the expressed warranties
(of advertising and otherwise).
In both Collins and McCarty, the issue of actual cause of the blow-out, as a proof
problem, received an interesting injection of consumer justice. In Collins, the court
held that the presumption of unconscionability (inherent in UCC S 2-719) overcomes
the lack of proof as to specific defect. In McCarty, the court ruled that the failure
of the tire to conform to the "nonblowout" express warranty was the defect but, had
the tire been warranted only as against defects in material and workmanship, plaintiff
would have had to show a specific defect in the tire. Compare Williams v. United States
Royal Tires, 101 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) (reliance on res ipsa loquitur)
with Phoenix Ins. Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 245 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 1st. Cir.
1970) (specific allegation as to defect).
In Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408
N.E.2d 403 (1980), the disclaimer of consequential damages provision appeared on the
backside of the seller's purchase acknowledgment, with nothing on the face of the
acknowledgment to alert the buyer to the disclaimer, and in fact, the printed legend
"conditions of sale on reverse side" had been stamped over and, in the court's words,
"rendered practically illegible." The language appeared at first glance to read, "No
conditions of sale on reverse side."
In Majors, the seller of a soybean inoculant stated on the product package, "[S]atisfac-
tion guaranteed or the purchase price ... will be refunded." Yet the seller also limited
its liability solely to the refund. The Majors court ruled that the limitation of remedies
was unconscionable. A contractual stipuation as to "satisfaction" or "satisfactory" per-
formance or even an advertisement of "satisfaction guaranteed" if (as in Majors) the
advertisement constitutes an express warranty creates rights in the buyer to deter-
mine, either arbitrarily or, depending on the intent of the parties, in a reasonable
fashion, whether he personally is satisfied. See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §5
79, 366-368 (1964); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 214 S 13 (1962); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1124 (1955).
See Passman v. Lindsay, 192 So. 767 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (parties agreed that if
a beverage cooler did not give "complete and satisfactory service," seller wouldmake
necessary adjustments if possible or, if not, seller would pick it up; held, buyer was
dissatisfied for a good reason, since cooler did not perform as impliedly warranted
or as expressly guaranteed). Compare Slemaker v. Tri-State Motors, 186 So. 871 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1939) with Reedy v. Davidson, 235 N.W. 710 (S.D. 1931). And see Young
v. Amato, 200 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). But see California Chem. Co. v.
Lovett, 204 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); McCauley v. Planters Seed Co., 85
So. 2d 334 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956) (good faith waiver of warranty and limitation of
liability upheld as between two merchants); Gilbert v. Reuter Seed Co., 80 So. 2d 567
(La. App. Orl. 1955) (same); Landreth Seed Co. v. Kerlec Seed Co., 126 So. 460 (La.
App. Orl. 1939) (same).
Although there was no true ambiguity in the contract language itself in Trinkle
UNCONSCIONABILITY
is to create an ambiguity as to the extent of the seller's obligations.117
Walsh speaks well for Majors, McCarty, and Collins in agreeing with
Louisiana jurisprudence that such limitations are ambiguous: "The con-
tractual provisions pleaded here [i.e., replacement or repair of defec-
tive parts, 'expressly in lieu of any other .. .warranty'] disclaim all
warranties, and at the same time would limit the remedies available
for a breach of warranty, and attempts to do both create an
ambiguity." ' l Jutta's, Inc. v. Fireco Equipment Co. 1 also involved an
unconscionable limitation on consequential damages and, thus, has no
meaning in Louisiana. The decision, however, expressly notes that the
meaning of the clause was obscure and that there was no clear and
unambiguous waiver of the implied warranties.20
Nosse v. Vulcan Basement Waterproofing, Inc.2 2 involved an
express warranty that was "explained" in language describable only
as terminally ambiguous322 and which could only be loved, much less
("positively no claims allowed after goods are cut"), the decision is identical to Kansas
City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber in that it is unclear whether the parties understood
that certain claims were to be barred even if discoverable only after processing, fabrica-
tion, or microscopic examination.
317. Radalac, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955);
Harris v. Automatic Enters., Inc., 145 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); see also
Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 161 La. 198, 108 So. 414 (1926).
In Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 131 So. 462 (1930), the seller's catalog
guaranteed that its radios were the "most satisfactory line of radio merchandise in
the industry," yet in small print on the shipping invoice, the seller limited the time
within which to make claims to twenty days. No limit was placed on the catalog's
representations; hence it could be argued that ambiguity aside, the buyer had not
consented to the limitation insofar as it affected the guarantee of satisfaction.
318. 59 Misc. 2d at 242-43, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 540. See cases cited in note 317, supra.
Again, it is to be observed that the breach of warranty remedies sought in Collins,
McCarty, and Walsh would be unavailable against a good faith seller in Louisiana.
Against a manufacturer or a seller not in good faith, however, waiver language would
be ineffective as against the consumer or other "layman" in view of the previously
discussed Civil Code article 2548 waiver jurisprudence. This being so, personal injury
damages and attorney's fees are available under Civil Code articles 2315 and 2545.
See Phillipe v. Browing Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1981); Arndt v. D.H. Holmes
Co., 119 So. 91 (La. App. Orl. 1928). Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 158 So.
223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), closely resembles Walsh, but Gordon was a tort case with
an implied warranty "alternative pleading." Phillipe sets forth the definitional rela-
tionship between Civil Code articles 2315 and 2545.
319. 150 N.J. Super. 301, 375 A.2d 687 (1977).
320. The limitation clause was "concealed in a provision clearly suggesting that
it was conferring upon the purchaser a benefit in the form of a guarantee; nothing
in the heading [suggested] the presence of a sharp limitation on defendants overall
liability hidden therein." 150 N.J. Super. at 307, 375 A.2d at 690.
321. 35 Ohio Misc. 1, 299 N.E.2d 708 (1973).
322. The basement leakproofing contract provided that the contractor would
"guarantee ... five years ... at an additional cost to the customer ... this guarantee
shall become effective upon customer's full compliance with [the] stated payment terms."
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understood, by lawyers. In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue,323 a lease
agreement and a dealer contract, prepared by the oil company, each
provided for extension and termination rights which, when the two
agreements were considered together, were "incapable of being recon-
ciled in such a manner as to be clearly expressive of an intention
which can be said to have been within the reasonable contemplation
of the contracting parties." '324 The termination provisions of the dealer
agreement, giving to Ashland alone the right to terminate at any time
upon ten day's written notice (upon the happening of certain listed
but vague circumstances 2 '), was held unconscionable. The case could
be resolved favorably to the lessee in Louisiana by applying Civil Code
articles 1901,32 1945,327 or 1958.28
But among the payment terms was the following: "If it is necessary to install a [floor
draining system to draw away water that still leaks through the walls despite the
waterproofing treatment] ... the customer is to be charged an additional price ..
. if customer refuses, [contractor] will no longer be responsible." After application of
a waterproofing substance around the foundation, the basement leaked more that it
had previously. Since the contract required the consumer to agree to additional work
at added expense before the contractor would honor its "guarantee," that additional
work was consented to and performed, but the basement continued to leak. The con-
tractor, who had obviously not performed in a good and workmanlike manner, decided
that the consumer was required by the contract to accept a leak-channeling system
or have no remedy. It is difficult to determine just what the contractor's obligation
really was, much less whether it was clearly explained as required by Civil Code arti-
cle 1958.
The Louisiana case most closely resembling Nosse is Michel v. Efferson, 223 La.
136, 65 So. 2d 115 (1953), in which a contractor refused to deliver possession of the
premises to the plaintiff unless the building was accepted with all defects. The court
would not categorize the plaintiff's acquiescence as a voluntary waiver of her rights
against the contractor for nonperformance. See also Troy v. Betz, 399 So. 2d 667 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1981); Melancon v. Juno, 337 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
323. 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
324. Id. at 438.
325. The termination right could be exercised when, in Ashland's sole judgment,
the lessee had "indulged in practices which tend to impair the quality, good name,
good will or reputation of the products of Ashland." No standard was set out in the
dealer agreement by which the oil company's judgment was to be determined or cir-
cumscribed. 223 S.E.2d at 438.
326. Good faith performance by Ashland would be inconsistent with an arbitrary
termination of the lease. See Gautreau v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 410
So. 2d 815 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
327. See text at notes 387-437, infra.
328. It is well established in Louisiana that it is the duty of the lessor to explain
himself clearly and that a failure to do so will result in a construction of ambiguous
terms favorably to the lessee. Like the seller, the lessor typically has the power in
the first instance to clearly stipulate in his own favor. Martin v. Martin, 181 So. 63
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). See generally Governor Claiborne Apts. v. Attaldo, 231 La.
85, 90 So. 2d 787 (1956); Werlein v. Janssen, 112 La. 31, 36 So. 216 (1904); Equilease
Corp. v. Hill, 290 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Bass v. Santoro, 194 So. 2d
780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); Claude Neon Fed. Co. v. Meyer Bros., 150 So. 410 (La.
App. Orl. 1933).
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.32 was a case in which
a very important obligation of the seller-the giving of title-was
treated in "extremely fine print.""0 That clause in Williams provided
for a prorating of payments (an obligation of the buyer),33 ' but the
effect of the clause retained title in the seller so long as any outstand-
ing balance in the account remained. The matter of title is an obliga-
tion of the seller, and it is to be explained to the buyer clearly.33 '
One can well argue that simply placing before a person of "limited
education"33 a contract form which in extremely fine print explains
that payments will be prorated on all purchases is not a clear
explanation of the seller's obligations as to title. If the jurisprudence
respecting the seller's Civil Code article 2474 obligation of explana-
tion as to implied warranties is to serve by analogy as a guide, then,
undoubtedly, the pro rata clause could be construed favorably to the
buyer in a Williams case in Louisiana as a clause that is ambiguous
and obscure. Moreover, the same result is predictable as a matter
of article 1958, which dictates that any obscure or ambiguous clause
should be construed against the preparer of the contract form. Nonen-
forcement of the pro rata clause would trigger Civil Code articles
2163-2166, 33 which treat the subject of imputation of payments.
The issue in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson3 5 was whether a
real estate broker's commission was "earned" under the listing agree-
ment when the broker produced a buyer with whom the seller entered
into an agreement of sale, regardless of the subsequent financial in-
ability of the buyer to consummate the sale. The New Jersey Supreme
Court overturned the well-established rule in that state favoring the
329. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'g on other grounds 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964).
330. 198 A.2d at 915.
331. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2439, 2456, 2549.
332. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2474, 2476. The common law "conditional sale" is not
recognized in Louisiana; hence Williams probably would be treated as a series of sales
secured by a chattel mortgage. See cases cited at note 65, supra.
333. 198 A.2d at 915.
334. Where there are several debts, the debtor has the right to declare what debt
he means to discharge by his payment. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2163. However, he cannot
impute the payment to reduce the principal when interest is due. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2164. If the creditor's receipt, accepted by the debtor, itself states that a certain im-
putation of the payment has been or will be made, the debtor no longer may declare
the imputation, unless there has been fraud or surprise by the creditor. LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2165. When both the receipt and the debtor are silent, the payment must be imputed
to the debt, which the debtor had at the time most interest in discharging, of those
that are equally due; otherwise to the debt which has fallen due, though less burden-
some than those which are yet payable.
If the debts be of a like nature, the imputation is made to the debt which has been
longest due; if all things are equal, it is made proportionally.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2166.
335. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
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broker in cases in which the buyer had failed to close and decreed
that any attempt by the broker to vary the rule announced would
be unconscionable. The court, however, did agree with the decision
of the appellate division that the commission agreement was "at the
very least ambiguous.""33 Ellsworth Dobbs most probably would have
been decided in Louisiana on the basis that any ambiguity in the con-
tract concerning the earning of the commission was the broker's
ambiguity and was to be construed against it on the authority of Civil
Code article 1958 or, alternatively, if there was no ambiguity, that
the plain words of the contract led to an absurdity.33 7 Less likely would
the Louisiana Supreme Court announce a broad new policy prescrib-
ing what terms the parties could incorporate into their agreement.
To the preparer of the contract language, its esoteric meaning was
no doubt clear, but that meaning simply did not comport with the
common understanding of the consumer or real estate seller, creating,
in the absence of an explanation, an ambiguity.
The most important point of the decision in Thibodeaux v. Meaux's
Auto Sales, Inc. was that the requirements of Civil Code articles 1958
and 2474 are not met by contract language that is incomprehensible
to the average layman, i.e., legalistic language.33 8 The court held-
virtually as a matter of law-that legal terms and the implications
thereof are not "clear and unambiguous" to the average consumer.39
The ambiguous nature of legalistic language no doubt also discourages
any attempts by the average consumer to even try to comprehend
its meaning. Legalistic language probably could be found to be at least
a contributing factor in most of the sixty-five unconscionability cases." °
It was expressly pointed out in one New York case: Seabrook v. Com-
muter Housing.4 This case involved the lease of habitable space, a
transaction to which Civil Code article 1958, of course, applies and
to which Civil Code article 2474 and Thibodeaux apply by analogy. 2
336. 50 N.J. at 556, 236 A.2d at 858.
337. See Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932), discussed
in text at notes 397-402, infra.
338. 364 So. 2d at 1371. See text at notes 255-258, supra. Thibodeaux, in essence,
calls for the use of "plain English" in consumer sales contracts. See Hersbergen, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Consumer Protection,
40 LA. L. REv. 619-623 (1980).
339. 364 So. 2d at 1371.
340. See Appendix Table 1 for listing of the cases.
341. 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), affd per curiam on other grounds,
79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Term. 1973).
342. Cf. Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979)




The Need to Explain or Draw the Consumer's Attention to
Unambiguous Contract Language
Had the language of waiver in Henningsen been clear, explicit,
unequivocal, and unambiguous, the waiver still would have been in-
effective in Louisiana because it was not specifically brought to the
buyer's attention and no attempt was made to "make him understand
that he was yielding his right." '343 The waiver language in Wilson
Plumbing was held ineffective because it was written in the same size
and color type as all other paragraphs on the same side of the form,
a failure of conspicuity. Language disclaiming an implied warranty
must be conspicious under UCC section 2-315, but no similar provi-
sion governs other self-serving clauses that are incorporated into the
supplier's adhesion contracts. This being the case, common law courts
frequently are constrained to rule that it is the duty of the consumer
to read the contract before signing it and, if he cannot read, it is
his duty to have someone read it to him. If he does neither, he is
bound by the terms thereof, at least in the absence of fraud.
343. 32 N.J. at 408, 161 A.2d at 97. See Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d
112 (La. 1973); Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974); Wolfe v. Henderson Ford Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973); Harris v. Automatic Enters., Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1962); cf. Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975)
(no attention drawn to waiver language located in "a most inconspicuous position on
the document"); Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (no attention
drawn to exclusionary clause in fine print on the purchase order).
The attention of the buyer in Henningsen was not directed to the exclusionary
language on the back of the purchaser order, drawing the following remark from the
court:
It is indisputed that the president of the dealer with whom Henningsen dealt
did not specifically call attention to the warranty on the back of the purchase
order. The form and the arrangement of its face ... certainly would cause the
minds of reasonable men to differ as to whether notice of a yielding of basic
rights stemming from the relationship with the manufacturer was adequately given.
The words "warranty" or "limited warranty" did not even appear in the fine print
above the place for signature, and a jury might well find that the type of print
itself was such as to promote lack of attention rather than sharp scrutiny
• ..If either [the manufacturer or the seller] or both of them wished to make
certain that Henningsen became aware of the agreement and its purported im-
plications, neither the form of the document nor the method of expressing the
precise nature of the obligation intended to be assumed would have presented
any difficulty.
32 N.J. at 399, 161 A.2d at 92. The ancient case of Hoover v. Miller, 6 La. Ann. 204
(1881), contains an idea strikingly apropos of Thibodeaux and Henningsen: where one
of the parties has had an opportunity to give the other a necessary explanation of
a doubtful or obscure term and has not done so, the inference is that the explanation
would have been disadvantageous to him if made.
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The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Louisiana
National Leasing Corp. v. ADF Services, Inc.' casts doubt on the strict
application of the rule that one is presumed to have read and
understood the contract he has signed, a rule nominally accepted in
Louisiana for years.34 5 The court suggests that while the rule certainly
applies to "persons engaged in business," the rule is not to be strictly
applied to consumers because "[s]afeguards protecting consumers must
be more stringent than those protecting businessmen competing in
the marketplace. ' 306  Thus, unambiguous language still must be
explained or brought to the attention of the consumer in Louisiana;
its mere presence in unexplained and unemphasized fine print or other
inconspicuous circumstances will be of no avail to the supplier. 3'
Placing a particular clause in the body of a contract in fine print
and without emphasis virtually guarantees that, unless an explana-
tion of it is made to the consumer or his attention specifically directed
to the clause, it will not truly be consented to because it will not
be what Civil Code article 1819 refers to as a "matter understood."
To enforce such a clause often is seen in UCC states as "unfair sur-
prise," an outcome that unconscionability is designed to prevent. In
fact, unconscionability has been applied in several cases to deny en-
344. 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979).
345. See Plan Invs., Inc. v. Heflin, 286 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973).
346. 377 So. 2d at 96.
347. Actually, a mere reading of Civil Code article 2474 seems authority enough for
the proposition that waiver of implied warranty language in fine print will not of itself
be effective. It will not be a clear explanation by the seller; rather, it will be an obscure
one to be construed against him. Several Louisiana cases made meaningful mention of
the fact of fine print waiver language. See, e.g., Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La.
469, 473, 131 So. 462, 463 (1930) ("It is too trite a proposition to need citation of authority
that a stipulation printed in small type . . ., and not ... brought to the attention of
the other party, has no effect against him."); Lyons Milling Co. v. Cusimano, 161 La.
198, 205, 108 So. 414, 416 (1926) ("The paragraph, in the letter of confirmation, declaring
that there were no conditions, representations, or warranties .... was printed in very
small type and was not likely to be read."). See also Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322
So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lee v. Blanchard, 264 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
The principle that fine print not brought to the consumer's attention has no effect
against him applies not only to a sale but also to any contract in writing. Civil Code
article 1958 has been interpreted to require that "[wihere a layman contracts with
a knowledgeable and experienced businessman, the burden is on the latter to point
out obscurity." Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333 So. 2d 254, 255 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976). See also Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 259 La. 1055, 254 So. 2d 464 (1971).
The Henningsen opinion itself casts doubt on the viability of fine print as sufficient-
ly directing the buyer's attention to the warranty waiver language on the reverse
side of the document: "[A] jury might well find that the type of print itself was such
as to promote lack of attention rather than sharp scrutiny." 32 N.J. at 399, 161 A.2d
at 92.
UNCONSCIONABILITY
forcement of such obscure clauses. Unico v. Owen,348 Dean v. Univer-
sal C.LT. Credit Corp.,19 Architectural Cabinets, Inc. v. Gaster," Bogatz
v. Case Catering Corp.,5' and Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co."52 are
examples. Fine print and "buried" clauses, in fact, are elements in
many of the sixty-five unconscionability cases 53 and in several cases,
the consent of the consumer to the clause is expressly doubted by
the court. 5 ' Unconscionability, however, is seemingly the remedy of
choice in the UCC jurisdictions for the prevention of the unfair sur-
prise that would result from enforcement of such "buried" clauses as
forfeiture of downpayment, confession of judgment, and waiver of
claims and defenses.
The "presumed to have read it" principle was applied reluctantly
by the intermediate appeals court in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Fur-
niture Co.,3"' permitting the operation of a payment prorating clause
that was located in "extremely fine print." Had the clause been one
of waiver of implied warranties, it clearly would have been ineffec-
tive in Louisiana, even if unambiguous.3 ' The same conclusion also
is warranted because the consumer's attention to the clause (which
pertained to the seller's obligation as to title) was not directed by
either the seller or the contract itself. Thus, the clause itself would
be "obscure" under Civil Code articles 1958 and 2474 and unexplained
in any event under article 2474.
Neither the contract itself nor any efforts of the supplier directed
the consumer's attention to or emphasized the importance of the key
fine print clause buried in the body of the contract in Bogatz, Seabrook,
Dean, Architectural, and Unico. Civil Code article 2474 would apply
348. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (a UCC S 2-302 "prior application" case in-
volving a "waiver of claims and defenses" clause; the clause was the fifth of eleven
fine-print paragraphs).
349. 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154 (App. Div. 1971) (waiver of claims and defenses
clause).
350. 291 A.2d 298 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
351. 86 Misc. 2d 1052, 383 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
352. 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), affd per curiam on other grounds,
79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Term. 1973).
353. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922); Chrysler
Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208 S.E.2d 321 (1974); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
354. See Architectural Cabinets, Inc. v. Gaster, 291 A.2d 298, 301 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 123, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967); Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
355. 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
356. Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ
denied, 294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974). The clause in Williams was not, in fact, free of
ambiguity, but was rather esoteric. See text at notes 58, 64, 132, 330-334, supra.
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to Dean, Architectural, and Unico, as would article 1958, to deny
enforceability of the obscured clause, while article 1958 would similarly
apply to Bogatz and Seabrook.
An analysis under Civil Code articles 1958 and 2474 also resolves
various other unconscionability cases. In New Prague Flouring Mill
Co. v. Spears,57 the Iowa court refused to enforce certain fine print
provisions not discussed or called to the buyer's attention and not
read to him or readable by him because of poor eyesight. One doubts
that a single sheet of paper measuring but five inches in width by
eight inches in length and containing four thousand words,85 in any
event could be considered "clear," "unambiguous," and "unobscure"
to an uncounseled layman. The same can be said of the lease contract
in Seabrook, which contained fifty-four clauses and ten thousand words.
The very format creates obscurity.
Insurance policies are renown for fine print clauses and adhe-
sionary terms. Hence it is mildly surprising that unconscionability has
been applied (by analogy) in so few insurance policy cases. The in-
sured in C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co."9 pur-
chased a policy to protect its property from burglary and robbery.
The policy listed various occurrences not covered, but the insured's
attention was not drawn to, nor any explanation made of the impor-
tance of, the policy's fine print definition of "burglary." That defini-
tion turned out to be an exclusion: The policy only covered burglaries
in which the exterior of the premises bore visible marks of force and
violence. A divided Iowa Supreme Court held the definition uncons-
cionable and permitted the insured to recover for a burglary that,
while producing visible marks of force on an interior door, had not
left the required visible marks on the exterior. 6 ° The Louisiana
Supreme Court is not so likely to be divided on the issue, for the
insurer, like the seller, is obligated by Civil Code article 1958 (and,
by analogy, article 2474) to explain himself clearly concerning that
which is covered by the policy and that which is not. Technically, there
was no patent ambiguity in the C & J definition, but Louisiana courts
have held that if there is a commonly accepted meaning of a term
such as "burglary" and that meaning is not what the insurance com-
pany, in its policy definition, has in mind, an ambiguity has been
created if the uncommon meaning is not explained.36" '
357. 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922). See Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 862 (1978).
358. 194 Iowa at 429, 189 N.W. at 820.
359. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 862 (1978).
360. The majority opinion relied on New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194
Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922) (the court's own prior decision and a UCC . 2-302
"illustrative results" case).
361. See. e.g., Jennings v. Louisiana & S. Life Ins. Co., 290 So. 2d 811 (La. 1974);
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Louisiana courts also have subscribed to the "dominant intent"
idea, by which the insured is permitted to recover, even though the
claim is clearly excluded by the policy, where the circumstances of
the claim do not defeat the intent of the exclusion. Thus, in C & J,
the intent of the definition of burglary was to protect the insurer
against the "inside" job. The Iowa court obviously believed that an
outside party had burglarized the premises despite the absence of
external visible signs. The result would be the same in Louisiana. 2
Two similar cases, Johnson v. Mobile Oil Corp.3 and Weaver v.
American Oil Co.,364 held unconscionable clauses in dealer leases that
were highly protective of the lessor oil company. In Weaver, the oil
company's contract with the lessee stipulated in fine print that the
lessee would indemnify and hold the company harmless against all
claims, including those pertaining to the negligence of the company's
agents or employees. The clause was not explained to the lessee "in
a manner from which he could grasp [its] legal significance," '365 and
the lessee's attention was not directed to it. The company asserted
the clause when its own employee negligently sprayed gasoline on
the lessee, causing injury to him. The contract in Johnson stipulated,
presumably in fine print, that "in no event shall [the company] be
liable for prospective profits or special, indirect or consequential
damages." This clause, which had neither been pointed out to the plain-
tiff nor explained to him, was invoked by the company when the ser-
vice station operated by the plaintiff was destroyed by a fire caused
by the company's delivery of gasoline containing water. The clause
was held unconscionable in both cases.
Although the offending clause in both Johnson and Weaver was
free of ambiguity and part of a purely commercial transaction, there
is reason to believe that the results of the two cases would be the
same in Louisiana. When the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized
in Louisiana National Leasing Corp. v. ADF Service, Inc. that, while
"[s]afeguards protecting consumers must be more stringent than those
protecting businessmen competing in the marketplace. . . ., [i]t must
Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235, La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171 (1958); Garrell v.
Good Citizens Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 204 La. 871, 16 So. 2d 463 (1943); Succession of Cor-
mier, 80 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); cf. Gautreau v. Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (option to renew an insurance policy).
362. See, e.g., Powell v. Liberty Indus. Life Ins. Co., 197 La. 894, 2 So. 2d 638 (1941);
Lewis v. Liberty Indus. Life Ins. Co., 185 La. 589, 170 So. 4 (1936); cf Hemel. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So. 2d 483 (1947) (definition of "mechanical
breakdown"); Muse v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 La. 605, 192 So. 72 (1939) (defini-
tion of "loss of hand").
363. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
364. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
365. 257 Ind. at 461, 276 N.E.2d at 146.
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be presumed that persons engaged in business . ..were aware of
the contents of the .. .agreement which they signed,""3 ' the court
did not necessarily mean to draw a sharp distinction between per-
sonal, family, or household motives and commercial or profit motives.
In the 1972 decision of Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-
Benz of North America, Inc.,367 for example, the court stated that Loui-
siana had aligned itself with the "consumer-protection rule, by allow-
ing a consumer without privity to recover,""3 ' yet the case involved
a purchase by a profit-motivated corporation. Of greater significance
is the fact that in both Johnson and Weaver the service station
operator was educationally disadvantaged.6 9 and was given no explana-
tion of the clause in question. The courts in Louisiana historically have
been inclined to protect such contractants, even in commercial
settings. 7 °
Under Civil Code article 2474, the oil company lessor-seller in
Johnson would have been required to explain clearly the extent of
its own obligations, and this duty to explain would apply to the com-
pany's obligations and responsibility for the consequences of its own
fault. 71 Thus, Johnson would fall within Civil Code article 2474 and
Thibodeaux; in fact, Johnson and Thibodeaux are quite similar
philosophically.2 The contract in Weaver was not nominally a sale,
366. 377 So. 2d at 96.
367. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972).
368. 262 La. at 90, 262 So. 2d at 381.
369. The plaintiff in Johnson had dropped out of school in the eighth grade and
was "practically illiterate." 415 F. Supp. at 268. The Weaver plaintiff was a high school
dropout with no particular business experience. Cf Price v. Amoco Oil Co., 524 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (upholding, as against a sophisticated lessee, an indemnity
clause quite similar to those in Johnson and Weaver).
370. Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) and George A. Broas
Co. v. Hibernia Homestead & Say. Ass'n, 134 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), are
part of the line of cases that follow the "inference of fraud" idea traceable to Succes-
sion of Molaison, 213 La. 378, 34 So. 2d 897 (1948), in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court said, "[Ilt is the duty of the courts to carefully and painstakingly investigate
transactions between a person of limited mental capacity and one experienced in
business affairs, in order that substantial justice might be meted out," 213 La. at 398,
34 So. 2d at 903. Yet Smith and Broas involved "consumers" in a profit-motivated
transaction. See text at notes 106-137, supra.
371. The duties imposed on the seller by the Civil Code govern and give meaning
to the broader issue of his responsibility for the consequences of his fault under Civil
Code article 2315. Phillipe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 370 (La. 1980).
372. Thibodeaux, discussed in text at notes 255-273, supra, held a disclaimer of im-
plied warranty ineffective because it was both ambiguous and unexplained. The
language, said the Louisiana court of appeal, was "couched in legal terms, and not
in terms which may be read and understood by the average layman." 364 So. 2d at
1371. By comparison, the federal district court in Johnson could have been applying
Civil Code article 2474 when it observed the following:
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but both Civil Code article 2474 and the Molaison requirement 33 would
apply to the case by analogy,374 so that the lessor's failure to explain
its fine print clause would result in nonenforcement of the clause in
Louisiana.
The strong message of Johnson and Weaver is that parties disad-
vantaged as to experience, education, or sophistication do not
necessarily consent to the terms of a contract when the terms are
decidedly favorable to the other party, but this imbalance can be cured
by a good faith disclosure or the presence of competent bargaining
assistance, as by a lawyer. This is also the implicit message of the
Molaison-Carter line of Louisiana cases."' If legal or otherwise com-
petent assistance had been available to the disadvantaged party in
the Molaison-Carter cases, it is clear that the decision in each such
case either could have been against this party,37 or (and more likely)
the factual pattern would not have been as it was in the first instance.
In the case of the illiterate or educationally disadvantaged con-
sumer, pointing out a clause is meaningless. Only an explanation of
[Blefore a contracting party with the immense bargaining power of the Mobil Oil
Corporation may limit its liability vis-a-vis an uncounseled layman, . . . it has
an affirmative duty to obtain voluntary, knowing assent of the other party. This
could easily have been done in this case by explaining to plaintiff in laymen's
terms the meaning and possible consequences of the disputed clause.
415 F. Supp. at 269. The court then added that which is implicit in Civil Code article
1819's language that consent results from a free and deliberate exercise of the will
with regard to a matter understood:
Such a requirement [of explanation by the superior party] does not detract from
the freedom to contract, unless that phrase denotes the freedom to impose the
onerous terms of one's carefully-drawn printed document on an unsuspecting con-
tractual partner. Rather, freedom to contract is enhanced by a requirement that
both parties be aware of the burdens they are assuming. The notion of free will
has little meaning as applied to one who is ignorant of the consequences of his acts.
415 F. Supp at 269.
373. See note 370, supra.
374. The principle of Civil Code article 2474 was applied by analogy to a lease
in Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979). See also
Riverside Realty Co. v. National Food Stores, Inc., 174 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965). The Weaver decision is also quite compatible with Civil Code articles 1819 and
2474: "The party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden of showing that
the provisions were explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and there
was in fact a real and voluntary meeting of the minds and not merely an objective meeting."
257 Ind. at 464, 276 N.E.2d at 148 (emphasis in original).
375. See text at notes 106-137, supra. The supreme court took note in Molaison
that the legatee did not have the assistance of counsel in signing the renunciation,
but this element is implicit in almost all consumer transactions.
376. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1978).
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the clause will suffice, and then only the clearest explanation will do. 7'
Where the consumer is not conversant in the English language, it
arguably must be shown that an interpreter explained the import of
the waiver or other language. No such explanation of the payment
schedule was given in the unconscionability case of Brooklyn Union
Gas Co. v. Jimeniz,7 8 despite the request of the Spanish-speaking buyer
for an explanation; thus, his misunderstanding of the payment schedule
and his resulting default could not avail the seller in Louisiana."' The
Spanish-speaking buyer in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso38 ° dealt with
a Spanish-speaking salesman, but not only did he fail to get an
explanation of the contract he signed, his consent was obtained
through fraud. 81
Not all "buried" clauses are in fine print. In Baker v. City of
Seattle,8 ' language disclaiming liability for personal injuries caused
by the use of a leased golf cart comprised the seventh and eighth
sentences of the eleven sentences in the one-paragraph contract form.
All eleven sentences were the same size, and no paragraph heading
indicated the significance of the disclaiming sentences contained in
the paragraph. The lessee was injured when the golf cart overturned
as a result of a brake failure. The disclaimer was ruled unconscionable.
377. Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974) (clear language of waiver not pointed out or explained);
Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto. Sales, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (am-
biguous language not brought to buyer's attention or explained to him).
378. 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civ. Ct. 1975).
379. Cf Succession of Molaison, 213 La. 378, 34 So. 2d (1948) (renunciation of legacy);
Succession of Gilmore, 157 La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924) (setting aside a probated will);
Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (sale of land). In Murphy
v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (Super. Ct. 1979), the court twice notes,
in the course of holding the price to be unconscionable, that the seller did not advise
the buyer of the total amount required to be paid in order to "own" the thing sold.
The agreement, however, did provide for weekly payments of $16 which, if paid for
78 successive weeks, would make the buyer the owner of the thing. The failure of
the seller in Murphy was to point out just what 78 times $16 totalled, which arguably
a seller should do in order to avoid, not an ambiguity, but an obscurity within the
meaning of Civil Code article 1958. Certainly, such would be required where the buyer
is educationally disadvantaged.
Another of the unconscionability cases, American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver,
105 N.H. 435, 291 A.2d 886 (1964) (discussed in text at note 116, supra), is quite similar
to McNamara. The homeowner in Maclver was not given an explanation of the cost
of credit, but that cost could have been determined by him by merely multiplying
the disclosed monthly payments by the total number of payments and deducting the
contract cash price.
380. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
381. See text at notes 119-120, supra.
382. 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
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In Louisiana a lessor is bound to deliver a thing that is safe," but
Civil Code articles 11 and 1764(2) presumably permit this implied
obligation to be renounced by the lessee. The language of waiver,
however, has to be unambiguous and brought to the lessee's atten-
tion or explained to him."M Since there was no suggestion in Baker
that the lessor directed the lessee's attention to the seventh and eighth
sentences, the waiver would be effective in Louisiana only if the con-
tract itself directed attention to those sentences. It did not, and the
waiver would fail in Louisiana. Although not involving personal in-
juries, the decision in Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v. C.A.
Roberts Co."' is similar to Baker in that the clause limiting consequen-
tial damages was not conspicuous and the seller's form did not draw
the buyer's attention to it and the seller did not explain it.388
Clauses or Contracts that Lead to an Absurdity
When, in 1967, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had before it,
in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,'87 a real estate broker's agree-
ment containing language traditionally viewed as meaning that the
broker's commission was to be deemed earned upon acceptance of a
purchase offer, the case could have been decided expeditiously by
affirming the decision of the appellate division that the commission
clause was ambiguous and, therefore, was to be construed favorably
to the real estate seller.388 But as it did in Unico v. Owen88 that same
year and seven years earlier in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
the New Jersey court eschewed the ground of ambiguity8 ' and took
the opportunity to hand down a new and broad policy for the state.
Important to the court was the reasonable expectation of the seller
that the broker's commission would be paid only out of the proceeds
of the sale. In effect, the court wrote that expectation into all such
contracts in New Jersey,39' thereby casting on the broker the risk,
383. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2692-2695.
384. Louisiana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979);
Tassin v. Slidell Mini-Storage, Inc., 388 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 396 So. 2d 1261 (La. 1981).
385. 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980) (see note 312, supra.)
386. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 983, 991, 408 N.E.2d at 405, 411.
387. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 834 (1967).
388. 50 N.J. at 556, 236 A.2d at 858. See text at notes 335-336, supra.
389. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
390. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See text at notes 274-282, supra. The disclaimer
language of Henningsen was not clear and free of ambiguity, 32 N.J. at 399-401, 407-08,
161 A.2d at 92-93, 96-97, and the waiver of defenses clause in Unico was the fifth
of eleven fine print paragraphs and was not brought to the buyer's attention or ex-
plained to him despite the use therein of legalistic language, 50 N.J. at 123, 232 A.2d
at 417.
391. 50 N.J. at 547, 555-56, 236 A.2d at 852, 857.
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previously borne by the seller, of the financial inability of the buyer
to perform. This risk was to be treated as a normal incident of the
broker's business. The related issue, of course, was whether the broker
could shift that risk back to the seller by appropriate contract
language. The court left no doubt that such a contractual stipulation
would be unconscionable. 92
It might be assumed that UCC section 2-302 had a significant
influence on the Ellsworth Dobbs case. This assumption is not necessari-
ly incorrect, but, in fact, the decision cites, as a primary authority,
the 1948 Louisiana case of McKelvy v. Milford.39 In truth, the rule
announced in 1967 in Ellsworth Dobbs is traceable through McKelvy
to the 1842 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Didion v.
Duralde:394 "[Tjhe record shows that the sale of the land was never
effected, and . . . the judge below . . . correctly concluded, that no
brokerage is due in the case of a sale until it is actually effected."
Left open by the Didion decision was the same issue as that
presented in Ellsworth Dobbs: the effect of an express stipulation to
the contrary in the broker's contract, i.e., a stipulation that the
broker's commission was to be deemed earned upon acceptance of a
purchase offer. Although the tenor of the Didion opinion reasonably
could lead to the conclusion that such a stipulation would not have
altered the outcome, the matter was laid to rest in McKelvy (which
392. In the words of the court:
Grossly unfair contractual obligations resulting from the use of . . . expertise
or control by the one possessing it, which result in assumption by the other con-
tracting party of a burden which is at odds with the common understanding of
the ordinary and untrained member of the public, are considered unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable.
Whenever there is substantial inequality of bargaining power, position or
advantage between the broker and the other party involved, any form of agree-
ment designed to create liability on the part of the owner for commission upon
the signing of a contract to sell to a prospective buyer, brought forward by the
broker, even though consummation of the sale is frustrated by the inability or
the unwillingness of the buyer to pay the purchase money and close the title,
we regard as so contrary to the common understanding of men, and also so con-
trary to common fairness, as to require a court to condemn it as unconscionable.
. . .[W]henever the substantial inequality of bargaining power, position or ad-
vantage to which we have adverted appears, a provision to the contrary in an
agreement prepared or presented or negotiated or procured by the broker shall
be deemed inconsistent with public policy and unenforceable.
50 N.J. at 554-56, 236 A.2d at 856-58 (citations omitted).
393. 37 So. 2d 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).
394. 2 Rob. 163, 165 (La. 1842). Cf. Blanc v. New Orleans Improv. & Banking Co.,
2 Rob. 63 (La. 1842) (loan brokerage commission).
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involved a clear and unambiguous agreement that the "broker's com-
mission ... is earned upon the signing . ..by both parties" of an
agreement to purchase) by this terse statement: "The quoted excerpt
from the agreement is unconscionable."'39
In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court on at least two occasions
between 1842 and 1948 has explained in Civil Code theory why such
a clear and unambiguous clause is nevertheless invalid and unen-
forceable. In 1930, it was held in Eastbank Land Co. v. Hoffstetter,
as to an allegation that the commission was earned and payable when
the offer to purchase was signed by the plaintiff and accepted by the
defendant:
No such obligation was incurred by the defendant or con-
templated by the parties at the time the offer was made and
accepted.
The commission could only be earned and [become] due when
the offerer obtained a person ready, willing, and able to buy on
the terms stated in the offer, and this . .. was never done.
It would be strange indeed to say that the defendant owed
the plaintiff a commission for making the offer to purchase. 96
Two years later, the court had before it, in Boisseau v. Vallon &
Jordano, Inc.,397 a clear stipulation that the owner was to pay the com-
mission upon the acceptance of an offer to buy. 98 The dissertation
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, premised on civilian theory, said what
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ellsworth Dobbs was to say in the
jargon of unconscionability thirty-five years later:
Counsel for Vallon & Jordano ... say that contracts not pro-
hibited by law constitute the law between the parties and are
enforceable against them, even though they were unwise in making
the agreements, and that "courts do not sit to relieve persons
of the results of their bad judgment."
That is true enough, but courts do sit to interpret instruments
evidencing obligations ....
395. 37 So. 2d at 371 (emphasis added). In the absence of a contractual stipulation
covering the issue, knowledge by the broker that the homeowner can only pay the
commission from the proceeds of the sale probably would bring the case within Civil
Code article 1897 as a contract "without cause." See First Progressive Bank v. Costan-
za, 427 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
396. 170 La. 594, 597, 128 So. 527, 528 (1930).
397. 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932).
398. The contract, in fact, required the commission to be paid even in the event
the contract of sale was declared null and void because of a title defect or for any
other reason. 174 La. at 497, 141 So. at 40.
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When courts are called upon to interpret written instruments
purporting to evidence obligations, if any doubt arises, they look
beyond the mere wording of the instrument itself and endeavor
to ascertain what was the true intent of the parties, for it is the
intent of the parties which determines whether an obligation was
assumed. 9
The interpretation of agreements is treated in articles 1945 to 1962
of the Louisiana Civil Code, in which certain general principles are
stated. Of significance in Boisseau were articles 1945, 1946, and 1950.
Article 1950 requires that "[w]hen there is anything doubtful in
agreements," the court is to "endeavor to ascertain what was the com-
mon intention of the parties, rather than to adhere to the literal sense
of the terms," and by article 1946 the words of a contract "are to
be understood . . . in the common and usual signification, without at-
tending so much to grammatical rules, as to general and popular use."
Under article 1945, the courts are bound to give legal effect to a con-
tract according to "the true intent" of the parties, determined by the
words of the contract, "when these are clear and explicit and lead
to no absurd consequences." Applying these rules to the case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the seller was not bound to pay
the commission:
The words of this instrument are "clear and explicit" that he
was to pay these commissions . . . . But we cannot give effect
to these provisions when to do so would lead to an "absurd
consequence."
... No sane man would obligate himself to pay a real estate
agent a commission for the bare privilege of listing his property
for sale or exchange .... Yet that is what this contract, according
to the agent's view, means ...
The contract seems to have been written mainly in the in-
terest of the real estate agent. Its provisions for the payment of
the agent's commission are snares and traps to catch the unwary,
and are so drastic, harsh, and out of accord with those usually
found in such instruments that no court of justice will enforce
them in the absence of proof positive that those who signed the
instruments understood and intended to be bound by them."'
399. 174. La. at 498-99, 141 So. at 40.
400. 174 La. at 500-02, 141 So. at 40-41. In general, the vendor will not be responsi-
ble for a commission in the event the transaction is not consummated, unless he is
at fault, e.g., by failing to convey title or by failing to present a marketable title.
See Walker v. Moore, 68 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953); cf. Deano, Inc. v. Michel,
[Vol. 431394
UNCONSCIONABILITY
To the Louisiana Supreme Court, there did arise a doubt as to the
owner's intent and, therefore, as to the common intention of the parties
within the meaning of article 1950, since the provision for commis-
sion was, in the literal sense of the terms, so out of accord with the
ordinary homeowner's expectations as to be absurd. This being so,
the court refused to enforce the literal sense of the terms in the
absence of "proof positive" that the owner had understood them and
truly intended to be bound by them.
The intriguing aspect of Boisseau lies not so much in its relation-
ship to the landmark New Jersey decision thirty-five years later in
Ellsworth Dobbs,"°' but in the similarity of approach of the two deci-
sions. Boisseau reasoned that since "no sane man" would have signed
such an absurd contract, the burden was heavy on the broker to prove
a knowing and intentional consent, a task one may as well say is im-
possible. Ellsworth Dobbs warns that a clause contrary to its ruling
would be unenforceable as an "unconscionable" clause, a term often
defined as "one such as no man in his senses and not under a delu-
sion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other." '02
In addition to the Boisseau, Hoffstetter, and McKelvy broker com-
mission cases, Blum v. Marrero"' and Chrysler Credit Corp v. Henry""4
are examples of the clear stipulation that leads to "an absurd conse-
quence" under Civil Code article 1945. In Blum, a pest control com-
pany inspected a house for termite damage for the benefit of a pros-
pective purchaser of the house, but it apparently failed to discover
significant beetle damage. The pest control company defended on the
basis that it had specifically contracted only to conduct a "termite
inspection" and had performed that obligation. The Louisiana court
was not impressed:
The pest control company could not reasonably suppose that [a
consumer] was unwilling to pay a contracted price for a house
with damage from sub-terranean termites, but was willing to pay
the same price for the same house with the same damage but
from beetles (or another kind of termite). [I]t would make no sense
(it would be an "absurd consequence" within C.C. art. 1945(3)) to
191 La. 233, 185 So. 9 (1938) (lack of marketable title not the fault of vendor). Of course,
where the prospective buyer defaults, Boisseau controls, but the broker may have an
action against the buyer for his commission. See Probst v. Di Giovanni, 232 La. 811,
95 So. 2d 321 (1957) and cases cited therein.
401. The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion does cite Boisseau. 50 N.J. at 550,
236 A.2d at 854.
402. Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 454, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (1970).
403. 346 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert denied, 349 So. 2d 872 (La. 1977).
404. 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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so construe a pest control company's contract for a "termite
inspection" . . . .40
By the unambiguous contract language in Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Henry,"' a seventy-year old woman with cataracts on both of her eyes
purchased an automobile and was the proper party defendant in an
action for the price. From this factual setting, the Louisiana court
inferred fraud and, accordingly, denied enforcement of the contract,
but the "absurd consequences" rationale was clearly an alternative
available to the court.4"7
The following thirteen unconscionability cases are susceptible to
the "absurd consequences" rational of Civil Code article 1945: Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Donahue,48 Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 9 Green
v. Arcos, Ltd.,41 New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears,4" Seabrook
v. Commuter Housing Co.,' 2 Trinkle v. Schumacher Co.,"8 Frank's
Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co.,"' United States
Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., Inc., Weaver v. American Oil
Co.," C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 17 Majors
v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc.,4" Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v.
Weber Packing Corp.,"9 Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc.,42°
and Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.'2 Characterizing the
contract language as leading to absurd consequences only would arise
in Majors, Weber, C & J, and Williams in the unlikely event that the
405. 346 So. 2d at 357. The alternative rationale for Blum is the application of
Civil Code article 1958 to the ambiguous meaning of "termite inspection."
406. 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
407. In the court's words, "It taxes our credulity to believe that a seventy year
old woman in her physical and economic condition would . . . proceed on her own
to buy a new automobile for slightly less than $3,600.00." 221 So. 2d at 533. Cf. Dennis
Miller Pest Control, Inc. v. Denney Miller, Jr. Pest Controls, Inc., 379 So. 2d 801 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 25 (La. 1980) (contract required buyer to obtain
financing, within 30 days, of $50,000 payable over a 30-year period-a virtual
impossibility).
408. 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976), affd, 264 S.E.2d 466 (W. Va. 1980).
409. 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154 (App. Div. 1971).
410. 47 T.L.R. 336 (C.A. 1931).
411. 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922).
412. 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), afj'd per curiam on other grounds,
79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Term. 1973).
413. 100 Wisc. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980).
414. 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980).
415. 65 Misc. 2d 1082, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
416. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
417. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
418. 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
419. 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
420. 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981).
421. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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previously discussed issues of ambiguity, obscurity, and the duty to
explain were resolved favorably to the supplier in each case. Unam-
biguous language in fine print or "buried" within the contract is pre-
sent in New Prague, Seabrook, Dean, and Weaver and could be an alter-
native ground of nonenforcement, as has been previously discussed.
It is absurd to believe that a farmer would purchase seed, costing
him $90 to $100 per acre to harvest, pursuant to a clause by which
he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right not only to recover
lost profits but that $90 to $100 per acre expense as well in the event
the seed was defective or not as represented (Majors). It is likewise
absurd to contend that a head-of-household welfare mother would make
payments for years in the knowledge that not one of the many items
purchased over the years was or would be "hers" so long as there
was an outstanding balance owed (Williams). Clauses which ostensibly
require the buyer to promptly make claims for defects that are latent
and not susceptible of prompt discovery (Weber) or to make, prior to
processing, claims based on defects discoverable only during or after
processing (Trinkle and Pittsfield) or that require the buyer to accept
not only defective goods, but goods that do not meet the contract
description (Green) lead to "absurd consequences" and will not be en-
forced according to the literal sense of the terms.42 '
A clause in New Prague was held "manifestly unreasonable""42 in
literally permitting the seller to deliver the wrong thing and thereafter
treat the buyer's repudiation of the contract and his subsequent failure
to give further shipping instructions as merely a request for an
extension of time for performance. Likewise, can a court rationally
be expected to believe that an under-educated service station lessee
knowingly and freely consented to indemnify American Oil Company,
an indemnification that could well reach into the millions of dollars
and that could result from the sole fault of the oil company itself
(Weaver)?4 Is it not slightly more reasonable for a corporation to seek
indemnity for the inevitable liability it faces from an insurance com-
pany? And if that lessee signed a contract with the oil company by
which he could only terminate the lease on notice of nonrenewal sixty
422. See Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 32 So. 985 (1901) ("purchaser assumes
all risks" language did not contemplate the risk that seller's orchard would be totally
destroyed by frost); cf. Elephant, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 239 So. 2d 692
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1970) (to interpret the language "[we] shall hold Dr. Robert Cane
harmless from any liability" as not including liability from negligence would be absurd
since such, in effect, would mean "hold harmless from nothing at all"; this would not
have been the intention of either party).
423. 194 Iowa at 433, 189 N.W. at 821.
424. Cf. Elephant, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., 239 So. 2d 692 (La. App.




days prior to the termination date, but the oil company could ter-
minate the lease at will, wiping out his investment of time and money,
is it not absurd to believe his consent was truly knowledgeable and
freely given (Ashland Oil)?.25
Dean, C & J, Seabrook, and U.S. Leasing likewise reveal absur-
dities. The offending clause in Dean, if taken literally, would have
permitted the repossessing creditor to convert any property of the
buyer left in the vehicle," 6 including, one assumes, the bank passbook
needed by the buyer to withdraw his life's savings or the receipt that
proves conclusively that his car loan payments, in fact, are not in
default. The definition in C & J of "burglary" made coverage under
the policy depend on the relative skill or ineptitude of the burglar.
The contract in U.S. Leasing purportedly obligated the lessee to pay
all three years of the lease payments despite the total uselessness
of the thing leased, which was caused by the failure of the third-party
supplier to deliver an indispensible component part."7
425. Cf. Gautreau v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 815 (La. App.
3d Cir.), cert. granted, 414 So. 2d 392 (La. 1982) (insurance renewal clause). But cf. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (commer-
cial utilities customer bound by contract requirement that unless notice of termina-
tion be given prior to September 15, 1972, the contract would be extended through
December 15, 1977).
'426. Such a clause might be construed in Louisiana as an invalid security device.
See Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Lee, 344 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) (Redmann, J.,
dissenting).
427. The thing leased was an "addresser-printer," which was delivered, but the
embossed plates bearing the names of the lessee's tenants was not delivered. Without
the plates, the thing was of no use to the lessee. Under the lease, all "claims" were
required to be asserted against the third party supplier, and the lessee was obligated
to make the lease payments even in the event such a claim was asserted.
An issue similar to that in U.S. Leasing arose in Bancshares Leasing Corp. v. Cabral,
399 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), but there the contract did provide expressly
that the purchaser-lessor and/or the lessee could enforce all warranties in "its own
name." The opinion suggests, however, that the lessee could avoid payment in any
event by showing that the lease was in reality a disguised sale. See also Capitol City
Leasing Corp. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 935 (La. 1981).
The lessor's implied warranty can be waived in a commercial transaction, as Loui-
siana Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979) demonstrates.
The lessee which does not enjoy the benefit of an assignment of the lessor-buyer's
implied warranty rights against the seller, and which cannot show a disguised sale,
as in Bancshares, could argue that it is subrogated to the lessor's rights. See Moreno's,
Inc. v. Lake Charles Catholic High Schools, Inc., 315 So. 2d 660 (La. 1975). The Civil
Code, however, may have anticipated the kind of absurdity found in U.S. Leasing,
for article 2699 provides:
If, without any fault of the lessor, the thing cease to be fit for the purpose
for which it was leased, or if the use be much impeded, as if a neighbor, by raising
his walls shall intercept the light of a house leased, the lessee may, according
to circumstances, obtain the annulment of the lease, but has no claim for indemnity.
Thus, even in the case of a valid waiver of the lessor's obligations to deliver and
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The lease signed in Seabrook permitted the lessor to delay the
occupancy date in the event that the apartment building was not com-
pleted on schedule, but it placed no time limit on such a delay, while
holding the lessee and her $464 security deposit in limbo in the
interim. In its literal sense, any open-ended clause such as in Seabrook
and New Prague would yield an absurd consequence if carried to its
logical extension. A court certainly would interpret an open-ended
clause as meaning a reasonable delay or extension, but as in Seabrook,
the absurdity is in believing that the lessee consented to bear the
risk that his current lease (which he would not want to renew) would
not expire long before occupancy began on the new lease or that he
consented to bear the risk of second-guessing whether a four-month
delay in the occupancy date would be viewed as "reasonable" by a
court in subsequent litigation to recover the security deposit."8
UCC section 2-302 comment 1 lists Kansas Flour Mills Co. v.
Dirks4" as an "illustrative results" case, saying of an extension clause
similar to the one in New Prague, "[I]n a rising market the court per-
mitted the buyer to measure his damages for non-delivery at the end
of only one 30 day postponement.""' Of course, a clause ostensibly
permitting either party to extend the time of performance without
limit, in a nonstatic market, would be an unfair one to which it is
absurd to think any party consciously would agree. Kansas Flour
perhaps is seen by the UCC as a companion to New Prague, in that,
maintain the thing leased in a condition such as to serve for the purpose for which
it is hired (Civil Code article 2692), the lessee still could argue that article 2699 per-
mits him to annul the lease whenever the thing's lack of fitness is unrelated to the
lessor's normal implied warranty obligations. Civil Code article 2699 has been so applied
as to suggest that the lessee in U.S. Leasing would find refuge thereunder, despite
a waiver of the lessor's obligations. See Add Chemical Co. v. Gulf-Marine Fabricators,
Inc., 345 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 263 (La. 1977); Truck
Equip. Co. v. O'Reilly, 142 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). But see Scudder v.
Paulding, 4 Rob. 428 (La. 1843).
428. See Chemical Cleaning, Inc. v. Brindell-Bruno, Inc., 214 So. 2d 215 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968). The occupancy in Seabrook was expected to begin on March 1, 1972,
but it was delayed until July of 1972. Plaintiff was forced to vacate her former lease
in early May of 1972. The Seabrook decision was affirmed on the basis that the lessor
had failed to perform its implied promise to make the premises available on the com-
mencement date or within a reasonable time thereafter. 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d
566 (App. Term. 1973). Cf. Johnson v. Colonial Buick, Inc., 334 So. 2d 453 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1976) (applying LA. CIv. CODE art. 2485 to a contract for the sale of a new
car, with no agreed time for delivery; after 14 weeks, it was held that a reasonable
time had passed, permitting buyer to cancel and obtain a refund); Holmes Brick &
Salvage Co. v. Reo Constr., Inc., 253 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 255
So. 2d 353 (La. 1971) (defendant breached a contract by failing to designate a time
for the demolition of a building).
429. 100 Kan. 376, 164 P. 273 (1917).
430. UCC S 2-302, comment 1 (emphasis added).
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presumably, the buyer would not have been permitted to extend per-
formance for an unreasonable time in a rising market. 31
The Civil Code points out that the contract is not to be "con-
founded with the instrument in writing by which it is witnessed." '432
When the writing expresses the true intent of the parties, the con-
tract is to be given legal effect.433 To be valid, however, all contracts
must be based on consent,43' and there can be no consent unless freely
and deliberately given as to a matter understood.'35 Whether or not
by design, the Civil Code appears to recognize that a signed writing
does not necessarily tell the entire story of the contract between the
parties, that is, what the parties truly intended. Given the presence
of standard forms, that which the supplier intended may be clear;
if not, article 1958 resolves any ambiguity against him. If the writing
speaks clearly as to the supplier's intentions, the issue becomes not
the clarity with which the parties have expressed their true intent
but, rather, did the consumer really give his consent to the expressed
intent of the supplier? As the Boisseau opinion observed, courts do
not sit to relieve persons of the results of their bad judgments as
to obligations undertaken, but courts do sit to interpret the in-
struments that evidence those obligations.' A knowing and volun-
tary assent to harsh contractual provisions permits no judicial scrutiny
in Louisiana, but whenever the meaning or intent of the language
of the instrument is the issue, the courts give weight to the obvious
fact that "informed and experienced persons, do not usually and
customarily bind themselves to unjust and unreasonable obligations." '437
Thus, even clear language may not prevent some doubt as to the par-
ties' true intent.
431. The delivery date in Kansas Flour was December 30, 1914, and this date was
extended to January 15, 1915, at buyer's election. The court permitted the buyer to
measure his damages by the difference between the contract price of $1.00 per bushel
and the January 15th market price of $1.29 per bushel. Unfortunately, it does not
appear from the opinion in Kansas Flour that the buyer ever attempted to extend
performance so as to measure his damages beyond one postponement of the delivery
date, and in fact, the one postponement made by the buyer was fifteen days, not thir-
ty, as suggested by the comment. The court held this fifteen-day extension reasonable.
In brief, inclusion of Kansas Flour in UCC S 2-302, comment- 1 was perhaps improvi-
dent.
432. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1762.
433. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1945.
434. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1797.
435. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1819.
436. See text at note 400, supra.
437. Oil Field Supply & Scrap Material Co. v. Gifford Hill & Co., 204 La. 929, 934,
16 So. 2d 483, 484 (1943).
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Price-Value Disparity and Problems Involving
Substantive Unconscionability
Judges and legal commentators frequently speak of "procedural"
unconscionability as distinguished from "substantive" unconscion-
ability."8 Presumably because there is no legislated definition of the
term "unconscionable," 439 some such delineation for purposes of analysis
was inevitable. However, it is useful only for analytical purposes since
a given case can involve elements of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.
When the term "procedural unconscionability" is used, the
reference is to the contract formation process and freedom of con-
sent and choice. ' ° Among the factors to be considered in applying
the label are the manner in which the contract was entered into,
whether each of the parties had a reasonable opportunity to under-
stand the terms of the contract, whether fine print hid significant
terms, and whether the particular provision was conspicuous or other-
wise brought to the attention of the party to whom the contract is
presented.
Substantive unconscionability has reference to the terms
themselves and whether they are commercially reasonable. In apply-
ing UCC section 2-302, judges tend to examine first the terms of the
contract alleged to be unconscionable, and if they are not unreasonably
favorable to one party, the inquiry into unconscionability typically
ends.4 1 If the terms appear unreasonably favorable to one party,
however, the possibility of a lack of a real and voluntary meeting
of the minds, or consent, is injected into the case. An inquiry then
must be made of such factors as the age, education, intelligence, and
business experience of, or presence of capable advisors for, the ap-
parently disadvantaged party, the relative bargaining power of the
parties, which party drafted the contract, whether the terms should
have been explained, whether the advantaged party was willing to
negotiate on the terms, and whether the disadvantaged party had a'
meaningful alternative choice. " With such an approach in mind, one
can explain the significance of the fact that the clause in Weaver v.
438. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, S 4-3, 4-4, at 150-155 (2d ed. 1980).
439. See, however, LA. R.S. 9:3516(30).
440. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
441. See Younger, A Judge's View of Unconscionability, 5 UCC L.J. 348, 349 (1973).
Compare Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) with
Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969).
442. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Weaver
v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1972).
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American Oil Co. 43 was in fine print, while this fact had no particular
significance in three commercial transaction cases finding no
unconscionability. 4" As the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York wryly observed, there is no unfair
surprise where competent parties are involved, for "to suggest that
[the utility company's] representatives failed to read the documents
.. .charges them with dereliction of duty or incompetence. 445
An analysis of unconscionability in consumer transactions involves
an initial inquiry into the terms of the contract: Do the terms seem
out of proportion to the risks of the creditor? If the terms are
unreasonably favorable to the creditor, it suggests an impairment of
the deliberate and informed consent to which the legal system aspires
as a standard. The suggestion of impaired consent can be confirmed
if, in addition to the unreasonably favorable terms, there is found the
lack of a meaningful alternative choice. But whether there is an
absence of meaningful choice depends entirely on the circumstances
of each case. The buyer who is "locked in" to a particular supplier
may have no alternative but to accede to terms actually understood.
Where fine print, unintelligible legal jargon, referral sales schemes,
or similar deception also is present, the finding of unconscionability
is simply facilitated. For the buyer who is not forced to deal with
a given supplier, the apparent ability to "walk away" from the pro-
posed transaction may not in fact be present if the buyer is lacking
in ability to protect himself, as when there is a gross disparity of
bargaining position or sophistication between the parties. The sup-
plier in such a case is likened to a fiduciary, and because of the terms
(in the contract) and the attendant circumstances, he is saddled with
the burden of proving the conscionability of the transaction. This is
quite a distance for common law courts to have travelled from the
starting point of caveat emptor.
Whether confronted with purely mercantile agreements or with
consumer transactions, those decisions finding unconscionability rely
on a sort of sliding scale balancing of the "procedural" and "substan-
tive" factors which underlie the particular case. Once the decision is
made that the terms appear to be unreasonably favorable to the
creditor (the substantive factor), an examination of the nature of the
443. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1972), discussed in text at notes 364-375 & 416-424,
supra.
444. First New Jersey Bank v. F.L.M. Business Machines Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 151,
325 A.2d 843 (1974); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co.,
383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974).
445. Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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debtor's consent, i.e., the meaningfulness of his choice and his apparent
ability to protect himself (the procedural factors), may reveal an un-
conscionable or unconsented-to bargain. An extremely harsh or
unreasonably favorable term may be held unenforceable with mere
lip service to the requirement of procedural unconscionability. 44' By
contrast, the clear absence of a meaningful choice or other factors
which contribute thereto may compel a court to withhold enforcement
of terms expressly permitted by law. 47
The principal thrust of Louisiana contract formation law is
informed consent. It is incumbent on the superior party to explain,
advise, declare, and disclose so that consent can be doubted only in
those cases in which clear language leads to an absurdity. These are
primarily the same factors one might outline for "procedural uncon-
scionability." Most of the unconscionability cases do involve both pro-
cedural and substantive elements. Finding Louisiana Civil Code
equivalents is not so difficult where, for example, there is a failure
of the superior party (seller, lessor, builder) to explain (the procedural
element), because that element itself tends in Louisiana to overshadow
a substantive element such as whether the stipulation in question is
simply too harsh, unfair, or unreasonable to enforce. Even the "ab-
surd consequences" idea is primarily procedural, because the court
is not technically judging the commercial reasonableness of the harsh
terms of the contract in the absence of certainty that consent actually
was given.
In a few unconscionability cases, however, one finds no signifi-
cant presence of procedural factors, so that the terms themselves must
be judged apart from the manner in which they came into being. For
example, suppose a buyer, suffering no particular incapacities, sees
a thing he wants and agrees in an ambiguity free contract to pay for
it a price very much in excess of the thing's objective "market" value.
Can it be said that such a contract is unconscionable? If so, would
Louisiana law be in accord?
446. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976) (involving a
ten-day termination clause, unilaterally exercisable by the franchisor).
447. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), cited
by the comments to UCC S 2-302, provides an example. A disclaimer of warranties
clause, expressly permitted by UCC S 2-316, was found to be in fine print, "hidden"
on the backside of the contract, and written in all but incomprehensible language in
a contract which not only was not subject to bargaining between the parties but also
was used in substantially similar form by all automobile retailers. A like evaluation
can be made of Williams v. Walker-Thomas in that the price of the stereo may have
been within normal "markup," and the pro rata clause is not necessarily unreasonably
favorable to seller, since UCC S 9-204(5) arguably permits the "cross collateralization




Within the UCC section 2-302 jurisprudence, there has developed
the idea that unconscionability can be premised purely on a disparity
between price and value. The "price unconscionability" idea was raised
in, or that label applied by commentators to, the following cases:
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,448 Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 49
American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver,450 State v. ITM, Inc.,"
Kugler v. Romain,452 Murphy v. McNamara,458 Jones v. Star Credit
Corp.,4" Toker v. Perl,455 Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano,416 and Toker
v. Westerman.457 As urged herein, the application of familiar Civil Code
principles readily could account for the outcome in each of these cases,
with the possible exception of Star Credit and Westerman.58 In Mar-
cano and Reynoso, for example, the buyers spoke only Spanish, yet
they were given no interpretation or explanation of the contract terms.
This fact alone would cast doubt on the enforceability in Louisiana
of the contract or clause in question, in light of Civil Code articles
2474, 1901, and 1819."59 Moreover, it is at least plausible that the sellers
448. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
449. 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
450. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
451. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
452. 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
453. 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (Super. Ct. 1979).
454. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., 1969).
455. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968), affd on other grounds, 108 N.J. Super.
129, 260 A.2d 244 (1970).
456. 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
457. 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
458. Both cases, however, are amenable to the "absurd consequences" and "inference
of fraud" approaches. See text at notes 104-114 & 399-437, supra. Cf. Smith v. Everett,
291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (price-value disparity was an important ingre-
dient in the affirmance of a finding of fraud).
459. Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978) (buyer had only a sixth grade education, did not understand the meaning of
"redhibition" and, therefore, could not be said to have knowingly waived it in the
absence of a clear explanation); Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1975) ("doubtful that an individual such as [buyer], a semi-illiterate, would have
noticed or understood the implications of [a small hand-written o after the word 'war-
ranty']"); Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (buyer
had only a seventh grade education and was unsophisticated; a clear and unambiguous
waiver of warranty clause was neither explained nor brought to his attention; held,
waiver invalid); Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (seller had
not completed grade school, did not realize value of property he sold); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (elderly buyer whose reading
ability was greatly impaired by severe cataracts, only a fourth-grade education; held,
contract fraudulently induced); Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969) (elderly buyer, illiterate, uneducated); Port Fin. Co. v. Campbell, 94 So. 2d 891
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) (buyer, an uneducated laborer, could not be charged with
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in Marcano and Reynoso knew of the defective condition of the thing
sold, so as to bring to bear Civil Code articles 1832, 1847, and 2548.460
Marcano and Reynoso also seem clearly within the Molaison-Carter
"inference of fraud" jurisprudence in that the buyer's disadvantage
was obvious to the seller. Similarly, the seller in Reynoso knew of
the buyer's lack of financial resources. 411 Toker v. Perl involved fraud
in the execution 412 and would be within the purview of articles 1819,
1825, 1832, and 1847.
knowledge of excessive oil consumption from fact that smoke came from the car);
Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
(buyer had little formal eduation, could not readily understand contracts); Davis v.
Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) (illiterate person signed a release; held,
error); Griffing v. Atkins, 1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) (seller "ignorant," buyer
a merchant; held, fraud); Segretto v. Menefee Motor Co., 159 So. 345 (La. App. Orl.
1935) (buyer illiterate; erroneously believed his down payment was the total price).
460. Fraud was not alleged in Reynoso or in Marcano, but this fact does not con-
vince the reader of those cases that articles 1832 and 1847 would not apply in Loui-
siana to vitiate buyer's consent in a similar case. See, e.g., Sunseri v. Westbank Motors,
228 La. 370, 82 So. 2d 43 (1955); Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974); Plan Invs. Inc. v. Heflin, 286 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Tauzin v. Sam
Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford,
177 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Jones v. Greyhound Corp., 174 So. 2d 826 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1965); Housecraft Div. of S. Siding Co. v. Jones, 120 So. 2d 662 (La.
App. Orl. 1960); Griffing v. Atkins, 1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
461. The seller in Reynoso knew that buyer had but one week left on his job. The
issue is of importance under Uniform Consumer Credit Code S§ 5.108 and 6.111, for
S 6.111(3) empowers the administrator to bring a restraining action against a creditor
who, inter alia, had a belief at the time of sale that there was no resonable prob-
ability of payment in full by the debtor. See generally Hersbergen, The Improvident
Extension of Credit As An Unconscionable Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225 (1974). The
lack of buyer's financial ability likewise was known to the seller in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas and in Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), but no Loui-
siana cases bearing on the effect of such knowledge have been found. However, the
case of Coburn Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 241 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), presents
some interesting food for thought. The ultimate ruling in the case was that the loan
to defendant was voidable for lack of capacity to freely consent. Yet, the third cir-
cuit's narrative permits speculation that the loan company's knowledge of the bor-
rower's limited mental ability was as important a factor as the limitation itself:
Coburn had been informed by [the borrower's] employer that in his opinion [bor-
rower] had the mentality of a five or six-year-old child, did not know what he
was doing, and should not be loaned the money or allowed to enter into the con-
tractual [loan] arrangement. Despite all of this, Coburn without further checking
or investigation, chose to proceed.
241 So. 2d at 804. Can it be said that the contract would have been enforceable had
the borrower been of sufficient mental capacity, but that his financial capacity was
known to lender to be inadequate to afford a reasonable probability of repayment
of the loan in full? Cf. First Progressive Bank v. Costanza, 427 So. 2d 594 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1983) (applying Civil Code article 1897 to seller's knowledge of buyer's finan-
cial problems).
462. See text at notes 90-92, supra.
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Both State v. ITM and Kugler v. Romain present numerous Civil
Code grounds for nonenforcement, including error, fraud, and general
bad faith."3 Although categorized for discussion purposes as a case
of unconscionability, Kugler is in fact a case brought under a state
consumer fraud statute.4 Within this context, Kugler says that a sale
at an exhorbitant price, especially in a low-income market, "raises a
strong inference of imposition.""5 Louisiana courts, as previously
discussed, tend to scrutinize cases involving a merchant and a layman
for facts upon which to raise an inference of fraud, the essence of
which is said to be unjust advantage. 6 Further support for the pro-
463. See text at notes 107-116, supra. Aside from the obvious inability of the seller
in Kugler to renounce the implied (Civil Code articles 2520, 2529, 2547, 2548) redhibi-
tion warranty, the contracts were not such that a Louisiana court, in good conscience,
could enforce them in any event. See, e.g., Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So.
529 (1936); Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926); Succession
of Gilmore, 285 La. 488, 102 So. 94 (1924); Lazarus v. McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 8
So. 253 (1890); Roberson v. Mars, 266 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Fell, 2 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941). Kugler v. Romain com-
pares nicely to Alexander Hamilton Inst. v. Hollis, 133 So. 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931),
in which the court declined to relieve the defendant from a "modern business course"
contract. The court found the contract to be plain and unambiguous, and no fraud
was proven. Defendant was not, however, within the Molaison-Carter category of disad-
vantaged buyers:
Defendant apparently thought he would be able to find in the course certain
matters of detail that would enable him to advance and to increase his knowledge
of the retail furniture business, the line engaged in by him, but this is not prac-
ticable. Those details can be acquired and mastered only by actual experience
in the business, and the only benefit that [one such as defendant can reasonably
assume] can be acquired from the study course is the broadening effects obtained
from studying general principles, as described in the course furnished by the plain-
tiff. Without a doubt, if the defendant had studied carefully and mastered all
the books and pamphlets sent to him by the plaintiff, he would have been better
fitted for any position in any retail mercantile business. There is no short cut
to knowledge or success in any line of business. In his zeal to make a sale. it
may be that the plaintiffs salesman overdrew the picture somewhat as to the
simplicity of the course of study and its direct application to defendant's business,
but we cannot say that in so doing he acted fraudulently.
133 So. at 459-60. Cf. Delta School of Business, Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Shropshire, 399
So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (school's representations as to placement was stu-
dent's principal motive).
State v. ITM lacks the educationally disadvantaged buyer, but in addition to the
rather obvious taint on consent of error and fraud, the contract, being of the "pyramid"
sale variety, is against good conscience and public policy, and it would be among the
article 1895 contra bonos mores obligations. See State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot In-
terplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624 (Iowa 1971); Twentieth Century Co. v. Quilling, 130
Wis. 318, 110 N.W. 174 (1907).
464. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-1 to 56:802 (West 1964).
465. 58 N.J. at 545, 279 A.2d at 653.
466. Cotton States Chem. Co. v. Larrison Enters., Inc., 342 So. 2d 1212 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1977); Altex Ready-Mixed Concrete Corp. v. Employees Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 308 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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position that a great disparity between price ind value necessitates
an inference of fraud in Louisiana can be found in the idea that a
merchant-purchaser cannot suppress the truth about the value of a
thing he purchases from a nonmerchant layman 67 and in the idea that
false bidding at an auction sale to enhance the price is fraud.'
Similarly, buyers who agree to refrain from bidding against each other
at an auction defraud the seller. 69 In fact, a buyer in Louisiana im-
pliedly represents his solvency. 71 In such situations, conversely, does
not the seller impliedly represent that his price is reasonably related
to value? No Louisiana decision has been found so holding, but in 1955,
the Louisiana Supreme Court found "startling" the knowledge that
a truck sold by defendant in July of 1948 as new for a price of $1,903
had been resold by defendant to plaintiff in January of 1949 for $2,320
"with no evidence disclosing the reason for such disparity in price. '
The Civil Code has relatively little to say about price. Civil Code
article 2464 treats the subject of price, but it does not ostensibly offer
for the buyer a mirror image of the lesion idea of articles 1864, 1867,
and 2222.472 Still, it is worth observing that the fourth clause of arti-
cle 2464 unambiguously states that the price "ought not to be out
of all proportion with the value of the thing," and although the exam-
ple offered therein of the one dollar price is directed toward
distinguishing a sale from a donation, one certainly could argue that
examples, like exceptions, ought not be permitted to swallow the rule.
In both Star Credit and Westerman, the buyer signed a contract
to purchase a home appliance valued at about $300 for a price of $900.
Although Louisiana courts apparently have not directly faced the
"price-value disparity" issue as yet, '73 when that issue does arise, any
467. Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Griffing v. Atkins,
1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
468. Baham v. Bach, 13 La. 287 (1839).
469. First Nat'l Bank v. Hebert, 162 La. 703, 111 So. 66 (1927); Chafee v. Meyer,
34 La. Ann. 1031 (1882).
470. Yeager Milling Co. v. Lawler, 39 La. Ann. 572, 2 So. 398 (1887).
471. Sunseri v. Westbank Motors, 228 La. 370, 378, 82 So. 2d 43, 46 (1955).
472. Louisiana Civil Code articles 1864, 1867, and 2222 permit rescission by a minor
for lesion; lesion is the "injury suffered by one who does not receive a full equivalent
for what he gives in a commutative contract." LA. CIv. CODE art. 1860. The lesion
idea has only narrow application to persons of full age. See LA. CIv. CODE arts.
1861-1863.
Article 2464 states that the price "ought not be out of all proportion with the value
of the thing" sold, but the context of article 2464 is that of serious prices, as opposed
to disguised donations. See note 485, infra.
473. Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), comes very close
on the facts to a price unconscionability case. In Smith v. Everett, real estate was
sold for about one-seventh of its value, with the seller, rather than the buyer, being
the victim. The decision nullified the act of sale on the ground of fraud, noting that
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past unwillingness of Louisiana's courts to focus on the price issue
should not foreclose attention to various plausible Civil Code grounds
on. which to premise nonenforceability of unconscionable price terms.
For example, because the seller in both Star Credit and Westerman
knew or should have known that the buyer had only limited financial
resources,474 the Molaison-Carter jurisprudence may apply. The courts
in Star Credit and Westerman declined to take that fork in the road,
and the decision in each case is properly placed in the "price uncons-
cionability" category. As such, there may be no Louisiana equivalent.
That is, if it be assumed that the consent of the buyer has not been
tainted with fraud or error, that the terms of the contract are not
ambiguous, that there has been no failure of the seller to explain
clearly the extent of his obligations, and that the disadvantage, if any,
as to education and experience is not so severe as to bring to bear
on the case the Molaison-Carter "inference of fraud" jurisprudence,
the Civil Code may not permit relief in the "pure" price uncons-
cionability case.475
While Louisiana courts frequently have said that "[c]ourts are not
created to relieve men of their bad bargains made,""47 such a state-
ment does not exist in a vacuum. Article 1901, the probable source
of the rule, has reference to "agreements legally entered into," '477 thus
raising, among other things, the public policy issues inherent in arti-
cle 1895. At least two situations are found in the jurisprudence which
"[hlad plaintiff known defendant was buying his property for a pittance of its real
value, he would not have consented to the contract." 291 So. 2d at 840. Cf. Community
Acceptance Corp. v. Kinchen, 417 So. 2d 22 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (price uncons-
cionability analogy applied to the financing of an automobile under the Louisiana Con-
sumers Credit Law, LA. R.S. 9:3551).
474. The buyers in Westerman qualified for welfare assistance subsequent to the
sale; the buyers in Star Credit were welfare recipients at the time of sale. Implicit
within eligibility for public assistance is low income level, which a reasonable, good
faith seller would have known. Cf. First Progressive Bank v. Castanza, 427 So. 2d
594 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (seller knew of buyer's financial problems and could not
enforce the sale); Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (homeowner's
financial status known to contractor).
475. See Fleming v. Sierra, 14 Orl. App. 168 (La. App. 1917); cf. E. Levy & Co.
v. Pierce, 40 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949) (allegation that price was contrary
to good morals). The Louisiana courts, of course, could resort to the gut reaction of
Heeb v. Codifier & Bonnabel: "The inequity, unreasonableness, and illegality of such
a . . . clause . . . is so obvious as to scarcely need citation of authority." 162 La. 139,
143, 110 So. 178, 179-180 (1926). The statement in Heeb was addressed to a penal clause,
but the underlying principle of lack of choice may be seen as justifying such a disposi-
tion. See Lazarus v. McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 8 So. 253 (1890).
476. Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511, 515, 50 So. 2d 15, 16 (1950).
477. In Fleming v. Sierra, 14 Orl. App. 168, 177 (La. App. 1917), for instance, the
court remarked, "[Nior is there any law authorizing an action on the bare allegation
of a purchaser that he paid an 'unconscionable' price for a thing." (emphasis added).
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suggest that consent in Star Credit and Westerman may not have
resulted from a free and deliberate exercise of the will; in short, er-
ror, fraud, violence, or threats are not the only defects in consent
deducible from article 1819. The first situation is represented by
Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc.,"8 in which a homeowner's agree-
ment to pay a broker's fee upon accepting a buyer's offer, regardless
of whether or not the sale was subsequently consummated, was unen-
forceable because it led to an absurd consequence. In two recent cases,
the notion that consent unfettered by error or fraud may be less than
free and deliberate has been discussed against a background of
standard-form contracts of adhesion. In both cases, the contract was
enforced, but an examination of the rationale in each illuminates the
viability of the Boisseau approach as a Louisiana equivalent of the
pure price unconscionability cases. In Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. Mecom,479 a commercial utilities customer signed a contract with
the utility company which, among other things, called for a minimum
monthly bill of $1,850 for five years, "and thereafter for similar periods
unless terminated by written notice given ... not ... less than three
(3) months prior to the expiration of the original term or any exten-
sion thereof." Although the customer was in no manner disadvantag-
ed and undoubtedly had legal assistance readily available,48 he failed
to give the notice of termination in 1972, and the contract automatical-
ly was extended to December 15, 1977. The customer quite clearly
had signed a contract of adhesion: if he did not accept all of the utili-
ty company's terms, he could not receive electrical power for his
business. He accordingly argued lack of a free and deliberate consent.
The argument did not carry the day: "Even were our courts to
recognize the power in themselves to disregard clauses in contracts
when one party had no power to negotiate terms, we believe that
such power should only be exercised in cases in which the clauses
in question are unduly burdensome or extremely harsh."8 ' It is perhaps
improper to suggest that a Louisiana court would classify a sale of
a refrigerator with a maximum retail value of $350, but a price of
$900,482 as "unduly burdensome or extremely harsh" merely because
the buyer had not the most remote resemblance to the successful en-
trepeneur in Mecom. Yet, such a buyer clearly has a stronger factual
base on which to present the Boisseau argument, and it also must
478. 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932). The case is discussed in text at notes 397-401,
supra.
479. 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
480. Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Mecom, 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1978) with Carter v. Foreman, 219 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
481. 357 So. 2d at 598. See text at notes 107-116, supra.
482. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Toker v. Westernman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
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be admitted that if price terms two and one-half or three times the
reasonable retail value are not "unduly burdensome or extremely
harsh," one may well be at a loss to bring to mind the better example.
The lack of a free and deliberate consent also was raised unsuc-
cessfully in Golz v. Children's Bureau, Inc.,88 in which the plaintiffs,
to their subsequent regret, had surrendered their child for adoption.
The plaintiffs categorized their act of surrender as a contract of adhe-
sion to which, because of disparate bargaining ability and the absence
of negotiation between attorneys for the respective parties, their con-
sent was not freely given. The facts of the case, however, indicate
that the plaintiffs were mature and literate persons who had been
subjected to no "pressure, undue influence or the like" by the defen-
dant; their act was not a rash, impulsive one, but came after a cooling-
off period of many months of "careful and apparent continued thought
and deliberation" and after a "trial" period during which the child
was actually surrendered; and the document they thereafter signed
was unambiguous in its expression of the finality of their act and was
carefully read and explained to them prior to signing. Two conclu-
sions spring immediately from Golz: (1) no court possibly could have
invalidated the act of surrender on the basis of lack of consent; and
(2) any resemblance between the case and Star Credit and Wester-
man exists solely in the most fertile imagination. Thus, neither Golz
nor Mecom stand as unyielding sentinels for the application of Boisseau
to the pure price unconscionability case.
Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co.48 4 presents the second
situation suggestive of the lack of free and deliberate consent approach
to price unconscionability. Certain minority shareholders of the
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company had sold to the corporation
shares of stock worth about $2,000 per share for prices ranging from
$350 to $400 per share. Although the case ultimately was decided on
the ground of fraud, the trial court offered both Civil Code articles
2464 and 1965 as alternative grounds for rescission. To the extent
that a gross inadequacy or disproportion of price versus value might
shift the burden of proof to the seller to show that the price was
the result of deliberate and intentional action by the parties, Mansfield
is probably correct in its interpretation. It may be doubted, however,
that article 2464 was intended to apply to the disproportionately higher
price.48
483. 326 So. 2d 865 (La. 1976).
484. 143 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. La. 1956), later op. ut 159 F.Supp. 104 (W.D. La. 1958).
485. See note 472, supra. In the earlier opinion, which granted a preliminary in-
junction, the court held that the price was "so . . . trifling, so out of proportion to
[the stock's] true value, that no fair-minded person could say it was 'serious.' Its in-
adequacy 'shocks the conscience'." 143 F. Supp. at 843.
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The Mansfield opinion, on the other hand, may have struck a Civil
Code chord resoundingly in holding that the buyer of stock had been
unjustly enriched within the meaning of article 1965 and ought to make
restitution. 8 Article 1965 has not received a great deal of judicial
attention in Louisiana, and it has not been a significant source of
judicial relief against harsh bargains. It is probable, also, that article
1965 by its terms and when read in its context does not have applica-
tion to either Mansfield or the true price unconscionability cases. '87
Yet, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in what could be termed a public
policy 88 decision, held that a given contract clause led to a result which
was wholly inequitable and violated the rule which is embodied in
article 1965 that one should not do unto others that which he would
Article 2464 usually is discussed against the background of the common law "pep-
percorn" consideration idea, i.e., the peppercorn would suffice as "consideration," but
it might fail the test of "serious consideration" under article 2464. See Murray v. Barn-
hart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906). Where no "price" is involved, article 2464 generally
is discussed within a context of "mutuality" of obligations. See Blanchard v. Haber,
163 La. 627, 112 So. 509 (1927). In short, while article 2464 appears in context to be
concerned with disguised donations and related matters, the language of the article
does admit of the price unconscionability construction of Mansfield. No other cases
tending to this construction have been found. However, in Haas v. Cerami, 201 La.
612, 10 So. 2d 61 (1942), the vendor's argument that the agreed price of $600 was
"out of all proportion with the value" of the interest in question was turned back
not because the theory was per se unsound, but because of the speculative nature
of the interest. And the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has suggested that
article 2464 is relevant to a case involving the sale of a thing (seed) having no value:
"[N]o real consent takes place because the seed, in such a case, are not an equivalent
for the price." Rapides Grocery Co. v. Clopton, 125 So. 325 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1929).
486. 143 F. Supp. at 843.
487. See, e.g., Miller v. Housing Auth., 149 La. 623, 190 So. 2d 75 (1966), on remand,
200 La. 704, 200 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Texas Co. v. State Mineral Bd.,
216 La. 742, 44 So. 2d 841 (1959); Miami Truck & Motor Leasing Co. v. Dairyman,
Inc., 263 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Chemical Cleaning, Inc. v. Brindell-Bruno,
Inc., 214 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968); cf Martinez v. Moll, 46 F. 724 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1891) (buyer purchased a plantation worth only two-thirds of the price he paid);
Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511, 50 So. 2d 15 (1950); J.H. Jenkins Contractor, Inc. v.
City of Denham Springs, 216 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). See generally Smith,
A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L.REv. 2 (1951).
488. Public policy decisions in Louisiana often are premised on article 1895. A per-
tinent example is Fassitt v. United T.V. Rental, Inc., 297 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974):
Public policy cannot condone the use in a sale or lease contract of a provision
irrevocably authorizing entry into a debtor's or lessee's home without judicial
authority or without the owner's consent at the time of entry. We decline to
construe [such a] provision, incorporated into a printed form contract as a necessary
condition of the agreement, as irrevocable permission to enter a private home
at any time, day or night, occupied or unoccupied, under any circumstances. Law





not wish others to do unto him and one should not enrich himself
at the expense of another.489
Whether or not exorbitant price terms are "unduly harsh,"
"absurd" in result, or violative of the "spirit" of article 1965, Loui-
siana courts have relieved parties in circumstances similar to those
of the buyers in Star Credit and Westerman and have done so with
the mere pronouncement that "it is against good conscience" to en-
force the bargain actually reached by the parties,"' The concurrence
of two equitable ideas which, if not traceable to articles 1945, 1965,
and the good faith portion of article 1901, are certainly of the spirit
of those articles, are thought to account for the several decisions which
employ the "in good conscience" standard. The first such decision is
found in Succession of Gilmore,4"1 in which an attorney's advice had
the effect of divesting a plaintiff of a one-half interest in the proper-
ty bequeathed to him under a will and vesting that interest in another
under a prior will. Plaintiff sought to set aside the judgment probating
the prior will. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not cite articles 1901,
1945, or 1965, and, indeed, the applicability of those articles may be
doubted. However, the court did grant relief:
The courts of this state will not hesitate to afford relief against
judgments . . ., when the circumstances ... show the deprivation
of legal rights . . ., and when the enforcement of the judgment
would be unconscientious and inequitable. Our courts will follow
the general principles of equity jurisprudence applied by the equity
courts of other states . . . in actions of this character. Courts of
equity will not permit one party to take advantage of and enjoy
the gains of ignorance . . . by the other, which he knew of and
did not correct, especially when a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship existed between them."'
If this writer has correctly perceived the message of Gilmore, relief
can be granted in Louisiana in the absence of fraud493 or of error as
to principal cause494 when the buyer is laboring under a mistaken
489. Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932). Article 1965
was offered by the court as an alternative ground for the invalidity of a broker's com-
mission clause. The court's remarks as to article 1965 are most likely to be seen as
dicta. Boisseau is discussed in text at notes 397-402, supra.
490. See Lazarus v. McGuirk, 42 La. Ann. 194, 8 So. 253 (1890); Standard Acc. Ins.
Co. v. Fell, 2 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); Roberson v. Maris, 266 So. 2d 488
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
491. 157 La. 130, 102 So. 94 (1924).
492. 157 La. at 133, 102 So. at 95 (citing 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
847-849, 956 (1918)).
493. Fraud was not alleged in Gilmore.
494. Succession of Molaison, discussed in text at notes 106-138, supra, may be an
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assumption as to value and the other party knows it. In such cir-
cumstances, a fiduciary type relationship can be said to exist,495 bring-
ing forth the duty to disclose the known facts.
When the fiduciary duty idea is combined with the rule of con-
struction, found in J. H. Jenkins Contractor v. City of Denham Springs,
that "the fact that an informed and experienced person does not usually
and customarily bind himself to unjust and unreasonable obligations,
is a serious factor that must be considered" '496 in construing an am-
biguous stipulation, the Boisseau-Mansfield idea clearly begins to
resemble that which forms the very backbone of the doctrine of un-
conscionable contracts: "one such as no man in his senses and not
under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and
fair man would accept on the other." '497 This very idea can be found
in Civil Code article 1934(4): "If the creditor . . ., at the time of making
[the contract] ...knew of any facts that must prevent or delay its
performance, and concealed them from the debtor, he is not entitled
to damages." A possible de facto application of this article is seen
in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Henry,499 in which the seller knew that
the buyer was a widow living on a pension. In short, the seller knew
that the woman could not afford an automobile priced at $3,593, plus
finance charges. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal found
a lack of consent: "It taxes our credulity to believe that a seventy
year old woman in her physical and economic condition would, without
some misrepresentation or fraud, proceed on her own to buy a new
automobile for slightly less than $3,600.00." 9 Henry did involve allega-
tions of misrepresentation and fraud not necessarily present in a pure
price unconscionability case. Still, Henry, along with the Molaison-
Carter cases, may have an important bearing on a very plausible in-
terpretation of article 1934(4), particularly since all three cases are
within the "failure to disclose" category. A creditor surely must be
held to know when, given the prospective debtor's circumstances, there
example. The court declined to apply the fraud label, and one might question whether
the plaintiff there was in error as to the principal cause. She obtained precisely what
she bargained for, although not realizing the value of what she gave up.
495. Cf. Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (in concealing
the property's true value, buyer obtained seller's consent through fraud); Griffing v.
Atkins, 1 So. 2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) (seller of ring did not know the true
value of the thing).
496. 216 So. 2d 549, 554-55. (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
497. Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 454, 274 A.2d 78, 80 (1970). See
text at note 402, supra. Cf. United Cos. Mortgage & Inv., Inc. v. Estate of McGee,
372 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979) (case remanded for proof under LA. R.S. 9:3551).
498. 221 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
499. Id. at 533.
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is no reasonable prospect of payment of the contemplated obligation."'
Such knowledge is expressly an unconscionable situation under the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code,5"' and it is implicitly so under the
UCC cases of Toker v. Westerman and Jones v. Star Credit. It may
be that article 1934(4) has always admitted such a possibility.
Price or value is perhaps only in rare cases the buyer's principal
motive, and a mistake as to value is usually not a ground for invali-
dity of the contract." 2 Yet, it would be ironic that a legal system
which permits rescission where the buyer purchases for $1,900 a 1971
Volkswagen automobile in the mistaken belief that it is a 1975 model.05
would give no relief for the buyer who, knowing that he was pur-
chasing a 1971 model, mistakenly paid the $1900 price of a 1975 model.
The primary feature which distinguishes the Civil Code from the com-
mon law is the duty of disclosure. This duty is found in articles 2474,
1832, and 2547 and elsewhere in the Code. The seller in Louisiana
is a fiduciary of sorts as to the qualities of the products he sells
because of his superiority of knowledge. If price unconscionability is
not soundly based on a particular Civil Code provision, it is soundly
premised in both the principles and spirit of the Civil Code.
Unconscionable Consequences of Default
The matter of substantive unconscionability also is raised in ten
cases which denied enforcement of stipulations regarding the conse-
quences of default by the buyer, lessee, or services consumer. In five
of the cases, Oldis v. Grosse-Rhode,5"4 Perkins v. Spencer,"5 King v.
American Academy of Dramatic Arts,"6 Educational Beneficial, Inc.
500. The duty of the more knowledgeable creditor to structure the obligation to
fit the known financial capabilities of the debtor-including a refusal to contract-
was explored by this writer in The Improvident Extension of Credit as Unconscionable
Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225 (1974). Professor Countryman further explored the
idea in a 1975 publication, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborn-
ing?, 27 ME. L. REV. 1 (1975).
By its terms, article 1934(4) would not apply to an obligation to pay merely money,
and its scope probably would not even encompass the related idea that a seller's
knowledge that a buyer will be incapable of obtaining substantial benefit from the thing
sold is also unconscionable. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE S 6.111(3)(b) (1969). Cf. LA.
CIv. CODE arts 1832, 2545. Compare Fite v. Miller, 196 La. 876, 200 So. 285 (1940) with
Henderson v. Leona Rice Milling Co., 160 La. 597, 107 So. 459 (1926).
501. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE S 6.111(3)(a).
502. See Citizens' Bank v. James, 26 La. Ann. 264 (La. 1874).
503. See Sunseri v. Westbank Motors, 228 La. 370, 82 So. 2d 43 (1955); Johnson
v. Heller, 33 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).
504. 35 Colo. App. 46, 528 P.2d 944 (1974).
505. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952).
506. 102 Misc. 2d 1111, 425 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
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v. Reynolds,"? and Lazan v. Huntington Town House, Inc., a stipulated
damages or "penal clause" was refused enforcement. In none of these
cases were procedural unconscionability elements found; thus the
ruling of unconscionability in each case addresses the default terms
themselves.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2117-2129 treat the subject of "obliga-
tions with penal clauses." In these articles, the penal clause, which
has been held to be the equivalent of the common law "liquidated
damages" clause,"9 is said to be a secondary obligation the purpose
of which is to enforce the performance of the primary obligation that
supports it.51 By such a penal clause, the parties fix the damages for
nonexecution or nonperformance5" by one or both of them. But if the
principal obligation itself suffers from an infirmity, any such infirmity
will infect the penal clause as well.512 As with any other stipulation,
the penal clause must be consented to."'5 When the creditor claims
the penalty, he cannot enforce the performance also, unless the penalty
was stipulated for the mere delay in performance." ' However, the
creditor may opt to sue for the execution of the principal obligation
in lieu of enforcing the penal clause.5 '
In Oldis and Perkins, the penal clause, if enforced, would have
507. 67 Misc. 2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
508. 69 Misc. 2d 1017, 332 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Dist. Ct. 1969), affd, 69 Misc. 2d 1019,
330 N.Y.S.2d 751 (App. Term. 1972).
509. Pennington v. Drews, 218 La. 258, 49 So. 2d 5 (1949).
510. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2117, 2118, 2119. Article 1934(5) is also relevant to the
penal clause.
511. McGloin v. Henderson, 6 La. 715, 720 (1834).
512. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2120. See Richmond v. Krushevski, 243 La. 777, 147 So.
2d 212 (1962) (when, by its terms, the principal obligation became null and void because
of the inability of the buyer to obtain financing, the penal clause likewise was rendered
null and void); J.G. Wagner Co. v. City of Monroe, 52 La. Ann. 2132, 28 So. 229 (1899)
(the city was not permitted to retain a construction project bidder's $2,500 deposit
pursuant to a penal clause where, at the time, the city itself lacked the power to
contract, thus giving the bidder a lawful excuse for its inexecution or nonperformance
of the principal obligation); cf. Hughes v. Breazeale, 240 La. 126, 121 So. 2d 510 (1960)
(raising the issue of nonperformance of the principal obligation because of an "irresistible
force").
513. See Roberson v. Maris, 266 So. 2d 488 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). Not all stipula-
tions that have the appearance of a penal clause necessarily will be so characterized
in the courts. See Reimann v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 191 La. 1079, 187 So.
30 (1939); Mossy Enters., Inc. v. Piggy-Bak Cartage Corp., 177 So. 2d 406 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965); cf. McCray v. Cole, 236 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 259
La. 646, 251 So. 2d 161 (1971) (treating a clause similar to that in Reimann as a penal
clause).
514. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2125; Barrow v. Bloom, 18 La. Ann. 276 (1866). An exam-
ple of a penal clause stipulated for mere delay is found in Pennington v. Drews, 218
La. 258, 49 So. 2d 5 (1949). See also McGloin v. Henderson, 6 La. 715, 720 (1834).
515. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2124.
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permitted the seller to retain as liquidated damages all payments made
by the defaulting purchaser toward the price, whether the payments
constituted 1 percent or 99 percent of the total price.51 In Oldis, the
clause would have meant a penalty of about one-third of the purchase
price of $75,000; in Perkins, the penalty amount was about one-fourth
of the purchase price of $10,500.
In cases such as Oldis and Perkins, the parties have not seized
upon a predetermined amount of money that will constitute the
liquidated damages. Such penal clauses have encountered rough sail-
ing in Louisiana almost from the beginning. In the first place, there
is a difference between damages stipulated for the breach of an obliga-
tion to simply pay money and damages stipulated for the breach of
an obligation to give a thing or perform an act: damages stipulated




Thus, the nonexecution of the purchaser's principal obligation to pay
the price is viewed differently from the nonexecution of the seller's
obligation to deliver and warrant. More to the point, however, is the
nature of the Civil Code penal clause: it is designed to both fix the
damages caused by nonperformance of the principal obligation and
act as a constraint to encourage performance of that obligation. 18 In
no way may the penal clause serve as a vehicle to recover punitive,
as opposed to compensatory, damages. In a long line of cases virtual-
ly identical to Oldis and Perkins, the courts of Louisiana have refused
to enforce clauses by which the seller was permitted to retain, as
a penalty for nonexecution, all payments made by the purchaser.5 9
516. The principal obligation in Oldis arose out of the sale of a corporation,, the
sole asset of which was a restaurant. The transaction in Perkins was the sale of a
dwelling. In neither case was unconscionability the sole ground for nonenforcement.
The common law jurisprudence would be hostile to any such method of "setting" the
amount of liquidated damages. See generally Note, Damages-Penal Clause-Liquidated
Damages, 25 TUL. L. REV. 407 (1951).
517. See Griffin v. His Creditors, 6 Rob. 216 (La. 1843); Mossy Enters. v. Piggy-Bak
Cartage Corp., 177 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Chauvin v. Theriot, 180 So.
847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938). But cf. Executive Car Leasing Co. v. Alodex Corp., 265
So. 2d 288 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), affid, 279 So. 2d 169 (La. 1973) (enforcing a clause
similar to that invalidated in Mossy).
518. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926); Morris Buick
Co. v. Ray, 43 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
519. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 143, 110 So. 178, 179-80 (1926)
("in its very nature the penalty is by way of compensation of the creditor for the
damages he sustains by the nonexecution of the principal obligation . . . . The in-
equity, unreasonableness, and illegality of such a penal clause as here sought to be
enforced is so obvious as to scarcely need citation of authority"); Thompson v. Bullock,
236 So. 2d 892, 898 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) ("such a penal clause is regarded as null
and void, since inequitable and unreasonable and an illegal attempt to recover punitive
rather than merely compensatory damages"); Rainey v. McCrocklin, 185 So. 705 (La.
App. Orl. 1939) (such stipulations "are void and unenforceable"); Chauvin v. Theriot,
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The invalidity of the penal clause does not prevent the aggrieved
party from proving his actual damages, but in general, the principal
obligation of the defaulting party is the payment of money, and the
damage in such a case in Louisiana is interest.2 However, when the
defaulting party has taken possession of the thing, the seller's damages
may be measured by the fair rental value of the thing for the period
of possession. The seller, therefore, is entitled to retain so much of
the payments made as reflects the fair rental value, apparently without
an express stipulation therefor. 2'
The agreement in Educational Beneficial bound the defendant to
pay a total of $2,400 for her daughter to take a course in computer
programming at a trade school. Under the agreement, a student who
enrolled in the course could attend any hours of the school session,
but in the event of withdrawal or discontinuance from the school, the
student was entitled to a refund equal to the difference between the
amount of net cash paid to the school and the "earned tuition." The
agreement defined "earned tuition" as consisting of a $600 nonrefund-
able enrollment fee, plus $7 per hour for all scheduled instructional
hours. The defendant's daughter dropped out of the course for per-
sonal reasons after some 129 hours of instruction (of the total 500
total hours in the course), with the result that the refund, as calculated
by the school, showed a balance owed to the school of $740.
Although the Educational Beneficial agreement was not altogether
free of procedural unconscionability elements," ' the court's holding
180 So. 847, 849 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938) (a provision by which all payments made
are to be forfeited upon default of the purchaser and the land is to be retained by
the seller was "in the nature of a penalty for the nonpayment of money, in excess
of the rate of interest allowed by law, and is therefore unwarranted, arbitrary,
unreasonable, and without consideration"); Victor v. Lewis, 157 So. 293 (La. App. Orl.
1934) (provision is against public policy and invalid). See also Subdivision Realty Co.
v. Woulfe, 135 So. 71 (La. App. Orl. 1931); Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace Co., 8 La. App.
422 (Orl. 1928).
520. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1935.
521. Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113 So. 2d 457 (1959); Louisiana Delta Farms Co.
v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So. 2d 213 (1942); Ekman v. Vallery, 185 La. 488, 169 So.
521 (1936). In Pruyn v. Gay, 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925), the parties had agreed
that all sums paid to the vendor would "be considered as rental" for the use of the
property. The court approved the stipulation, but the amount retainable pursuant to
the stipulation was limited to fair rental value. See Thompson v. Bullock, 236 So. 2d
892 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 256 La. 894, 240 So. 2d 231 (La. 1970); Brown
v. Weldon, 199 So. 620 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941). For any amounts paid beyond a fair
rental value, the vendor owed the defaulting purchaser an accounting. Pruyn v. Gay,
159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925); Dambly v. Burrell, 147 So. 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
Not all things sold have a rental value, however. See Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel,
162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926).
522. The plaintiff's apparent reason for existence was to hold the school's tuition
notes as a holder in due course. Plaintiff actually made no loans and, apparently, did
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is premised on the one-sided nature of the stipulation. Viewed as a
stipulated damage clause, the earned tuition formula (which included
the $600 "nonrefundable enrollment fee") seemed less a stipulation
related to any damages the school might incur than a punitive
damages stipulation, especially given that the student who attended
no classes was charged the same $600 fee as the student who attended
99 per cent of the classes. There being no ostensible relationship bet-
ween the figure of $600 and the expected damages, one might sug-
gest that such a penal clause in Louisiana would be viewed as akin
to the "retention of all payments" clause which is an impermissible
attempt to stipulate punitive damages.52 3 Such stipulations are not
routinely enforced in Louisiana, but where the parties agree to a figure
as a penal amount, the Louisiana courts typically do not second-guess
them, because a stipulation for $600 or for "five times the rent per
day" '524 is quite different from the stipulation for retention of all
payments, however many. In fact, there is no requirement that the
party seeking enforcement of the penal stipulation show any actual
damages, much less that there is a close relationship between the penal
amount and the actual damages.525 Thus, in general, the agreed sum
or agreed percentage of the total price as stipulated damages is readily
enforceable in Louisiana.526
It is also clear from the jurisprudence that the parties must have
made a good faith effort to reasonably estimate the probable loss that
a breach would cause. Unrealistic and unreasonable amounts often are
considered not to be good faith estimates of probable damages 27 or,
alternatively, are considered to be attempts to produce punitive
damages. 25 In some instances, such stipulations are likened to pro-
not otherwise acquire commercial paper. Moreover, the defendant's daughter was
marked "enrolled" as of a date two weeks in advance of the execution of the pro-
missory note for the tuition. The "earned tuition" thus reflected 24 hours of instruc-
tion that preceded her actual enrollment. The school apparently was also in the habit
of billing up to 100 hours of "allowable absences"; that fact was not apparent from
a reading of the contract and was not disclosed to the defendant or her daughter.
Based on the Molaison jurisprudence, discussed in text at notes 106-120, supra, a Loui-
siana court would no doubt look long and hard at the "agreement."
523. Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926); Thompson
v. Bullock, 236 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Chauvin v. Theriot, 180 So. 847
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
524. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Club De Peana, 242 F. 2d 730 (5th Cir. 1957);
Lama v. Manale, 218 La. 511, 50 So. 2d 15 (1950).
525. Morris Buick Co. v. Ray, 43 So. 2d 83 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
526. See, e.g., Ducuy v. Falgoust, 228 La. 533, 83 So. 2d 118 (1955); Sherer-Gulett
Co. v. Bennett, 153 La. 304, 95 So. 777 (1923); Warriner v. Marine, 68 So. 2d 786 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1953).
527. John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
528. Louisiana Delta Farms Co. v. Davis, 202 La. 445, 12 So. 2d 213 (1942); Heeb
v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 162 La. 139, 110 So. 178 (1926); John Jay Esthetic Salon,
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mises not supported by serious consideration.5"
Had there not been a "nonrefundable" amount in Educational
Beneficial, the stipulation certainly would have had a greater likelihood
of success in Louisiana.53 Had the school sought to retain a cash down
payment rather than to enforce the contract, there is a possibility
that the defaulting student would have been without a remedy in Loui-
siana, so long as the school stood ready to perform.51 A similar refund
procedure crops up in King v. American Academy of Dramatic Arts,
as to which the court remarked that to the extent the enrollment
agreement would permit the academy to both dismiss a student
without legal justification and also retain his payments, such would
be unconscionable.53 2 In fact, the refund procedure in the King con-
tract covered only a voluntary departure by the student (as in Educa-
tional Beneficial) and not a dismissal. The outcome of a dismissal case
generally depends on the firmness of the school's foundation for
dismissal. The King decision reasoned that the dismissal was without
just cause. Such a dismissal could be likened to a failure of perfor-
mance by a school; as such it would constitute a basis for refund.3
Lazan v. Huntington Town House, Inc., a case in which the lessee
of a party room defaulted, is quite similar to King in that there was
a stipulation for damages, but in neither case did the facts come within
that stipulation."4 In both cases, the court labeled the clause as "un-
conscionable" when, in fact, such was an unnecessary ruling. In both
King and Lazan, then, the true question is, in what circumstances
may one retain a deposit or payments in the absence of an applicable
penal clause? In the further absence of an agreement as to earnest
money or an option, the answer in Louisiana may be that such a
Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979); see also Monroe Sand & Gravel
Co. v. Sanders, 79 F. 2d 292 (5th Cir. 1935); Claude Neon Fed. Co. v. Angell, 153 So.
581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934). Compare Gauthier v. Magee, 141 So. 2d 837 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) with McCray v. Cole, 236 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
529. John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
530. See Federal Sign Sys. v. Leopold, 120 So. 898 (La. App. Or]. 1929).
531. Compare Penny v. Spencer Business College, Inc., 85 So. 2d 365 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1956) and Alexander Hamilton Inst. v. Hollis, 133 So. 458 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1931) with Richardson v. Cole, 173 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) and Delta School
of Business, Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Shropshire, 399 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
532. 102 Misc. 2d at 1113, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
533. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2046; Sciortino v. Leach, 242 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1970); cf. Guillot v. Spencer Business College, Inc., 267 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ refused, 263 La. 986, 270 So. 2d 122 (1972).
534. In King, the penal clause or liquidated damages clause did not expressly cover
a dismissal situation. In Lazan, the stipulation appeared in a "cancellation agreement"
offered to the lessee of a reception hall subsequently to the lessee's notice of his default
to the lessor, and it was not consented to by the lessee.
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deposit must be refunded as a payment of a thing not due. 35 The
creditor, however, would be entitled to prove his actual damages. Here,
a potentially important distinction between King and Lazan arises:
the specific party room leased in Lazan might be relet at no damage
and perhaps at a better rate for the lessor because of the breach;
the same reasoning does not apply to King in the absence of addi-
tional facts regarding maximum enrollment capacity, applicant waiting
lists, and the like.
With respect to the Lazan liquidated damages clause, 36 nonen-
forcement in Louisiana can be predicted, since, as the New York court
worried, the clause could be construed to mean that the defaulting
lessee would be liable for the stipulated amount if he simply held his
reception at another and perhaps vastly less elegant hall with but
a few close friends, even though the lessor had relet the original
room. " 7 In any event, such a stipulation could bring to the case the
"absurd consequences" idea of Civil Code article 1945.38
The remaining unconscionability cases concerning the consequences
of default involve, in essence, specific performance actions for the con-
tract price instituted by the creditor against the defaulting debtor.
Only one of these cases, Denkin v. Sterner,'5 involved a sale. The buyer
in Denkin agreed to purchase from the vendor certain equipment for
a total price of $35,500. The agreement of sale contained a stipulation
that in the event of default by the buyer, the seller would be entitled
to the full amount of the unpaid purchase price, together with interest,
costs, and attorney's fees. The buyer did breach the contract by a
letter "cancelling" the order prior to delivery of any of the equip-
ment. In one of the earliest reported UCC decisions, the Pennsylvania
court held the clause unenforceable as violative of UCC section 2-718 .50
535. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2133, 2302, 2303.
536. In the event the lessor did relet the room, the offer was to return the lessee's
downpayment, but in the event that the lessee made "other arrangements elsewhere
for their reception, the parties [agreed] that as liquidated damages the [lessor] [would]
be entitled to 50% of the total bill." 69 Misc. 2d at 1018, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
537. See Pennington v. Drews, 218 La. 250, 49 So. 2d 5 (1949); see cases collected
at note 519, supra.
538. See text at notes 387-437, supra.
539. 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 203 (1956).
540. By UCC S 2-718, damages for breach of a contract of sale may be liquidated
in the agreement, "but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." UCC
S 2-718(1) (1978). However, subsection (1) concludes by stating that "[a] term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty." Thus, Denkin is not an
unconscionability case, despite the courts use of that term. The opinion perhaps does
indicate that nonenforcement of the clause would have been the result even in the
absence of UCC S 2-718.
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Because a UCC seller's normal damages for a breach by the buyer
prior to delivery is the difference between the market price and the
unpaid contract price at the time and place for tender"1 and because
the seller has an "action for the price" in only limited circumstances, 2
a stipulation of the Denkin variety seems, by definition, to run afoul
of the "unreasonably large liquidated damages" prohibition of UCC
section 2-718.2'
There is reason to believe that the answer to Denkin stipulations
would be the same in Louisiana. For one thing, a stipulation which
would obviously yield a greater sum of money than would performance
by the purchaser will most likely be seen in Louisiana as an imper-
missible stipulation of punitive or noncompensatory damages. 44 In
Louisiana, the measure of the seller's damage in a buyer repudiation
case is virtually the same as that under the UCC: the difference bet-
ween the contract price and the market price of the goods at the
time of the breach."S Since that measure of damages presumably would
place a seller in the position that he would have enjoyed had the buyer
performed, it is analytically difficult to understand how a penal clause
calling for the seller to retain the thing and be entitled to its price
could ever be classified as a good faith and reasonable attempt to
set damages.
Further stimulus for the argument that the Denkin clause would
be unenforceable in Louisiana comes by way of the 1942 decision in
Mossy Motors v. McRedmond,46 a case .quite similar to Denkin in that
the buyer repudiated because he had subsequently found a better deal
elsewhere.47 The buyer, having found an automobile dealer who of-
541. UCC S 2-708(1) (1978). Subsection (2) of S 2-708 adds, however, that if the measure
of damages under subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position
as performance would have done, the measure of damages is the profit which the seller
would have made.
542. UCC S 2-709, comment 2 (1978) reveals that "[t]he action for the price is now
generally limited to those cases where resale of the goods is impracticable except
where the buyer has accepted the goods or where they have been destroyed after
risk of loss has passed to the buyer." Comment 3 adds: "[An action for the price
... can be sustained only after a 'reasonable effort to resell' the goods 'at a reasonable
price' has actually been made or where the circumstances 'reasonably indicate' that
such an effort will be unavailing."
543. See note 540, supra.
544. See cases cited in note 519, supra.
545. See Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J.B. Beaird Co., 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d
144 (1953); A.M. Cameron Co. v. Shaw's Dep't Store, 44 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1950); Cyrus W. Scott Mfg. Co. v. Stoma, 10 La. App. 469, 121 So. 335 (2d Cir. 1929).
546. 12 So. 2d 719 (La. App. Orl. 1943) (on rehearing), affg on other grounds, 11
So. 2d 279 (La. App. Orl. 1942) (original opinion).
547. The decision in -A.M. Cameron Co. v. Shaw's Dep't Store, 44 So. 2d 192 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1950), is likewise similar to Denkin v. Sterner.
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fered a better bargain, repudiated the contract with Mossy Motors.
Mossy's suit for its lost profit on the contract was unsuccessful. 44
Because the major premise of the award of damages under Civil Code
article 1934 is that "damages" are the amount of the loss the creditor
has sustained by virtue of the breach or the amount of the gain of
which he has been deprived,549 the price typically would not be the
equivalent of "damages," although arguably "profit" would. This be-
ing the case, the Denkin stipulation would appear to be punitive in
nature."'0
In two cases, Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto55' and Fairfield
Lease Corp. v. Pratt,552 stipulations in a contract for the lease of a
coffee vending machine were refused enforcement as unconscionable
because the lessor would have been given the right to repossess and
accelerate and recover all unaccrued and unearned rent. In Louisiana,
the lessor is entitled to take only one of two alternative courses of
action upon breach of the lease by the lessee: he may elect to ter-
minate the lease or he may elect to enforce it-he cannot do both. 53
If he elects to terminate or dissolve the lease,5" the lessor is entitled
to regain possession of the thing or of the premises555 and he is entitl-
ed to any accrued and unpaid rent. If the lessor elects to enforce the
lease, he may demand payment of all future rentals,"' but he is not
entitled to retake or disturb the lessee's right of possession or use
548. The Mossy Motors case on original hearing is discussed and criticized in Note,
Damages-Breach of Contract-Lost Profits-Article 1934 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870, 17 TUL. L. REV. 658 (1943). The opinion of Mossy Motors on rehearing is com-
mended in Note, Sales-Breach of Contract by Vendee-Right of Vendor to Resell-Effect
of Resale on Damages, 17 TUL. L. REV. 673 (1943). "Profit," of course, must be
distinguished from the difference between the contract price and the market price.
549. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(3).
550. Cf. Pennington v. Drews, 218 La. 258, 49 So. 2d 5 (1950) (a penal clause calling
for $25 for each day that defendant refused or delayed a work call did not apply in
the absence of a showing that plaintiff had specific work for defendant at the time
of the refusal by defendant).
551. 7 UCC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1181 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
552. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537, 278 A.2d 154 (1971).
553. See, e.g., Weil v. Segura, 178 La. 421, 151 So. 639 (1933); United States Leasing
Corp. v. Keiler, 290 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Mid-Continent Refrig. Co.
v. Williams, 285 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Clay-Dutton, Inc. v. Coleman, 219
So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
554. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2729.
555. The Louisiana Civil Code makes no distinction between leases of movable prop-
erty and leases of immovable property. But see LA. R.S. 9:3261-9:3271 (Supp. 1974).
556. Where the lessee abandons the leased premises, the entire amount of rent
is matured. See Sliman v. Fish, 177 La. 38, 147 So. 493 (1933). The lessor is under




during the unexpired term of the lease.557 In short, the defaulting
and dispossessed lessee is liable only for the rent accrued and unpaid
as of the time of repossession; the lessor may not stipulate to the
contrary.5
Although the Louisiana Civil Code does not distinguish between
leases of movable property and leases of immovable property, the Loui-
siana Revised Statutes do contain provisions pertinent to the lease
of movables.5 ' However, while the ancillary law merely codifies the
jurisprudence as to the lessor's basic option to enforce or cancel the
lease on default by the lessee, the lessor can cancel the lease and
seek damages, including liquidated damages, under the statute.M Even
so, the court may not award unreasonable liquidated damages.561 In
Ouachita Equipment Rental Co. v. Baker Brush Co., 2 a clause for li-
quidated damages similar to that in the Fairfield Lease cases51 was
found to be unenforceable as written in that it provided for an
unreasonable amount of liquidated damages.' It is clear that the Fair-
field Lease cases would not be enforceable in Louisiana.
557. The lessor may relet without impairing his recourse against the lessee, but
the lessee is entitled to a credit for the rent received thereby. Weil v. Segura, 178
La. 421, 151 So. 639 (1933); Bernstein v. Bauman, 170 La. 378, 127 So. 874 (1930). In
fact, the lessee's right to possession is a right that may be seized and sold by his
judgment creditors. Hollier v. Boustany, 180 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
558. United States Leasing Corp. v. Keiler, 290 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974)
(lease of a photocopier); Mid-Continent Refrig. Co. v. Williams, 285 So. 2d 247 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973) (lease of refrigeration units); Clay-Dutton, Inc. v. Coleman, 219 So.
2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969) (lease of an automobile); Bill Garrett Leasing, Inc. v.
General Lumber & Supply Co., 164 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 246
La. 595, 165 So. 2d 485 (1964) (lease of a truck).
559. LA. R.S. 9:3261-9:3271 (Supp. 1974).
560. LA. R.S. 9:3261, 9:3267; Ouachita Equip. Rental Co. v. Baker Brush Co., 388
So. 2d 477 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
561. LA. R.S. 9:3267.
562. 388 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
563. In both the Fairfield Lease cases and Ouachita Equipment Rental, the lessor,
by the stipulation, could repossess and accelerate and recover, as liquidated damages,
the entire unpaid future rent.
564. Penal clauses have been enforced against defaulting lessees in Louisiana. In
Sherer-Gillett Co. v. Bennett, 153 La. 304, 95 So. 777 (1923), the lease of a store counter
contained a stipulation for damages of 40 percent of the total rent, plus attorney's
fees and court costs, in the event of breach by the lessee in refusing to accept delivery.
Important to the court was the fact that "[oInce the counter had been delivered and
accepted and the price had become collectable, the contingency which made the pre-
sent claim for damages possible would have passed out and been extinguished." 153
La. at 310, 95 So. at 779. In short, the 40 percent figure apparently covered the expenses
incurred in obtaining the contract and the profit margin it represented.
In Leon v. Dupre, 144 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), a tavern owner had agreed
that if he should require the lessor of a music box to remove it from the tavern at
any time, the sum of $190 would be paid to the lessor. After having the thing only
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It is likewise clear that Bogatz v. Case Catering Corp.,"' involving
the lease of a party room breached by the lessee four months prior
to the rental date, simply would raise the same basic issues as the
Fairfield Lease cases, so that the "full amount due" clause could only
be imposed in the event that the lessor elected to enforce the lease,
rather than cancel it. 6 In Nu Dimensions Figure Salons v. Becerra,6 7
however, is found a case for which there may be no Louisiana Civil
Code equivalent. The defendant had signed a contract form for a pro-
gram of 190 one-half hour weight-reducing sessions over a twelve
ten days, the tavern owner ordered the lessor to remove it. The trial judge gave the
lessor a judgment for only $50. This judgment, so obviously compatible with LA. R.S.
9:3267 (Supp. 1974), was affirmed by the court of appeal. But, in Tac Amusement Co.
v. Henry, 238 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), the lessee of a music box who breached
the lease seven weeks into the ten-year term was relieved of liability for liquidated
damages that would have equaled $20,430, based on the lessor's weekly share of the
proceeds of the music box multiplied by the remaining weeks in the term. The court
of appeal characterized such liquidated damages as being so far in excess of anticipated
actual damages and profit and so far out of proportion to the lessor's rather indefinite
obligations as to be a punitive damages stipulation and, thus, invoked Civil Code arti-
cle 2464's serious and proportionate consideration requirement.
565. 86 Misc. 2d 1052, 383 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Civ. Ct. 1976). See text at notes 351-357,
supra.
566. A number of alternative approaches to nonenforcement appear to apply to
Bogatz. The liquidated damages provision was in small print, without any legend or
attention-drawing device; for this reason, the case previously was treated as one of
procedural unconscionability. See text at notes 351-357, supra. The subject matter of
the contract was a wedding party, a party that became a moot issue when the wedding
was cancelled four months in advance of the rental date. The contract was seemingly
premised, therefore, on the assumption of fact by both lessor and lessee that the wed-
ding would take place-an error in fact. See text at notes 29-66, supra. Equally plausi-
ble is the argument that in Bogatz there is a contract without a cause. LA. CIv. CODE
art. 1893 provides that "[an obligation without a cause ... can have no effect." Arti-
cle 1897 explains that the obligation is without a cause "when the consideration for
making it was something which, in the contemplation of the parties, was thereafter
expected to exist or take place, and which did not take place or exist." As an example
of the principle, article 1897 offers the gift in consideration of a future marriage if
the marriage does not take place. Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1827 ("A promise to give
a certain sum to bear the expenses of a marriage, which the party supposes to have
taken place, is not obligatory, if there be no marriage."). See also Roy v. Florane, 239
La. 749, 119 So. 2d 849 (1960) (gifts in contemplation of marriage); Ricketts v. Duble,
177 So. 838 (La. App. Orl. 1938) (same); Wardlaw v. Conrad, 18 La. App. 387, 137 So.
603 (2d Cir. 1931) (engagement ring); Decuers v. Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361, 120 So.
388 (Orl. 1929) (engagement presents). Perhaps the Louisiana case most reminiscent
of Bogatz in this regard is McCormick v. Monette, 1 La. App. 186 (1st Cir. 1924). McCor-
mick loaned (or donated) to Monette $500 to aid him in purchasing an automobile.
At the time of the transaction, Monette was engaged to McCormick's daughter, but
the daughter ultimately married another. Even accepting Monette's characterization
of the transaction as a donation, said the court, it was a donation made on contempla-
tion of a future marriage which did not take place and was void as without a cause
under Civil Code article 1897.
567. 73 Misc. 2d 140, 340 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
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month period, at a cost of $300 payable in ten successive monthly
paymefits of $30. The contract stipulated that the $300 "shall be paid
whether or not buyer avails herself of the sessions purchased" and
that the sessions were not "transferable, refundable, or cancellable."
Defendant did "cancel" the contract shortly after signing it. The New
York court treated the $300 sought by the salon as presenting the
"liquidated damages versus penalty clause" issue. To enforce such an
unconscionable 8 clause, per the New York court, would have placed
the salon in a better position after the breach than it would have
been in had the defendant performed fully. This made the clause an
unreasonable one, calling for liquidated damages disportionate to the
probable damages that the salon might actually incur. In short, the
clause provided for punitive rather than compensatory damages.
In Louisiana, a contract of the Nu Dimensions variety, stripped
of all elements of procedural unconscionability, may be enforceable
whether or not the action for the total payments is deemed a penal
clause. 9 Viewing the contract as the equivalent of a lease of the salon's
space and equipment, the lessor clearly can elect to hold the member-
ship rights open for the defaulting lessee and collect the $300."'0
However, viewed in the light of penal clauses in the sales of movable
property, the seller perhaps would be less likely to prevail.571 But con-
tracts for personal services are neither leases nor sales. Perhaps for
this reason, the courts of Louisiana have not devised a sound approach
for the problem.
In Tac Amusement Co. v. Henry,572 a case involving, in essence,
the same stipulation as in Nu Dimensions, the Louisiana Fourth Cir-
568. The court expressly did not decide the case on the ground of unconscionability.
73 Misc. 2d at 143, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
569. There was testimony in the case of high pressure sales tactics and misrepresen-
tations regarding the right to cancel. Moreover, the salon manager allegedly told the
defendant that she could discontinue the sessions at any time; this directly conflicted
with the "not cancellable" language in the contract. 73 Misc. 2d at 141 & 144, 340
N.Y.S.2d at 270 & 273. Compare Delta School of Business, Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Shrop-
shire, 399 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (error as to principal motive), Sciortino
v. Leach, 242 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (school's nonperformance was a "failure
of consideration"), and Richardson v. Cole, 173 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) (rescis-
sion of a contract for dancing instruction, based on plaintiff's subsequent physical dis-
ability) with Guillot v. Spencer Business College, Inc., 267 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 263 La. 986, 270 So. 2d 122 (La. 1972); Penny v. Spencer Business
College, Inc., 85 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956), and Alexander Hamilton Inst. v.
Hollis, 16 La. App. 448, 133 So. 458 (2d Cir. 1931) (all denying recovery of tuition or
allowing avoidance of payment thereof).
570. As a lease of movable property, the salon contract would come under LA.
R.S. 9:3261.
571. See text at notes 544-550, supra.
572. 238 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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cuit Court of Appeal denied enforcement on a basis similar to that
of Nu Dimensions: the stipulation called for an amount57 "far in ex-
cess of conceivable actual damages." ' In other words, the Louisiana
court seemed to believe, as did the New York court, that a "full price"
stipulation for breach in such a case inevitably benefits the lessor
or services contractor more than would performance, thereby render-
ing it a punitive damages clause. But five years after Tac, in Dennis
Miller Pest Controls, Inc. v. Wells,575" the fourth circuit addressed the
same issue in a case almost identical to Nu Dimensions and enforced
the contract against a defaulting contractant-ruling that enforcement
of the contract would not be "unconscionable." ' Two of the five judges
dissented, being of the view that there was "no authority for the pro-
position that [the pest control company] is entitled to collect the full
amount of his contract while at the same time he will perform no
obligations for a full nine out of the twelve months" 5' and that Tac
permitted a recovery based on anticipated profits, not on the gross
amount. The majority pointedly disagreed: "It cannot validly be main-
tained that plaintiff is only entitled to the loss of the profit it would
have derived from the contract had it not been breached in view of
the mutually agreed upon provisions stipulating the amount to be
awarded in the event of such an occurrence.""57
Recent decisions tend to indicate that the enforceability of clauses
of the Nu Dimensions variety may depend on the commercial-consumer
distinction drawn by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana Na-
tional Leasing Corp. v. ADF Service, Inc." In Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Mecom,85 for example, a commercial utilities subscriber was
forced to pay $45,362 for utility services he did not need or consume,
under a contract not dissimilar to that found in Dennis Miller. In the
most recent penal clause case in Louisiana, Ball Marketing Inc. v.
Sooner Refining Co.,581 the court enforced a penal clause providing for
a total amount of $3.9 million in damages, yet the court also conceded
that Louisiana courts more closely scrutinize the harshness of penal
clauses imposed by a party with "vastly superior bargaining power."' 2
573. The Tac contract concerned the leasing of coin operated music and amuse-
ment devices for the breach of which by the lessee, the lessor was entitled to liquidated
damages in a sum equal to the lessor's average weekly share of the coin boxes prior
to breach multiplied by the number of weeks remaining in the ten-year term.
574. 238 So. 2d at 399.
575. 320 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ denied, 323 So. 2d 806 (La. 1976).
576. 320 So. 2d at 595.
577. Id. at 596.
578. Id. at 594.
579. 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979). See text at notes 344-347, supra.
580. 357 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
581. 422 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
582. Id. at 586.
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In Ball Marketing, the relative bargaining power of the parties was
not found to be "vastly" disparate and they had negotiated their agree-
ment. In Mecom, the utility company no doubt held a vast upper hand
and a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract of adhesion was perhaps thrust upon
the utility customer, but only the consequences of the contract were
harsh-the actual terms were not. 83 By contrast, penal clauses have
been considerably less successful when imposed upon a layman-
consumer, as in Nu Dimensions, by a party having vastly superior
bargaining power.584
In Allen v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,585 a clear exclusion of
damages in a "yellow pages" listing contract was held unconscionable,
permitting the disappointed advertiser to sue the telephone company
for damages resulting from the omission of his advertisement in the
telephone company's 1963 yellow pages. Allen, however, is the minority
view on the issue,586 although prior decisions to the contrary did not
apply the principle of unconsionability. In Wille v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 7 the Kansas Supreme Court did apply unconscionability
to the same telephone company exclusion language, and it held that
the exclusion was valid. 88 Unlike the good faith seller, the services
583. Mecom could have avoided the problem by simply giving a timely notice of
termination. See 357 So. 2d at 597.
584. See John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1979); Community Constr. Co. v. Governale, 211 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1968) (construing a stipulated damages clause adversely to pest control company);
Gauthier v. Magee, 141 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); cf. Short v. Mossy Motors,
Inc., 354 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (ruling that the purchaser's "cash deposit
may be retained as liquidated damages" clause did not apply to a $900 payment by
a purchaser who subsequently failed to complete the sale); Richardson v. Cole, 173
So. 2d 336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965) (consumer permitted to rescind the unearned por-
tion of a contract for dancing lessons on the basis of "equitable considerations," i.e.,
her subsequent physical disability). But cf. Tubbs v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
349 So. 2d 994 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (enforcing the contract against a customer who
failed to notify the utility company that he no longer resided at the subject premises);
Young v. Carr, 140 So. 2d 796 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (enforcing a "20% of the con-
tract price" liquidated damages clause).
585. 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d 689 (1969), later op. at 61 Mich. App. 62, 232
N.W.2d 302 (1975).
586. The Allen opinion lists several cases upholding the exclusion clause. 18 Mich.
App. at 635 n.1, 171 N.W.2d at 691 n.1. See also Annot., A.L.R.2d 917 (1963).
587. 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976).
588. The primary expressed difference between Allen and Wille is the matter of
the availability of reasonable advertising alternatives for the advertiser; the Allen court
found that yellow pages advertising is unique and that no such reasonable alternatives
exist, while the Wille opinion holds that numerous alternative forms of advertising
exist. Important to the Allen opinion was the "common knowledge" that yellow pages
listings are the "only directory of classified telephone listings freely distributed to
all the telephone subscribers in the Flint [Michigan] area." 18 Mich. App. at 639-40,
171 N.W.2d at 693. In view of the legally sanctioned status of the clause in question
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contractor in Louisiana is liable for damages upon breach of his
contract,589 but as in other contractual settings, a clear and unam-
biguous limitation of damages will be upheld.9 ° Louisiana courts pro-
bably would follow their own precedents59' on the Allen issue and side
with Wille, even if unconscionability was an available tool for Loui-
siana courts. A disinclination to follow Allen is particularly likely by
virtue of the recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Loui-
siana National Leasing Corp. v. ADF Service, Inc. 9'
CONCLUSION
Appendix Table 1 summarizes a principal conclusion of the pro-
ject which culminates in this article: The outcome of virtually all of
and the lack of "procedural" factors such as deception, the case can only stand for
the proposition that purchasers who sign contracts of adhesion in order to secure goods
or services not available elsewhere on better terms will not be presumed to have
given their consent freely and deliberately to one-sided terms unreasonably favorable
to the other and more powerful party. As such, the case exemplifies the reference
in UCC 5 2-302, comment 1 to "oppression."
589. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(3). In several cases, damages have been awarded
for the failure to include the plaintiff's listing in the "white" pages, the "yellow" pages,
or both. Falcon v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 327 So. 2d 631 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 332 So. 2d 281 (La. 1976); Levy v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 So. 2d
371 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Loridans v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 So. 2d
323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Mayeux, Bennett, Hingle Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 148 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 244 La. 131, 150
So. 2d 589 (1963); Scheinuk The Florist, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 128 So.
2d 683 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
590. In Wilson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 194 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967), a clause in the listing agreement limited the telephone company's liability for
error or omissions to a refund of the charges for the advertisement. The clause was
upheld where the plaintiff's advertisement was erroneously listed, but the court did
not clearly extend its holding to the case of an advertisement that was omitted.
However, in Marino v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 376 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1979), a similar clause was held valid in an omission case. Cf. South Cent. Bell Tel.
Co. v. McKay, 285 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (upholding a clause by which
telephone company could refuse certain listings).
Any limitation clause, of course, would have to be free of ambiguity, for any am-
biguity would be construed under Civil Code article 1958 favorably to the advertiser.
See Meyer v. Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co., 16 La. App. 472, 133 So. 504 (2d Cir.
1931). To the extent negligence can be shown, the exclusion clause can be avoided.
This occurred in Bunch v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 356 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1978), in which the telephone company did list the plaintiff's business name cor-
rectly in fulfillment of the listing agreement, but it also inadvertently listed the phone
number of plaintiff's competitor's business as that of plaintiff's business immediately
above that of the plaintiffs correct listing. The exclusion clause was held inapplicable.
However, where the allegations of negligence are merely "restatements of the breach
of the contract," the exclusion clause will apply, as in Marino. 376 So. 2d at 1312.
See also Hennessy v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 382 So. 2d 1044 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
591. See cases cited in note 590, supra.
592. 377 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979). See text at notes 259-260, supra.
UNCONSCIONABILITY
the unconscionable contracts cases nation-wide could have been
duplicated in Louisiana without either UCC section 2-302 or its
underlying common law inherent judicial power idea. When all is said
and done, however, one realizes that to ask whether Louisiana Civil
Code equivalents can be found so that the UCC section 2-302 cases
could be decided the same in Louisiana is to show a bias in one's
assumptions. The question, just as legitimately, could be posed inverse-
ly: Would the adoption of UCC section 2-302 permit Louisiana courts
to continue to handle unfair contract cases as successfully as does
the Civil Code? The fact that this work suggests that the absence
in Louisiana of section 2-302 is not particularly significant is not to
be taken as a strong reason to omit section 2-302 or the entirety of
UCC article 2. Certainly, one now cannot argue that section 2-302
would mean an end of the general norm that contracts are enforceable,
because the section would bring to Louisiana nothing not already in-
digenous. Furthermore, while a few states account for several of the
unconscionability cases, some states have contributed none of the
decisons, despite having had section 2-302 for at least fifteen years.
Unconscionability has not turned the world of contracts upside down,
nor is it likely to do so in the future.
The Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana judiciary must be
given extremely high marks in the area of unfair contracts. The flex-
ibility demonstrated herein regarding the Louisiana legal system is
the result of a partnership of sorts. The Civil Code itself has great
concern for the contract formation process and for those situations
in which there is a wide disparity in bargaining position or power
between contractants. For its part, the Louisiana judiciary, sometimes
following the lead of the Louisiana Supreme Court (and sometimes
not), has been willing to give the evolution of the law a "nudge" from
time to time so that a body of law of nineteenth century origin (and
in a real sense, of much earlier origin) can continue to serve the
citizens well, even though the system of production, marketing, and
contracting has changed greatly over the years.
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